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ecosystem and environment where it influences and is influenced by other firms.
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incorporate the following round of innovations. Ecosystems are often formed around
platforms on which products and complements are built, and platforms may also
facilitate transactions between distinct groups of users in a two or multi-sided market.
In this study, established theoretical concepts have been brought together to
analyze the success factors of mobile business ecosystems in a holistic manner. Addi-
tionally, the impact of the historical legacy and path-dependent evolution of a firm’s
previous business activities, capabilities, and assets on decisions the firm has made in
its ecosystem and platform strategies is studied, and a novel theoretical concept, ‘angle
of entry’, is recognized. Through a qualitative multiple case study of three leading
companies in the smartphone business and their respective business ecosystems, eight
common success factors are identified that have contributed to the disruption of the
smartphone business by these three new entrants from the IT world, replacing the
incumbents. Based on the results, it can be stated that all three leading ecosystems
utilize, at least to a certain extent, closed source code to protect their differentiating
or otherwise significantly value-adding software components. Similarly, the product
platforms of all three ecosystems offer sufficiently open application programming
interfaces so that device manufacturers, accessory makers, and developers are able to
create products and apps with meaningful differentiation.
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Verkostoituneessa taloudessa tai liiketoimintaekosysteemeissä toimivien yritysten
arvonluonti saattaa olla hyvinkin riippuvaista suhteista muihin yrityksiin, mikä on
lisännyt erityisesti strategisen ja tuotteisiin liittyvän päätöksenteon kompleksisuutta
huomattavasti. Järjestelmäajattelussa yritys nähdään osana laajempaa taloudellista
ekosysteemiä ja ympäristöä, jossa se vaikuttaa muihin yrityksiin ja on samalla ym-
päristönsä vaikutuksen kohteena. Liiketoimintaekosysteemissä yritykset kehittävät
yhdessä kyvykkyyksiään innovaatioiden ympärillä tehden yhteistyötä ja kilpaillen
samalla tukeakseen uusia tuotteita, tyydyttääkseen asiakkaita ja ottaakseen käyttöön
uusia innovaatioita. Ekosysteemeitä muodostuu usein tuotealustojen ympärille, ja
lisäksi alustat voivat välittää transaktioita erillisten käyttäjäryhmien välillä nk. kaksi-
tai useampipuolisessa markkinassa.
Tässä tutkimuksessa on yhdistetty tunnettuja teoreettisia käsitteitä mobiilialan
liiketoimintaekosysteemien menestystekijöiden analysoimiseksi kokonaisvaltaisesti.
Lisäksi on tutkittu yrityksen historian ja sen toimintojen, kyvykkyyksien ja resurssien
polkuriippuvaisen evoluution vaikutuksia sen päätöksiin ekosysteemi- ja tuotealusta-
strategioissa. Tämän tuloksena on tunnistettu uusi teoriakäsite, ‘tulokulma’. Kolmesta
johtavasta älypuhelinliiketoiminnan yrityksestä ja näiden kunkin ekosysteemistä teh-
dyn kvalitatiivisen monitapaustutkimuksen perusteella työssä tunnistetaan kahdeksan
yhteistä menestystekijää, jotka ovat auttaneet näitä IT-maailmasta tulleita tulokasyri-
tyksiä mullistamaan älypuhelinliiketoiminnan syrjäyttäen alan vanhat johtoyritykset.
Tulosten perusteella voidaan todeta, että kaikki kolme johtavaa ekosysteemiä hyö-
dyntävät ainakin jossain määrin suljettua lähdekoodia suojatakseen erilaistamista tai
muuten merkittävää lisäarvoa tuottavia ohjelmistokomponenttejaan. Samoin kaikkien
kolmen ekosysteemin tuotealustat tarjoavat riittävästi avoimia sovellusrajapintoja,
jotta laitevalmistajat ja sovelluskehittäjät pystyvät luomaan tarpeeksi erilaistettuja
tuotteita ja sovelluksia.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
In the beginning of the 1990s, few companies or individuals could foresee the
vast proliferation of personal wireless communications and the impact it would
have on the lives of people in the decades that would follow. Indeed, mobile
phones have become so pervasive that the total number of mobile subscriptions
globally is expected to hit nearly 7 billion by end of 2014, according to the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU, 2014). This would imply an
average penetration rate of well over 90%, although there are still significant
regional differences with the lowest penetration rates in Africa (69% by end of
2014) and Asia and the Pacific (89% by end of 2014). These regions are also
the fastest growing ones, as other regions such as the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States (CIS), Arab States, the Americas, and Europe have reached
over 100% penetration, and due to the effects of saturation, are expected to
grow at less than 2% during 2014.
While the increase in mobile phone penetration continues to drive growth in
Africa and other emerging markets mainly in Asia, most other countries have
already reached or are close to reaching saturation levels, which means they
have transitioned to replacement sales markets. In developed and developing
countries alike, the growth of the mobile handset market is increasingly driven
by a major transition and paradigm shift — the transition to smartphones or in
general terms, mobile devices with advanced computing capabilities, making
use of mobile broadband subscriptions that enable quick access to Internet-
based services and online content. According to ITU (2014), mobile broad-
band penetration levels are highest in Europe (64%) and the Americas (59%),
followed by CIS (49%), with the Arab States (25%), Asia-Pacific (23%), and
Africa (19%) trailing significantly. Globally, ITU expects mobile broadband
subscriptions to reach 2.3 billion by end of 2014, corresponding to a pene-
1
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tration rate of 32% (ITU, 2014). Clearly, the transition to smartphones will
drive revenue both from device replacement sales as well as from subscription
upgrades to mobile broadband.
To illustrate the proportions that this relatively new product category has
reached, an estimated 988 million smartphones were sold globally in 2013,
representing a 44% increase on 2012, according to Canalys (2014). For com-
parison, only 316 million personal computers (PCs), including laptops, mini-
notebooks, and desktops but excluding media tablets (pads) incapable of run-
ning Windows 8, were sold in 2013 according to Gartner (2014a), 10% fewer
than in 2012. The shrinking of the PC market can be attributed to the rapidly
growing popularity of the tablet category, the global sales of which reached
195.4 million units in 2013, marking a 68 percent increase on 2012, accord-
ing to Gartner (2014b). If we consider the fact that more than 97% of the
tablets sold (namely, Apple’s iPads and Android-based tablets from Samsung
and other manufacturers) actually have more in common with smartphones
than traditional PCs due to running operating systems originating from the
smartphone world, we can appreciate just how big and rapidly growing the
smart device business really is.
In the rest of the section, the history of smartphones from their inception to
the present day is briefly reviewed, highlighting key events that have shaped
the business landscape. It should be noted that the history piece also reflects
the author’s personal views and experiences, having worked on the forefront
of mobile communications and smartphone development from 2004 onward,
except where explicit references are used. Also, in Section 1.1.2, it is discussed
why business ecosystems matter in the smartphone business. The interested
reader is encouraged to read on, although the objectives of the study at hand,
presented in Section 1.2, can well be understood without this background
information.
1.1.1 Brief History of Smartphones
How Smartphones Came to Be
Smartphones as a product category and industry branch did not really exist
before the year 2000. It was then that the first mobile devices based on the
Symbian operating system (OS) were introduced to the market and marketed
as “smartphones”. One could argue, however, that certain cellular handsets
from early to mid ’90s (such as the IBM Simon and the Nokia 9000 Com-
municator) that incorporated PDA functionality could be considered “proto-
smartphones”, predecessors to proper smartphones as the term is understood
today. These early devices were not extensible in terms of their software
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applications and features, but offered many advanced capabilities out of the
box, namely the ability to send and receive emails, and maintain an electronic
calendar, address book, and notes. The Nokia 9000 even had rudimentary,
text-based web browsing capabilities, which was groundbreaking at the time.
Interestingly, many of the early proto-smartphones had a touch screen, often
accompanied by a pen-like stylus, as their input method alongside a keyboard
that typically conformed to the QWERTY layout.
For the first few years of the new millennium, smartphones remained mostly
business and productivity oriented devices that often were quite bulky and had
relatively little to offer to ordinary consumers. As a result, they were carried
mostly by corporate professionals and technology enthusiasts. It was mainly
Nokia (with its 9210(i), 9500, and 9300 communicators), Palm (with its first
Treo smartphone circa 2002), and Research in Motion (RIM, who released
the first BlackBerry R© smartphones in 2003) who pioneered those early days
of smartphone business. Sony Ericsson and Motorola also released their first
smartphones in 2003, based on Symbian OS and a user interface (UI) and
application platform called UIQ1 (originating from ‘User Interface Quartz’),
but they failed to gain significant traction despite a number of progressively
better products introduced to the market.
By 2006, Symbian had established itself clearly as the market-leading smart-
phone OS, mainly through the success of Nokia and its popular S60 smart-
phones, with an overwhelming 67% share of smartphones sold globally running
Symbian (Canalys, 2006). It had already previously held more than 50% of
the market in 2004 and 2005, but was under pressure from mainly Microsoft’s
Windows Mobile that was predicted by some to surpass Symbian by 2010
(ZDNet, 2006). Such fears proved unsubstantiated as Symbian dominated
two thirds of the market, while Microsoft and RIM held 14% and 7% market
shares respectively, for the full year of 2006 (Canalys, 2006).
Microsoft, having expanded into the fledgling smartphone business as an OS
provider in late 2001 with its Windows Pocket PC 2002 that included cellular
support, was obviously keen to capture a sizable share of the rapidly growing
market. This was also viewed as strategically important by the software gi-
ant, as the ongoing convergence of personal computing, Internet protocol (IP)
based data communications, and mobile telecommunications was recognized
already back then. Most devices running the Windows Pocket PC 2002 OS
1The UIQ platform was designed for feature-rich phones and optimized for touch screen
use from the beginning, but through its many versions and years of existence, it did not
manage to attract enough operators, device manufacturers, and ultimately, consumers to
remain viable. It was officially disbanded in 2008, when Nokia acquired Symbian Ltd and
agreed to pool its assets into the newly established Symbian Foundation. Nokia’s popular
Series 60 (S60) software platform, also built on Symbian OS, was to be the UI of choice in
Symbian Foundation, eliminating the need for alternatives.
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were connected PDAs without cellular functionality, but with the first Win-
dows Mobile OS released in June 2003, Microsoft was getting serious about
smartphones. Subsequent versions followed approximately on a yearly basis,
appearing all the way through to 2009. With Windows Mobile, Microsoft
managed to gain a steady, though limited, foothold in the smartphone mar-
ket, with its global market share fluctuating between roughly 12% and 17%
between 2004 and 2008. Various handset manufacturers, from HTC, Motorola,
Hewlett-Packard, and Samsung to lesser-known players produced the actual
devices with varying success on the market. The devices were favored mostly
by professional users, those working in the information and communications
technology (ICT) industry, and others requiring mobile office functionality in
their handsets.
Nokia, then the largest manufacturer of mobile phones globally, had also es-
tablished itself as the leader in the smartphone business by 2006. Unlike most
other smartphone manufacturers of that era, Nokia had succeeded in making
smartphones attractive to many consumer segments, not just business users
who were the core audience of both RIM and Microsoft, as proven by the sales
success of hit products like the N73 and N95. Nokia’s smartphone portfolio
at the time was already quite broad and expanding further, seemingly offering
“something for everybody” in a multitude of price points, further reinforcing
the company’s lead. The outlook was bright, as Nokia had a 50% share of the
smartphone volumes in Q4 2006. At the same time, its smartphone competi-
tors, RIM, Motorola, Palm, and Sony Ericsson, each had single-digit market
shares between 5% and 8%. Samsung did not even make it to the top 5 list,
despite having produced Windows Mobile smartphones since 2004. Indeed,
the market was tipping in favor of Nokia to the point that one could rightfully
ask whether anything could threaten the company’s dominance.
Apple’s Rise and the Paradigm Change
On January 9, 2007, an announcement was made that would shape the fu-
ture of smartphone business — the iPhone was announced by Apple, Inc.,
the Cupertino, California based manufacturer of personal computers (Macs),
portable media players (iPods), and related accessories. Apple had returned
to prominence from the brink of bankruptcy through the vision and leader-
ship of its CEO and co-founder, Steve Jobs, who had rejoined the company
in 1997. The company had basically reinvented its core product offering in
the early 2000s, and it benefited greatly from the success of the iPod which
commanded as much as three quarters of the portable media player market in
2003-2004, until the music players in smartphones and music oriented feature
phones started eating away its market. Before discussing the iPhone, let us
briefly review the major transitions that Apple went through before launch-
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ing its smartphone product. Understanding them will help understand a few
particular design decisions that Apple made regarding the iPhone.
In 2001, Apple transitioned to a completely new OS for its computer products
called ‘Mac OS X’ that was partially based on software components from BSD
Unix and other open source or mixed source projects such NeXTSTEP, and
featuring a proprietary UI and application framework. The underlying core
OS was named ‘Darwin’ by Apple, and it later formed also the basis of the
iPhone OS, later abbreviated to iOS. To date, iOS powers Apple’s iPhone,
iPod Touch, and iPad devices. On the hardware side, Apple announced in
2005 that it would phase out the PowerPC processors that had powered its
computers and laptops for more than a decade, transitioning to Intel’s x86
processor architecture starting in 2006. This move allowed Apple to better
compete with Intel-based PC manufacturers and also to run multiple bodies
of software: native Mac OS X, Unix, Java, .NET, as well as Win32, the latter
through emulation or virtualization techniques. Dual booting to Microsoft
Windows also became possible on Mac computers. This was a shift towards
openness in the platform strategy of a vendor that had sworn by proprietary,
incompatible solutions for most of its existence.
The iPhone, first sold in June 2007, differed greatly from other smartphones
of its time. It had a very large screen for its time, measuring 3.5 inches di-
agonally and covering nearly the entire front side of the device, much larger
than the 2.6-inch screen of the Nokia N95 or other smartphones of the era.
Moreover, there was only a single button on the front of the device with no
physical keypad or keyboard whatsoever, as the screen was in fact a capaci-
tive touch screen that responded to finger touch. All the functionality of the
device was accessible via the touch screen, and a virtual on-screen keypad
or keyboard popped up whenever numerical or text input was required. The
UI was smooth, responsive, pleasing to the eye, and intuitively easy to learn
even for a person that was not “tech savvy”. In many ways, the device was
remarkably simple to use, yet it accomplished what most users wanted from
a mobile handset, and more. Thus, also people who were not familiar with
smartphones discovered and loved the new product, and it become a global
hit despite its limited geographical availability. For many, the iPhone defined
what constituted a smartphone.
All of a sudden, the sophisticated but complex UI of Symbian S60, which relied
on deep, layered menu structures, seemed cumbersome and even outdated. It
did not help much that it had many times the number of features that the
iPhone had when consumers had a hard time finding and using them. At first,
the incumbent smartphone manufacturers failed to take the iPhone seriously
and argued that with so many features missing (such as 3G cellular access and
multimedia messaging service (MMS)), the device is not a real smartphone at
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all and would only appeal to niche users. Also much of the industry was still
dead set on physical keypads and did not believe that touch screens would
become widely popular, as the earlier (resistive, stylus-based) touch screen
devices had not gained mainstream popularity.
Both assumptions turned out to be wrong — most users did not mind the
lack of features in the first iPhone (which were eventually remedied in prod-
uct software updates and newer iterations of the product), and the finger-
sensitive touch screen was not only accepted but loved by consumers, sparking
an industry-wide paradigm change to devices with large touch screens as the
primary input method. This change was further fueled by the introduction
of Android in November 2007, Google’s open source mobile software platform
that also had adopted a touch UI paradigm similar to the iPhone. It’s worth
noting that Nokia, too, had earlier developed a touch-based UI for its Symbian
Series 90 platform but used it only in a single commercial product, the Nokia
7710. Series 90 was not designed for finger touch, however, but it could have
been refined to support that paradigm, had Nokia’s leadership not decided to
discontinue it in favor of focusing on S60.
App Store as a Platform for Complementary Innovation
A second major shift in the smartphone business landscape occurred when
Apple released a software development kit (SDK) for the iPhone on March 6,
2008. This SDK allowed individuals and companies to enroll in the iPhone
Developer Program for a modest fee, and develop and publish free or commer-
cial software applications for the iPhone, to be sold in the newly announced
iPhone App Store, a consumer-oriented application marketplace run and “cu-
rated”2 by Apple, which would open in July 2008. The business model of the
App Store is based on simple revenue sharing scheme: the developer gets 70%
of the revenue accrued, and Apple gets the remaining 30%. The app purchases
take place conveniently on the device and the billing is handled via the user’s
iTunes account with credit card details, and as there are no middlemen in the
transaction, the developer gets the full 70% of the price paid.
The above proved out to be a wonderful business model, and once open, the
app store was bustling with all sorts of creative, fun, and useful applications,
capturing the long tail of complementary innovation and really unleashing the
power of the iPhone hardware for even the most bizarre purposes one could
2The curation basically means that Apple imposes rather strict rules on what kinds of
applications can be published, and each application that makes it to the store catalog will
have gone through a vetting process. Not only does this improve quality, as poor quality or
nonfunctional applications are not accepted, but it also enforces security, as malware, short
for malicious software, is typically caught in the vetting process.
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think of. While the iPhone did not have all the features out of the box, no
matter what the need, there was an app for it. Apple later used a variation of
the latter part of the previous phrase in its TV commercials and even obtained
a trademark for it.
The iPhone App Store was clearly a differentiator for the iPhone at a time
when other smartphones had a much more limited selection of applications
available through a number of inconvenient storefronts that not many con-
sumers were even aware of. Furthermore, the fragmentation, perceived high
development cost coupled with risky returns, and other barriers that some
other development platforms like Symbian suffered from meant that develop-
ers flocked to the iPhone App Store where the success stories were abundant.
Some lucky individuals who had developed applications that became popular
on the iPhone made millions of dollars, though the competition was getting
tougher as more and more developers published applications and the catalog
was swelling, making discovery (getting one’s applications noticed) increas-
ingly an issue.
Android’s Rise and Symbian’s Fall
Another major, industry-shaping event had taken place on November 5, 2007.
It was then that the newly formed Open Handset Alliance, led by Google,
announced the launch of Android. Android is a smartphone software platform
that was originally developed by the Palo Alto, California based company An-
droid, Inc., founded in October 2003 and later acquired by Google in August
2005. The platform development continued at Google, and an industry consor-
tium of initially 34 organizations was gathered in the form of OHA to prepare
for the launch in late 2007. The OHA roster included handset manufacturers,
mobile network operators (MNOs), chipset (semiconductor) manufacturers,
software integrators, and independent software vendors (ISVs), essentially cov-
ering all parts of the value network or ecosystem involved in mobile business.
This was to guarantee that Android had enough initial support from the mo-
bile industry to get it off the ground. Google and OHA promoted Android as
an “open platform for developers, users, and industry”, offering a “cutting-edge
mobile user experience” (Google, 2008).
The first Android smartphone, the T-Mobile G1 (also known as the HTC
Dream), was manufactured by the Taiwanese handset manufacturer HTC. It
began sales in the US and UK in October 2008 and expanded to other markets
in early 2009. While not a major commercial success and not quite up to
the level of user experience (UX) that the iPhone offered, it did alright and
showed what Android was capable of, even at version 1.0. The first Android
products were touch & QWERTY sliders with a trackball for navigation, but
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soon enough, subsequent updates to the OS (starting from v1.5 ‘Cupcake’,
released in April 2009) enabled a virtual on-screen keyboard, allowing the
creation of touch-only devices in the vein of the iPhone. This accelerated the
productization efforts of handset manufacturers, and Samsung, LG, Motorola,
Sony Ericsson, and smaller manufacturers soon released their Android debuts
during the second half of 2009 and early 2010.
Drastic strategic moves were seen, as for example Motorola, suffering from an
outdated portfolio and serious financial troubles, decided to focus its smart-
phone efforts solely on Android, discontinuing its work on other platforms.
Similarly, Sony Ericsson decided to base its future Xperia line of smartphones
on Android, giving up on Windows Mobile that had featured in its Xperia
X1 device. Also in China, the local handset manufacturers saw Android as a
welcome, cost-efficient enabler for producing inexpensive smartphones for the
large and fast-growing domestic market as well as for export. The Android
ecosystem was rapidly gaining momentum.
Although Nokia’s smartphone sales continued strong through 2008 and 2009
despite the global economic downturn, it was clear that the company had two
serious challengers in the smartphone space that grew at an alarming rate:
Apple with its iPhone and the Android camp. During the period, despite
achieving good sales figures, Nokia’s Symbian based smartphone portfolio was
rapidly losing its competitiveness from consumer perception, UX, and tech-
nical performance perspectives. The cumbersome nature and legacy of the
Symbian software asset was slowing the much-needed renewal of the platform,
and the UX severely lagged behind that of the iPhone but also Android hand-
sets. Furthermore, other device manufacturers such as Samsung and Sony
Ericsson had effectively abandoned Symbian as they had focused their efforts
on Android, leaving Nokia alone to develop the platform and gather support
for the ecosystem, which was very costly but resulted in only limited success.
Symbian was perceived exclusively as a Nokia platform which limited the will-
ingness of existing and potential partners to invest in it. Application develop-
ers were also increasingly focusing their efforts on iPhone and Android, both
of which seemed to offer better returns for their investments through lower
development costs, easier monetization and discovery, and a wide audience of
consumers that were willing to purchase applications. The ecosystem around
Symbian was withering away.
Crumbling Walled Gardens and the Reduced Role of Operators
As a consequence of the success and popularity of the iPhone, MNOs around
the world were facing new kinds of dynamics. Even major incumbent operators
holding strong bargaining power in large markets such as the US and West-
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ern Europe (e.g., UK, Germany, France) had to come to terms with the fact
that they no longer could dictate the UX on smartphones or require operator
service portals and premium services to be preinstalled in the case of Apple.
Apple categorically refused any attempts by operators to alter or customize
the experience on its devices.
Exclusivity deals of limited duration were an early tool for Apple to ensure
support from key operators in each market area. These operator partners
agreed to costly promotion campaigns and device subsidy plans in exchange
for the exclusive right to market and sell the iPhone. As a benefit, many of the
early operators offering the iPhone (such as AT&T in the US) saw an influx
of subscribers, while their rivals suffered from increased levels of churn. Many
of these iPhone-less carriers, such as Verizon Wireless and Sprint in the US,
turned their attention to Android-based handsets (as evidenced by the Verizon
‘Droid’ franchise) manufactured mainly by Motorola, Samsung, and HTC, all
of whom were still willing to work with operators in terms of customization,
co-branding, and so forth. However, even the most stubborn carriers have
since given in, and very few operators today would not offer the iPhone given
the opportunity.
A second major shift was related to digital content and services, especially ap-
plications and their distribution. Traditionally, the major incumbent operators
had built ‘walled gardens’, closed, operator-controlled palettes of content and
services for their subscribers that typically restricted the selection of premium
content to operator-preferred sources. The content and services were offered
through deals and partnerships between the operators and content/service
providers, and the operators benefitted from the transactions made by their
subscribers. This was not the case with the App Store and iTunes, the mar-
ketplaces of choice on the iPhone. As discussed above, Apple had introduced
a revenue sharing scheme where it took 30% of application revenue while
the developer got 70%, leaving nothing for the operator despite the fact that
applications were often downloaded “over the air”, using the operator’s cellu-
lar network. Apple had effectively cut the operators out of the digital con-
tent value chain. The allegedly more operator-friendly Android Market (now
called Google Play) as well as Nokia’s Ovi Store did offer operators a cut
in return for operating billing services. Due to the rapidly growing popular-
ity of both iPhone and Android handsets, operators found themselves largely
disconnected from application development, distribution, and monetization.
In the past, and as recently as 2012, operators have had several initiatives
with the goal of establishing new application development and runtime en-
vironments as well as distribution channels that would be more “friendly” to
their cause. These include mobile OS and middleware standardization ini-
tiatives such as LiMo (Linux Mobile) Foundation as well as web technologies
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based, cross-platform runtime environments such as the one promoted by the
Wholesale Applications Community (WAC). WAC was an operator-led con-
sortium that aimed at creating a unified and open platform to allow mobile
application developers to more easily write applications that would work on a
variety of devices, OS’s, and networks. WAC is defunct as of June 17, 2012,
having reached an agreement to integrate its major programs and initiatives
into the GSM Association (GSMA).
A third major shift is the proliferation of what is dubbed as ‘over-the-top’
(OTT) communications. Some applications such as Skype, Fring, and Viber,
previously available and popular on PCs, have made their way to smartphones
and enable subscribers to circumvent operator tariffs for voice calls, instead
paying for data only, often at a flat (or tiered flat) rate. Similarly, text mes-
sage (SMS) and MMS volumes have declined due to the availability of popular
instant messaging and chat applications such as WhatsApp and Snapchat.
Many (if not most) operators see this transition as troublesome, as it requires
them to come up with new business models that allow them to benefit from
increased mobile data usage and neutralize the effects of OTT services gradu-
ally eating into voice and SMS revenue. Bundled service pricing is a common
solution, combining voice, SMS/MMS, mobile data, and potentially some pre-
mium services (e.g., video on demand) into a service plan with a fixed monthly
rate. Some carriers still actively fight OTT services by outlawing and blocking
them from their networks, but such policies are only likely to frustrate users
and increase churn if rivaling carriers have adopted more open policies.
Mobile operators have struggled to maintain their relevance as anything more
than data transport service providers, and their past initiatives to assert con-
trol in innovation ecosystems have not been very successful. Although their
role is crucial in enabling mobile communications, currently they seem to have
been increasingly relegated to the role of data transport providers. This de-
velopment is likely to continue if they cannot innovate and engage their sub-
scribers more. As it stands today, mobile ecosystem leaders and leading hand-
set manufacturers (often but not always the same thing) have captured the
minds and hearts of consumers.
War of Ecosystems
Another hurdle for Nokia was its services and solutions strategy, which it had
adopted in 2007 and started to implement in 2008. The company launched
a plethora of mostly free-of-charge services available on the web and Nokia
handsets under the ‘Ovi’ brand which seemed to offer very little if any bene-
fit over similar, more established services already available. In fact, many of
them were actually deemed much worse than the free services from the likes of
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 11
Google that were also available for Nokia handsets. Recurring quality issues
plagued many of the services despite numerous updates. Additionally, the
fragmentation of Nokia’s software platforms meant that multiple versions of
service clients had to be developed and maintained to support each platform
generation and branch. Although Nokia invested huge sums in R&D, more
than just about any other company in the industry as a percentage of rev-
enue, the resources were spread across so many platform, product, and service
development projects that progress was painfully slow. With the exception of
Nokia’s complimentary turn-by-turn navigation on its smartphones, free mo-
bile e-mail, and the services targeted for the emerging markets such as Life
Tools, the palette of Ovi services and solutions did not, as a whole, meet
adoption targets. Many of the services were subsequently ramped down.
Despite these major difficulties, Nokia soldiered on with its in-house platform
strategy, focusing on Symbian and Maemo, later renamed MeeGo as a result of
Nokia’s partnership with Intel. By mid 2010, it was clear that the old strategy
was not coming to fruition, and so a drastic change was needed. Android was
about to overtake Symbian as the #1 smartphone platform globally (which
it accomplished in Q4 2010) and MeeGo was suffering from product delays.
Mr. Stephen Elop, joining from Microsoft, became the new CEO of Nokia
on September 21, 2010, initiating a strategy assessment and renewal process.
The outcome was Nokia’s new strategy, announced on Feb 11, 2011, that saw
the company enter into a strategic alliance with Microsoft, focusing its smart-
phone efforts on the Windows Phone platform and ramping down Symbian
and MeeGo. Elop claimed that the industry had entered an era where there
was a war between ecosystems, not merely a battle between devices. Nokia
had not succeeded in building an ecosystem on its own, so it joined forces with
Microsoft to create a “third ecosystem” to compete with the ecosystems of Ap-
ple and Google (Android). Microsoft stood to gain a lot from the partnership,
as it had secured a large-scale handset vendor for its Windows Phone plat-
form which was struggling to gain manufacturer support. While some other
manufacturers such as HTC, Samsung, and LG were also Windows Phone li-
censees, they focused most of their product efforts on Android. Nokia, on the
other hand, was “all in” with Windows Phone, in practice having no viable
alternatives should things go awry.
Both Microsoft and Nokia had invested heavily in making Windows Phone
8 a booming success, and in many ways, their relevance in the smartphone
business was dependent on the success of the products and complements built
on that platform. For Nokia, for reasons stated above, it was also very much
a question of existence. Even with critically acclaimed products on the mar-
ket, building a successful, thriving ecosystem is no small feat. Despite huge
efforts on Nokia’s side to make attractive ‘Lumia’-branded smartphone de-
signs on Windows Phone as well as tablets on Windows RT, the devices and
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their ecosystem failed to generate the kind of momentum that was required to
sustain Nokia’s smartphone business. Despite healthy sales growth of Lumia
smartphones up until Q3 2013, the business was losing money fast, and Nokia
had to act. Rumors of a possible takeover of the handset business by Microsoft
had circulated already in June 2013, but the news finally came on September
3, 2013: Nokia had signed an agreement to sell its Devices & Services busi-
ness to Microsoft in an all-cash transaction valued at 5.44 billion Euro. Of
the total purchase price of 5.44 billion, 3.79 billion relates to the purchase of
substantially all of the Devices & Services business, and the remaining 1.65
billion relates to the mutual patent agreement and “future option” (Nokia,
2013a; Microsoft, 2013).
When the deal was granted approval by Nokia shareholders in the Extraordi-
nary General Meeting on November 19, 2013, the story of Nokia as a handset
manufacturer, once largest in the world, was over (Nokia, 2013b). The com-
pany would retain its network infrastructure and services business Nokia Solu-
tions and Networks (promptly renamed to Nokia Networks), the location-based
services and mapping business HERE, and a third business called Technologies
which is said to build on several of Nokia’s Chief Technology Officer (CTO)
organization and IPR activities, further expanding Nokia’s patent portfolio
and the licensing activities around it, also exploring new business opportuni-
ties through advanced research, development and concept products in areas
such as connectivity, sensing and material technologies, as well as web and
cloud technologies.
Having given up its once-triumphant handset business, Nokia needs to inno-
vate and find new growth in its remaining businesses which at first look do
not have a whole lot of synergy. The location-cloud business of HERE is,
however, heavily dependent on connectivity solutions inside vehicles as well
as smartphones acting as clients or ‘companion devices’ to the services, so
HERE remains closely linked to the smartphone business even though selling
the actual devices is no longer a business for Nokia. Whether HERE will enter
the consumer market with some other kinds of devices utilizing location-based
services remains to be seen. As for Nokia Networks, the network infrastructure
business offers solid revenue for years to come especially due to 4G LTE (Long
Term Evolution) network rollouts and upgrades, although the competition
remains tough.
While ecosystem building in general takes a lot of time, effort, and money, it
is worth noting that the barriers to entry for new smartphone manufacturers
are considerably lower than what they used to be about five years ago. This
is primarily due to the availability of off-the-shelf, turnkey solutions as a basis
for smartphone designs. Many mobile chipset vendors offer reference designs
for which they have ported the Android OS and the required device drivers.
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This makes it relatively easy even for smaller device vendors with limited mo-
bile specific expertise or software/hardware integration capabilities to make
handsets. Also, the free-of-cost and open source nature of Android makes it
an attractive, cost-effective platform for building smartphones. This is par-
ticularly true in the Far East, especially China, where intellectual property
rights (IPR) are not strictly enforced and thus the manufacturers can afford
to make handsets even cheaper without fear of litigation. Furthermore, man-
ufacturing assets and scale have also diminished in importance as successful
smartphone vendors such as Apple produce their handsets in large volumes
through contract manufacturing services such as Foxconn and Pegatron.
The signs of increasingly intense rivalry between mobile business ecosystems
are becoming more evident. In June 2012, for example, Apple launched version
6 of its iOS operating system but without the familiar Google Maps application
that had been the preinstalled mapping solution ever since the first iPhone in
2007. Instead, Apple had developed its own mapping application with novel
features such as 3D flyover and also featuring turn-by-turn navigation free
of charge (BBC News, 2012). Interestingly, some much-loved features from
Google Maps such as StreetView (the ability to view streets from a full 360
degrees) were absent. Also, usability and map data issues irritated many users
and even sparked Apple CEO Tim Cook to apologize, assuring that Apple
would fix the shortcomings.
Building a fully functional mapping solution is a demanding task, and Apple
had ramped up its mapping capabilities through a series of acquisitions done
between 2009 and 2011 (PC Magazine, 2012b). It had gone through all the
effort because it wanted to rid its ecosystem of a control point occupied by
Google. Owning the mapping platform gives Apple the opportunity to collect
more data on user behavior which in turn can be leveraged to improve existing
services and monetized via advertisers. In this sense, Apple is increasingly
fighting Google in its home arena of advertising, location based services, and
cloud-based services in general.
Google is also increasingly leveraging the popularity of its services such as
Gmail as a weapon against rivaling ecosystems. On December 14, 2012, Google
announced it would be discontinuing some of its mobile synchronization ser-
vices as part of “winter cleaning” (Google, 2012c). In particular, this meant
that after January 30, 2013, non-Android device users would not have push-
email or calendar synchronization linked to their Gmail accounts. Phones that
rely on the Exchange ActiveSync protocol for synchronization to Gmail as well
as Google calendar and contacts would have to revert to periodical, non-push
synchronization. This includes all Windows Phone users, so the decision can
be seen as a serious blow against the Windows Phone ecosystem, given how
popular Gmail accounts are. iPhone users are somewhat less effected as they
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will likely be able to use a tailored application for accessing their Gmail ac-
counts. Those with paid Google Apps subscriptions would also continue to
enjoy Exchange ActiveSync access to their accounts. As a final blow to re-
maining Symbian/S60 users, Google announced they would stop the support
for Google Sync for S60 also on January 30, 2013.
For the consumer and end user, the rivalry and developments described above
can be troublesome. For one thing, sharing personal data and content between
devices belonging to different ecosystems is not easy. Applications and content
purchased on one platform are usually not transferable to another. The notion
of ecosystem ‘lock-in’ is increasingly prominent as, for example, the choice
of smartphone is increasingly influential on the purchase decision of tablets,
laptops, and media streaming devices and also the choice of services (Apple
App Store, iTunes, iCloud vs. Google Play, Google Play Music, Google Drive
vs. Microsoft Windows Phone Store, Xbox Music/Video, OneDrive). Due to
such strong vertical offerings with limited interoperability and compatibility,
the consumer may find him/herself locked into an unsatisfactory solution from
which it is costly to break free from, often requiring repurchase of applications
and content, and in some cases also hardware peripherals and accessories,
adding up to the costs. While creating platform lock-in has always been a
central tool for platform proprietors to strengthen network effects and drive
revenue, in the world of business ecosystems, lock-in can happen on multiple
levels, as also noted by Kenney & Pon (2011).
1.1.2 Why Business Ecosystems Matter
According to Q4 2012 sales figures, Samsung was the leading smartphone man-
ufacturer with a 29.0% global market share, followed by Apple (22.1%), Huawei
(5.3%), ZTE (4.7%), and Lenovo (4.4%). The rest of the market, 34.5%, is
divided between numerous smaller players (Canalys, 2012b). As of Q4 2012,
this group of manufacturers with low single digit market share includes former
incumbents such as Nokia and RIM, and niche players such as Sony (formerly
Sony Ericsson). Still in the previous quarter, both Sony and RIM made it to
the chart with market shares of 5.1% and 4.2%, respectively (Canalys, 2012a).
Also, never before have Chinese companies occupied the ranks #3 to #5 in
terms of global smartphone market share. What is particularly startling about
these figures is that only one and a half year earlier, in Q1 2011, Nokia was still
holding on to its position as the #1 smartphone manufacturer with a market
share of 24.0%, although Apple and Samsung were close behind already then
(Canalys, 2011a). In Q2 2011, Apple overtook Nokia as the largest smart-
phone manufacturer globally, before Samsung claimed the #1 position later
in 2011 (Canalys, 2011b).
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The figures above illustrate a rare, if not totally unique phenomenon in recent
business history: a leading incumbent in an industry sector suffers an almost
complete collapse of its market share and profit in just a couple of years, disap-
pearing into the low-single-digit market share range. Almost simultaneously,
two companies that had practically no stake in the smartphone market a few
years earlier have taken the lead. Surely such a drastic change in the market
structure warrants a study on the factors that contributed to it.
As noted in the previous section, Nokia had failed in creating a thriving busi-
ness ecosystem and had eventually fallen behind both in product innovation as
well as stimulating external, complementary innovation on top of its in-house
platforms. The new entrants Apple and Google, despite not previously having
a foothold in the mobile business, were able to create and establish mobile
business ecosystems around their mobile platforms and software application
marketplaces through clever ecosystem and platform strategies and have, at
least for the time being, displaced former incumbents such as Nokia and RIM
(renamed to BlackBerry in January 2013). Indeed, business ecosystems have
become the new basis of competition in the smartphone business, and the
dynamics of the industry have changed permanently. Some researchers even
go as far as saying that the mobile ecosystem wars are drawing to a close
after some six years, with Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS capturing over
94% of the overall smartphone market, pointing to the marginal role of other
players (VisionMobile, 2014). Moreover, according to VisionMobile (2014),
the developer mindshare rating was 71% for Android and 55% for iOS. The
latter platform commands the highest developer loyalty, however, being the
preferred platform for 59% of its developer base.
Based on the above, it would currently seem that the market is very much a
duopoly with limited business opportunities for other competing ecosystems.
However, both Apple and Google did rise to prominence relatively quickly,
through both technical and business model innovation as well as the capa-
bility to quickly respond to changes in consumer preferences, disrupting the
early incumbents of the smartphone business. Therefore, it is fair to assume
that these leading ecosystems, too, are not immune to changes in the techno-
logical and business landscape, and their current entrenched positions may be
challenged at some point in the future. Understanding the factors that would
contribute to such developments is a key motivation for this thesis.
An opportunity is seen to learn from the firms and ecosystems by examin-
ing the strategic choices they have made and the results they have achieved
over the years. How does one then successfully orchestrate a business ecosys-
tem or manage a platform, particularly in the mobile smartphone industry?
The question is of great interest not only in management science and con-
sulting but also in the academia, as an increasing number of research papers
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and articles published in journals in the last couple of years have examined
the competition between mobile software ecosystems and their digital market-
places for consumers, developers, operators, and other constituents involved
in the creation of value.
1.2 Objectives of the Study
1.2.1 Prior Research
The various phenomena and mechanisms related to performance, competition,
and cooperation of firms, whether active in mobile business or other indus-
tries, have been studied by various authors, though often from a distinctive
perspective by each individual author and using different theoretical concepts
and frameworks.
Already for some decades, scholars particularly in the strategic management
field have studied the sources of competitive advantage in an attempt to ex-
plain the differential performance of firms (Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1991).
Two prominent views have emerged over time, firstly the influential industry
structure view of Porter (1980) which suggests that above-average returns pri-
marily stem from a firm’s membership in an industry with favorable structural
characteristics such as bargaining power relative to suppliers and customers,
barriers to entry, rivalry within the industry, and so forth. Thus, many schol-
ars have focused on the industry as the relevant unit of analysis, according to
Dyer & Singh (1998).
An alternative view called the resource-based view, studied notably by Wern-
erfelt (1984, 1995) and Barney (1991, 2001), argues that differences in firm
performance and returns are fundamentally due to firm heterogeneity and dif-
ferences in the accumulated tangible or intangible resources and capabilities
of firms. When firms possess resources and capabilities that are rare, valu-
able, non-substitutable, and difficult to imitate, they are able to achieve a
competitive advantage over other, competing firms (Dyer & Singh, 1998).
Dyer & Singh (1998) acknowledge the contributions of the industry struc-
ture view and resource-based view to understanding factors contributing to
above-average returns, but at the same time, argue that these views do not
sufficiently consider the fact that the (dis)advantages of a firm are often linked
to the (dis)advantages of the network of relationships in which the firm is em-
bedded. They also argue that a firm’s critical resources may extend beyond its
boundaries and that those resources may be embedded in interfirm routines
and processes. Thus, firms that make relation-specific investments and com-
bine resources in unique ways may realize an advantage over competing firms
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unable or unwilling to do so. Hence, idiosyncratic interfirm linkages may be
a source of relational rents3 and competitive advantage.
Consequently, Dyer & Singh (1998) argue that the relationship between firms
is an increasingly important unit of analysis for understanding competitive ad-
vantage especially in an interorganizational context, hence the term relational
view. Moreover, they identified four distinct sources that provide competi-
tive advantages when organizations work together, namely 1) investments in
relation-specific assets, 2) substantial knowledge exchange, 3) complementary
resources/capabilities enabling the joint creation of new products, services, or
technologies, and 4) effective governance mechanisms resulting in lower trans-
action costs. As shall be discussed later in Chapter 2, these findings are
remarkably similar to those of other theories of interfirm cooperation and
competition, laying the theoretical foundation for the research problem of this
thesis.
A fundamental concept which many of the theories discussed in this thesis
build on is that of network effects. The theory of network effects (also called
network externalities) and firms and their products forming “virtual networks”
was laid out by Katz & Shapiro (1985) and continues to form the foundational
basis of much of the more advanced theory that is used to describe and explain
modern concepts such as mobile software application stores. The basic notion
is that many products have little or no value in isolation, but when combined
with other related products, they generate value. In this sense, the products
are complementary to each other. Also, positive network effects imply that
the more users a product has, the more value it has to each user.
Katz & Shapiro (1985, 1986, 1994) and others recognized that systems mar-
kets exhibit complexity in terms of expectations, coordination, and compati-
bility well beyond that of regular product markets where individual products
compete against each other. Here, expectations refers to the fact that the
components of a system, such as software applications for a computer, may
be purchased over a period of time, thus requiring the rational buyer to form
expectations about the availability, price, and quality of the components in
the future. Coordination refers to the issue that a firm’s decision to make
a certain product, such as a new processor design, depends on other firms’
capability and willingness to make their complements, in this case, software,
work on it. Compatibility refers to the issue of whether a component designed
for one particular system also works in another system. Systems that are pop-
ular tend to have widely available components and will be even more popular
due to the positive feedback (network effects). Indeed, Katz & Shapiro (1994)
acknowledge that network effects have proven troublesome to economic theory
3Dyer & Singh (1998) define relational rents as supernormal profits jointly generated in
an exchange relationship that cannot be generated by either firm in isolation.
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as an equilibrium (of supply and demand) may not exist, or multiple equilibria
may exist, and also the fundamental theorems of welfare economics may not
apply.
Network effects, when generalized to include both same-side and cross-side
effects as described by Eisenmann et al. (2006), are the theoretical founda-
tion for two-sided markets, discussed by Parker & Van Alstyne (2000); Rochet
& Tirole (2003); Parker & Van Alstyne (2005); Eisenmann et al. (2006) and
other authors. Much of the research on the topic has focused on the issue of
pricing and subsidization of the two sides of the market whose transactions are
facilitated by a platform, but competitive dynamics between several platform
providers serving two-sided markets is also an enduring topic of academic in-
terest. Hagiu (2009) and Rysman (2009) discuss multi-sided platforms (MSPs)
as a generalization of two-sided markets.
Most of the early examples and case studies of two-sided markets deal with
either credit card markets (Rochet & Tirole, 2003), directories of businesses
(Rysman, 2004), or computer OS’s (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2000, 2005), ap-
proaching the demand and pricing relationships of those markets mostly from
a theoretical, quantitative perspective. Extensive case studies of qualitative
nature on two or multi-sided markets have been a rarity, and until just a
few years ago, hardly any had been made specifically on the topic of mobile
software platforms and application stores.
The theory of industry platforms and the associated roles of platform leaders
and complementors have been studied extensively in particular by Cusumano
& Gawer (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002, 2008; Cusumano, 2010). Although build-
ing on the theory of network effects as well as two-sided markets, they focus
mostly on technical and organizational concepts such as scope of offering,
product architecture and modularity, external relationship management, and
internal organizational structure. Boudreau (2008) has studied the effects of
the number of complementors on the intensity of competition and level of in-
novation on a platform through quantitative econometric analysis, coming to
the conclusion that under specific circumstances, adding too many complemen-
tors can detract from a platform’s ability to generate new innovation as well
as profits for the firms making complements on it, mainly due to crowding-out
effects and substitution as opposed to market expansion.
The ecological analogy of business ecosystem, as first coined by Moore (1993,
1996) and further refined by Iansiti & Levien (2004a,b), has been widely
adopted in management science for describing the modern ICT business land-
scape, its actors, and the dynamics of cooperation and competition among
them. The etymology and characteristics of the term as well as its rela-
tionship to other similar concepts such as value network (described by, e.g.,
Christensen (1997), Stabell & Fjeldstad (1998), and Allee (2000)) has been
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explored by, e.g., Peltoniemi (2004) and Peltoniemi & Vuori (2004). Further-
more, quantitative measures for the health of a business ecosystem have been
developed by, e.g., Den Hartigh et al. (2006), building on the concepts devel-
oped by Iansiti & Levien (2004a). Also a significant body of research exists on
software ecosystems and particularly (open) innovation management in such
ecosystems (Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007; Bosch, 2009; Jansen et al., 2009;
Parker et al., 2010).
Extensive case studies on mobile software ecosystems have been quite rare,
however. Also, when applied to case studies, business ecosystem theory often
seems to lead to quite high-level analysis when firm or platform-level analysis
would be valuable in adding insight. Many of the firms described as “keystones”
in business ecosystem theory act as platform providers for a two-sided market,
and therefore it is surprising that ecosystem case studies have not widely
considered two-sided market aspects in their analysis.
Interestingly, Eaton et al. (2011) and Tilson et al. (2012) have approached the
evolution and dynamics of mobile software ecosystems from a different per-
spective, studying the paradoxical relationship between control, generativity,
and change in the cultivation of innovation in digital ecosystems using mobile
application stores as case examples. They note that, for example, control,
while reducing generativity through seeking to strengthen control boundaries
for emerging innovation, can also feed extensive generativity. In a similar
manner, generativity resulting in emerging and unexpected innovations can
increase the need for control.
More recent studies, such as those by Tuunainen et al. (2011), Campbell &
Ahmed (2011), Idu et al. (2011), Hyrynsalmi et al. (2012), and Bresnahan
et al. (2014), have analyzed the software ecosystems and developer market-
places of Apple, Google, BlackBerry, and Microsoft. As insightful as their
studies have been, however, their perspectives have been limited in scope to
cover application marketplaces and developer programs without a broader,
holistic understanding of the firms’ ecosystems of collaborators and competi-
tors, their product platforms, their method of value capture, and the various
strategic decisions that they have made over the years to define their ‘rules of
engagement’ in the mobile smartphone business.
An aspect that has received little attention in the existing literature and case
studies on mobile business ecosystems is what the author calls angle of entry
into a business domain. This novel term refers to the historical legacy of a
firm mainly in terms of its previous business activities, capabilities, and assets
which, as is argued in this study, has had an impact on more recent choices
the firm has made in its ecosystem and platform strategies. This seems quite
plausible, given that the central argument of the path dependency theory in
economics and social sciences, as described by P. David (1985, 1994, 2001), is
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that the set of options in decision making for any given circumstance is limited
by the decisions one has made in the past, even though past circumstances may
no longer be valid or have any relevance. Therefore, the author’s hypothesis
is that the angle of entry of a firm can at least partially be used to explain
some of the ecosystem or platform level success factors. This is essentially one
of the detailed research questions (#1) that are stated in Section 1.2.3. Given
that there are ample historical data and documents available on the mobile
industry and its actors, it should be feasible to study to this question.
Finally, it should be noted that at least so far, very few researchers have at-
tempted to bring together the separate but interrelated theories of platforms,
two-sided markets, and business ecosystems, despite the fact that these con-
cepts largely describe similar phenomena and underlying mechanisms, even if
from somewhat different perspectives. Muegge (2013) makes an attempt in
this direction, discussing the platform theory of Cusumano & Gawer (2002)
together with the business ecosystem theory of Moore (1993, 1996, 2006) and
Iansiti & Levien (2004a,b), arguing that they represent different but comple-
mentary layers of analysis in a complex hierarchical system. Herein lies a
significant purpose for this thesis from a theoretical perspective: bridging the
different theoretical concepts with notable similarities and making sense of
them in a holistic way.
1.2.2 Research Target
In designing the framework, practical applicability is an important considera-
tion, as it can be argued that many of the existing frameworks are too abstract
or difficult to apply to be of practical value to executives and managers who
are responsible for making the strategic decisions that ultimately shape the
business landscape and ecosystems. While the goal for this framework is to be
holistic in the sense that it covers the relevant aspects of the various existing
models, no attempt is made to create a unified theoretical framework that
would automatically be suitable for any industry setting. The scope of the
study is limited strictly to mobile business ecosystems and firms active in the
smartphone business.
In the research conducted as part of this thesis, the aim is to understand the key
drivers and strategic choices that contribute to a firm’s ability to successfully
create, sustain, and manage a business ecosystem4 of firms producing value-
4In the context of this study, business ecosystems are typically diverse, not limited to
specific geographical regions (as opposed to firm clusters), and encompass a wide range
of firms that belong to different industries, including (but not limited to) mobile hand-
set vendors, PC and CE vendors, original design manufacturers (ODMs), semiconductor
companies, wireless carriers, Internet content & services providers, and ISVs.
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adding complementary innovation5 on top of a product (or industry-wide)
platform in the smartphone business. An attempt is made to put together an
analysis framework that combines the most suitable elements of existing theo-
retical frameworks known to the scientific community for the specific purpose
of analyzing the success factors of ecosystems, platforms, and firms active in
the smartphone business. In particular, these factors are analyzed from the
perspective of a firm’s angle of entry into the smartphone business as discussed.
1.2.3 Research Questions
The high-level research question of the study is formulated as follows:
What are the success factors of a business ecosystem in the mobile smartphone
industry?
This question can be broken down further to four more specific questions, also
illustrated in Figure 1.1:
1. How do a firm’s legacy and angle of entry into the mobile business affect
the success factors of its ecosystem?
2. How does a leading firm successfully orchestrate an ecosystem to foster
value-adding complementary innovation?
3. How does a leading firm successfully manage a product/industry platform
to enable value-adding complementary innovation?
4. What is the interplay between successfully orchestrating an ecosystem and
managing a product/industry platform? Are the success drivers similar?
By the term angle of entry, a reference is made to the perception that many
large incumbents that currently occupy a major role in mobile smartphone
business have an older, more mature business in PC or CE manufacturing,
computer operating systems and/or software, or alternatively, in the rela-
tively new business domain of Internet services, content, and online advertis-
ing. When these companies have expanded into or refocused their business on
the rapidly growing mobile sector, they have made strategic choices regarding
which roles in the ecosystem or value network they desire to occupy, and also
5Value-adding complementary innovation is defined here somewhat loosely, and can mean
anything from commercially available hardware accessories and after-market software appli-
cations developed by third parties to specifically tailored business-to-business (B2B) solu-
tions, with the general notion being that it contributes to the overall value and attractiveness
of the platform and/or ecosystem through a mechanism known as positive feedback, thereby
attracting even more complementors.
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Figure 1.1: Research questions
how they intend to capture value. Based on the legacy of these firms, their
existing businesses, and their capabilities and assets, the firms have been and
are in somewhat different positions as they have entered the mobile business
arena, and thus stand to capture value from their ecosystem in somewhat
different ways.
Hence, a topic of research interest in this thesis is to understand how the dif-
fering angles of entry affect the success factors of the firms and ecosystems
being examined. This concept is illustrated in Figure 1.2. The figure also pro-
vides an approximate two-by-two matrix division of the adjacent industries or
businesses into hardware and software oriented ones on the horizontal axis,
while the vertical axis attempts to separate emphasis on mobility and uni-
versal access from personal computing, productivity & entertainment. One
should note that this is by no means an absolute division, as there are ex-
amples of firms which are equally innovative in both hardware and software
development and have a high capability level and significant assets in both
areas. Similarly, many companies that have started out as developers and
publishers of PC software have since evolved and expanded into Internet and
cloud services business often via Software as a Service (SaaS) or Platform
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Figure 1.2: Angles of entry into mobile smartphone business
as a Service (PaaS) business models and offerings. As an example, PC soft-
ware incumbents like Microsoft have taken their productivity software suites
and enterprise applications online, Microsoft Office 365 being a good example.
Some others firms have become online content providers and/or aggregators.
It is common for different software licensing and revenue models to coexist in
a single firm, even for the same product range. By this division, the aim is to
understand where the firms are coming from in a historical sense, which could
explain some of their strategic choices and inclinations.
1.3 Scope of the Study
Stated concisely, the high-level goal of this study is to identify common (and
perhaps also some differing) success factors in leading mobile business ecosys-
tems, specifically those led by three companies that are chosen for a multiple
case study: Apple, Google, and Microsoft. These companies are chosen for a
particular reason: each of them has historically been active in different busi-
nesses outside the traditional telecommunications industry before successfully
entering, and as of late, dominating the smartphone business, pushing aside
long-standing incumbents with roots in the telecommunications equipment in-
dustry. Although ‘success’ could be defined in many ways, here it simply refers
to the ability of a firm to establish itself in a new business domain previously
dominated by incumbents such as Nokia and BlackBerry, and to create a sus-
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tainable ecosystem of complementary products and innovation around itself.
According to VisionMobile (2014), this is clearly true for at least the Google
Android and Apple iOS ecosystems, together accounting for 94% of the over-
all smartphone market, followed by the Microsoft Windows Phone ecosystem
as a distant third with low single-digit market share. In line with their re-
spective market shares in smartphone sales, these ecosystems have captured
the mindshare of application developers, ranging from large corporations to
individuals, who are largely responsible for the complementary innovation in
the ecosystems.
Looking at Figure 1.2, we can see that each of the three relatively new entrants
to the smartphone business is coming from a particular angle of entry, Apple
from the ‘computer hardware and consumer electronics’ business, Microsoft
from the ‘computer software: operating systems and applications’ business,
and Google from the ‘Internet (cloud) services, content, and advertising’ busi-
ness. All of these angles are non-traditional in the sense that they do not
represent core elements of the traditional telecommunications value chain but
rather adjacent industries (personal computing, Internet search and advertis-
ing). The other three angles of entry, ‘traditional telecommunications equip-
ment, pagers, handsets’, ‘mobile operators’, and ‘web browser’ represent the
old incumbents (Nokia, BlackBerry) and a number of failed initiatives from
operators and various consortia (e.g., WAC, Mozilla Foundation). Since this
study focuses on identifying strongly common success factors and not fail-
ure factors of mobile business ecosystems, I choose to limit its scope to the
three angles of entry that appear successful as defined above and to the three
case companies that represent each of those angles. Further justifications for
selecting the case companies are found in Section 1.4.2.
Defining Smartphone Business
This study is limited to a specific business and industry context, the smart-
phone business. As such, it is necessary to note that the word ‘smartphone’
has no official industry definition, though the following definition is generally
agreed to:
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A smartphone is an advanced mobile device with connectivity
and functionality well beyond that of a regular, voice-centric
phone, most notably with the ability to add and run sophisti-
cated after-market applications on an identifiable operating sys-
tem. Limited capabilities to run only simple sandboxed appli-
cations (e.g., Java-based games) are not considered sufficient for
smartphones. The operating system (or platform) of a smart-
phone must provide sufficiently well defined and documented
interfaces as to enable application development, a form of com-
plementary innovation, on the device by parties other than the
handset manufacturer itself, although the extent of platform
openness in this sense can vary significantly.
In terms of features, most current smartphones support full-featured e-mail
and personal information management (PIM) capabilities, including calendar,
address books, various notes and tasks lists, alerts and reminders, and other
functionality associated with a personal organizer. The ability to synchro-
nize PIM data wirelessly with various online services has also become a norm.
Moreover, modern smartphones are expected to natively have corporate email
server connectivity and synchronization capabilities, most often associated
with Microsoft Exchange support using the ActiveSync protocol. Especially in
corporate use, and due to the increasing bring-your-own-device (BYOD) mo-
bile device policy in many firms, standards-based remote device management
capabilities are also increasingly becoming a requirement for smartphones.
Messaging oriented smartphones, such as BlackBerry’s line of products, com-
monly include a QWERTY keyboard to facilitate the core use case of the
device: writing emails efficiently on the go. However, most smartphone ven-
dors have opted to use a touch screen as the main input mechanism. Many
devices, such as Apple’s iPhone, use touch as the sole input method with few
or no physical buttons, while some others have a hybrid approach, combining
the advantages of a physical keyboard with the direct object manipulation
of a touch screen. Physical QWERTY keyboards remain available mostly on
BlackBerry devices and some older, mid to low tier smartphones as well as
some feature phones. The number of such products has diminished, however.
The current trend as of 2014 seems to overwhelmingly favor touch-only devices
where a large touch screen is the only input method and physical buttons are
used only for volume control, power switch, and other limited purposes. The
trend towards bigger touch screens in the range of 4.3 to 5.5 inches has also im-
proved the practical usability of virtual, on-screen QWERTY keyboards. The
intermediate device category between smartphones and tablets, often called
‘phablets’, appears to be gaining popularity and is further validating the con-
sumer acceptance of very large displays (5 inches or more) on pocketable de-
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vices. Despite their large physical size, these devices are still used as phones,
but also effectively replace the functionality of larger tablets.
The majority of smartphones also double as digital cameras, video recorders,
media players, and/or portable navigation devices (PNDs), being true multi-
purpose devices. It is fair to say, however, that also modern feature phones
have gained much of the functionality and features that were earlier avail-
able only on smartphones, leading to terms such as ‘pseudo-smartphone’ and
‘smartphone lite’. Thus, the definition of what really constitutes a smart-
phone unfortunately continues to remain somewhat blurry. As smartphone
OS’s, particularly Android, penetrate lower price tiers, the non-smartphone
market continues to dwindle and is expected to eventually disappear towards
the end of the decade. The year 2013 was expected to be the turning point
when smartphones outship feature and basic phones globally (IDC, 2013). Re-
cent statistics seem to confirm this, as smartphones consistently outsold non-
smartphones in the first quarter through third quarter of 2013 (VisionMobile,
2014).
It is also important to note that the smartphone business encompasses much
more than just the mobile devices and the software running on them. It is
increasingly about services, content, and solutions, ranging from quite generic
Internet services to highly tailored, integrated solutions for a specific purpose,
in both enterprise and consumer settings. The digital content consumed by
smartphone users, be it music, videos, applications or whatever, is most often
discovered, accessed, and downloaded through the Internet, on the mobile de-
vice itself. The smartphones of today are increasingly reliant on the Internet,
requiring intermittent connection to the cloud at minimum, commonly utiliz-
ing at least some form of cloud storage (e.g., synchronization of user data to
and from server clusters located in the Internet), cloud computing, or cloud-
assisted computing (e.g., real-time speech recognition on smartphones with the
help of remote computing resources).
Although most players in the smartphone business rely on device sales as the
primary monetization mechanism, it is increasingly evident that stand-alone
device sales is becoming a thing of the past and any firm in that business hop-
ing to capture significant revenue growth must be active also on the services,
content, and solutions front, either through acting as a proprietor/provider or
partnering with other firms who fill that role. Thus, this study will not be
limited to mobile devices but will consider services, content, and solutions re-
lated aspects where relevant to comprehend the whole picture of this complex
and rapidly developing business.
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1.4 Research Methodology
1.4.1 Selection of Research Method
Due to the complex nature of the research problem, the empirical research
approach is chosen. A further justification is that not all factors impacting
the subject of research are known in advance. A foundational set of factors
has been identified based on existing bodies of research and literature, but it
is assumed that additional, novel factors may be identified during the course
of the research.
The main research method is multiple case study due to the real-life context of
the research that revolves around several large companies in the mobile com-
munications, computing, and Internet content and services industries. The
theoretical framework used in the research is grounded in strategic manage-
ment and applied economics research, and therefore literature review is used
as a supporting method in order to comprehend the current state of research
in the context of the multidisciplinary fields involved. The bodies of research
most relevant to the research topic pertain to value configurations (such as
value networks), network externalities and two-sided markets, business ecosys-
tems as a model of firm populations engaged in mutual cooperation and com-
petition, and management of platforms and complementary innovation.
Unit of Analysis
The primary unit of analysis in this study is a firm, more specifically a firm
that acts as the orchestrator of an ecosystem and/or as the provider or spon-
sor/proprietor of a platform (or a two-sided market). Each firm included in
the multiple case study is also analyzed in the broader context of its ecosys-
tem and the interorganizational relationships between itself and other firms
and organizations, particularly its ecosystem partners. Therefore, also the
relationships between firms constitute a secondary unit of analysis, in line
with the relational view of Dyer & Singh (1998). A rough division between
firm-level and ecosystem-level analysis can be made. This is reflected in the
analysis framework described in Chapter 3.
Empirical Data
Mostly qualitative and descriptive data are used for analysis of the case compa-
nies’ business model, ecosystem and platform approaches, and related strate-
gies for competing and cooperating in the smartphone business, also reflecting
on the larger context of the Internet and mobility services and solutions. Quali-
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tative data are used primarily because all the relevant factors having an impact
on the analysis framework are not explicitly known a priori. It is reasonable
to expect that after gathering and analyzing enough empirical evidence, the
analysis framework itself could be improved to yield results with even higher
relevance with regard to the research questions at hand. That being said, the
framework has been built with a preliminary set of analysis dimensions that
are well grounded in prior scientific research and literature.
In the case studies of Chapter 4, the investigated data objects are press re-
leases, product information on corporate web sites, trade magazines, industry
analyst reports, market research reports, industry expert blogs, and existing
scientific publications in the field. Excluding scientific publications which are
listed in the References section, these empirical data objects are listed in Ap-
pendix A under the section titled ‘Chapter 4’.
Research Process
The research process of this study follows roughly the three-layered pyramid
model of Christensen et al. (2002) for theory-building, with minor adaptations
as shown in Figure 1.3. First, based on the research target and the research
questions defined in Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 respectively, relevant bodies of
research and existing theory are identified that would support understanding
and studying of the research problem, even if they do not readily describe
the exact same objects or actors under analysis. A brief overview of this
prior research was given in Section 1.2.1, whereas more elaborate review and
discussion of the theories takes place in Chapter 2.
Second, the various theories are categorized and grouped together based on
perceived similarities of the phenomena that they describe and also based on
the cross-citation by their authors who themselves have observed similarities
or links between the theories. One basis for the categorization is a similar
level of abstraction or analysis. As an example, some theories or concepts
relate to the analysis of individual firms or platforms operated by individual
firms, whereas others relate to broader communities or ecosystems of firms,
describing the complex interplay and relationships between these firms. Based
on the categorization of the theories and theoretical concepts, I devise an
analysis framework specifically for this study and its research questions. The
analysis framework acts as a window of sorts into the data under analysis.
Third, observations, measurements, and descriptions of the phenomena under
study are made according to the analysis framework and its categorization, re-
sulting in the formulation of the empirical findings. Eventually, these findings
are used to answer the research questions. Already before conducting the anal-
ysis, there are certain outcomes or observations that can be expected or even
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Figure 1.3: Research process
predicted, based on deduction from the theory. While making observations
based on the actual empirical data, it can happen that some anomalies are
found, i.e., some results seem to clearly contradict the theory and the expected
results arising thereof. Most results, however, should confirm the theory (4a
in Figure 1.3), being in line with the predictions arising from the deductive
process.
Christensen et al. (2002) suggest that a secondary, inductive path involving
categorization of anomalies (4b in Figure 1.3) and formulation of new or re-
vised theory (5 ) be followed as a proper scientific method for building theory.
They argue, however, that exceptions should not be mistaken for anomalies,
i.e., signs of invalidity of a theory. Instances where the expected outcome did
not occur, but for reasons that can be explained by the theory, are not anoma-
lies. Yin (2003) makes a distinction between literal replications of a theory,
i.e., instances where the outcome matches exactly what the theory predicts,
and theoretical replications where the predicted outcome did not occur, but
for reasons that the theory can explain. If a theory can account for an ob-
served phenomenon neither as a literal nor as a theoretical replication, then
an anomaly has been identified. (Christensen et al., 2002)
While the nature of the research questions of this study is more practical than
theoretical, identifying anomalies or building a new or better theory is not the
foremost goal. It may also be that a larger set of data, or a broader set of case
studies would be needed in order to be able to create meaningful new theory.
Thus, more emphasis is put on getting meaningful answers to the research
questions within the scope of this study, and ideally, being able to provide
practical guidelines to industry executives on ecosystem management.
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1.4.2 Selection of Cases
Three case companies were chosen for the multiple case study in total. The
companies, Apple, Google, and Microsoft, were chosen because each of them
can be seen as a hub and orchestrator of a business ecosystem in the smart-
phone business. Each of them is also a platform provider. These three compa-
nies compete in the same arena, yet they have very different historical legacies
as companies, hence the notion of angle of entry. Each of the companies is
representative of one particular angle (arrow) illustrated in Figure 1.2. Apple
is the ‘computer hardware and consumer electronics’ company, whereas Mi-
crosoft is the ‘computer software: operating systems and applications’ firm.
Not surprisingly, Google depicts the ‘Internet (cloud) services, content, and
advertising’ player. It is also worth noting that in light of the status quo, two
of the case companies are ‘winners’ in the sense that they occupy the number
one and number two positions in the smartphone business as leaders of their
respective ecosystems.
In contrast, BlackBerry, although not explicitly covered in the multiple case
study, could be considered an example of a ‘loser’ in the ecosystem game as
it has lost much of its former market power due to an unsuccessful ecosystem
and platform strategy. The once dominant smartphone manufacturer Nokia
could also have warranted its own case study, but given the company’s decision
to divest its handset business and transfer those assets to Microsoft, Nokia’s
smartphone business is considered in the context of the Microsoft Windows
Phone ecosystem. Microsoft is the big question mark, an unfulfilled promise,
which has struggled for years to stay relevant in the smartphone business
but has also managed to renew and grow its assets remarkably well. With
an all-new generation of operating systems launched for PCs (Windows 8),
tablets (Windows RT), and smartphones (Windows Phone 8), it is interesting
to consider Microsoft’s prospects in the ecosystem game.
These three case studies should provide sufficient data to be able to answer
the research questions. As per Figure 1.2, however, the author recognizes
two additional angles, namely ‘mobile operators’ and ‘web browser’ that could
prove out to be interesting study subjects for future research. As noted in Sec-
tion 1.1.1, large, global MNOs have had a series of unsuccessful attempts in
trying to control mobile application distribution, but the last serious effort in
this vein, WAC, was abandoned in 2012. Since then, however, advancements in
web technologies and standards such as HTML5 have sparked renewed interest
in web browser based application environments and even complete operating
systems as is the case with the Linux-based Firefox OS, being developed since
mid 2011 by the non-profit Mozilla Foundation known for its popular Firefox
web browser. Firefox OS saw its initial release in April 2013 and has received
significant support particularly from the mobile operator Telefónica, with the
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first commercial phone launched in Spain in July 2013, followed by certain
Latin American countries. In February 2014, launches in another eight coun-
tries were announced, including Germany and further Latin American coun-
tries (Telefónica, 2014). Also the German multinational operator Deutsche
Telekom and its foreign subsidiaries in Poland, Hungary, and Greece launched
their first Firefox OS devices during the summer and fall of 2013, with fur-
ther device launches announced for four additional European markets in 2014
(Deutsche Telekom, 2013, 2014). Nevertheless, the future relevance of Firefox
OS as a mobile application platform remains to be seen, but at least for the
time being, it is not a serious contender in the smartphone ecosystem game.
1.4.3 Reliability and Validity of the Results
Yin (2003) argues that the quality of case study research should evaluated by
certain criteria pertaining to the research framework used, the internal and
external validity of the results obtained as well as the reliability of the re-
sults. Validity generally refers to the extent to which an account accurately
represents the phenomenon to which it refers (Hammersley, 1990). As a con-
sequence, the research framework is valid if it includes the right dimensions
of analysis. In the case of interview studies, respondent validation is a viable
method for determining the validity of the framework. Other possible meth-
ods include the usage of multiple sources of evidence, triangulation, and the
establishment of a chain of evidence between the collection of data for each in-
dividual case (Yin, 2003). According to Silverman (2005), comprehensive data
treatment and use of appropriate tabulations also contributes to an increased
validity of the results.
Internal validity is related to causal relationships, i.e., whether certain condi-
tions of the phenomenon under study lead to outcomes of interest. In simple
terms, this refers to whether the right things are being studied and analyzed
to be able to draw conclusions about a topic of interest.
External validity, on the other hand, refers to the generalizability of the re-
sults, i.e., whether or not the identified relationships between the studied phe-
nomenon and certain outcomes can be generalized to a different or possibly
broader context, beyond the individual cases studied. According to Yin (2003),
it is an important consideration in designing the research framework and se-
lecting the cases.
Reliability means that the observations based on the data collected for the
case studies can be reliably repeated over and over with the same results.
This requires some rigor in documenting and following the same procedures
for each consecutive case, and also managing the empirical data of each case
properly, preferably storing it in a database. (Yin, 2003)
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For the case studies in Chapter 4, the general quality and quantity (depth
and breadth) of the descriptive data used is assessed and the reliability and
validity of the results is evaluated in Section 5.2.
1.5 Structure of the Study
This thesis is divided into five chapters. An introduction to the field of study
and the research problem at hand is provided in Chapter 1 while also outlining
the scope of the study and the research methodology used.
In Chapter 2, the different bodies of research relevant to the research prob-
lem are overviewed thoroughly, summarizing the most important theoretical
concepts and frameworks on value creation and networks, network effects,
business ecosystems, two-sided markets, as well as approaches to managing
product/industry platforms and complementary innovation on platforms. To
a certain extent, this chapter also attempts to bridge some of these concepts
and frameworks which bear many similarities and often describe similar phe-
nomena from a slightly different angle.
In Chapter 3, the author brings forth a new analysis framework that builds
upon many of the existing concepts and frameworks introduced in earlier re-
search and described in the previous chapter but also incorporates some novel
ideas. This framework is designed especially with the smartphone business
context in mind, although its applicability may be wider.
In Chapter 4, the analysis framework developed and explained in the previ-
ous chapter is applied to three distinct case studies, each one of them on a
major firm that is active in the global smartphone business, albeit with sig-
nificantly different backgrounds and legacy as well as differing approaches to
capturing value and playing the ecosystem game. The latter part of the chap-
ter also synthesizes the results from the case studies in order to identify and
discuss commonalities between the case companies and their ecosystems and
platforms.
In Chapter 5, the key results obtained from the case studies are summarized in
order to be able to formulate answers to the research problem. Reliability and
validity of the results are reviewed for the entire study. Practical implications
for industry executives and managers are presented, drawing from the answers
to the research questions and the case studies. Finally, suggested further
research is discussed.
Appendix A contains a list of references to web articles, press releases, news
stories, industry analyst reports, expert blogs, and other descriptive material
that are used in the case studies of Chapter 4.
Chapter 2
Theoretical Background
In this chapter, the main theoretical concepts relevant to the thesis are pre-
sented and discussed. Moreover, the chapter attempts to summarize the bulk
of the research articles and other literature that was reviewed in order to com-
prehend the status quo of the bodies of research related to the thesis. This
theoretical background is then used as a basis for developing and formulating
the analysis framework described in Chapter 3.
2.1 Path Dependency Theory and Angle of En-
try
When outlining the research problem at hand and defining the research ques-
tions to be answered in Section 1.2.3, the concept of angle of entry was intro-
duced to illustrate the potential impact of the history, capabilities, and assets
of different firms on their choices and inclinations evident in their ecosystem
and platform strategies as well as performance in the mobile smartphones busi-
ness. Also presented was the hypothesis that the angle of entry of a firm can
at least partially be used to explain some of the ecosystem or platform level
success factors.
As noted in Section 1.2.1, the theory of path dependency in economics would
seems to support this idea. Let us explore this foundational concept briefly.
2.1.1 Path Dependence
Originally, path dependency theory was conceived by economists, most no-
tably David, Arthur, and Liebowitz & Margolis, to explain technology adop-
tion processes, such as why industries have sometimes settled on supposedly
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inferior technological standards (consider, e.g., the classic case of the Video
Home System (VHS) vs. Betamax standards war which ended in the victory
of VHS), but also to understand industry evolution in general. The theory
has been strongly influential on the field of evolutionary economics. It also
has its counterpart in mathematics and physics where chaos theory includes
the notion of sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Using a popular ex-
ample commonly referred to as the butterfly effect, “a hurricane off the coast
of Florida may be the fault of a butterfly flapping its wings in the Sahara”
(Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995b).
Arthur (1989, 1994) has studied the dynamics of allocation between two or
more competing technologies displaying increasing returns, i.e., the more they
are adopted, the more experience is gained with them, and the more they are
developed further and improved. He notes that modern, complex technologies
often exhibit such characteristics, arising naturally in a market where agents
(e.g., consumers) must choose between technologies competing for adoption.
He further argues that under such conditions multiple outcomes are possi-
ble, as allocation problems with increasing returns tend to exhibit multiple
equilibria. Although static analysis can typically locate these multiple equi-
libria, it usually cannot conclusively tell which one will be “selected”, i.e.,
be the outcome of the adoption process, resulting in a specific market-share
structure. Through a dynamic analysis approach, he has studied how the pos-
sibility of random events occurring during adoption influences the selection of
the outcome. According to the results obtained by Arthur (1989), seemingly
small historical events and insignificant circumstances can become magnified
by positive feedback loops and may cumulatively “tip” the system into the
actual outcome selected.
According to David (2001), the concept of path dependence refers to a property
of “contingent, non-reversible dynamic processes, including a wide array of
biological and social processes that can properly be described as evolutionary”.
In probabilistic terms, he states that “a path dependent stochastic process is
one whose asymptotic distribution evolves as a consequence (function of) the
process’s own history” and that non-ergodic processes, being unable to shake
free of their history, are said to yield path dependent outcomes.
In particular, David (1985) has studied the emergence of the nowadays ubiq-
uitous QWERTY keyboard layout (originating from the 1870s) as the de facto
standard on typewriters and later PCs. Some alternative layouts introduced
later, such as the Dvorak layout (from the 1930s), offered better ergonomics
and less effort in moving fingers, yielding a better typing rate than a stan-
dard QWERTY keyboard, but have remained marginal. David (1985) argues
that it is possible for a standard that is first-to-market to become entrenched,
persisting in the face of superior competitors due to the legacy established by
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the early standard. This notion of legacy can be seen as analogous to net-
work effects as described by Katz & Shapiro (1985, 1986) — typically, the
longer a particular standard has existed, the larger its network of users and
the stronger its network effects. The original considerations that led to the
adoption of the QWERTY layout — avoiding typewriter hammer-jamming
problems — are but a distant memory, but modern society is locked into this
arguably inefficient standard by little more than historical accident.
Liebowitz & Margolis (1995a) have studied path dependence from the per-
spective that economies and markets appear to make errors in the choice of
products and standards and may even “lock-in” to these incorrect choices de-
spite readily available information that points out better choices. They argue
that possessing even a minor advantage or a seemingly inconsequential lead
for some technology, product, or standard can have significant and irreversible
influences on the ultimate market allocation of resources. Similarly, Arthur
(1989) notes that dynamic allocation under increasing returns can cause the
economy gradually to lock itself in to an outcome that is not necessarily supe-
rior to alternatives, not easily altered, and not entirely predictable in advance1.
Thus, it is interesting that such lock-ins and errors do occur even though the
business world is characterized by voluntary decisions and individually maxi-
mizing behavior.
Three types (or degrees) of path dependence are identified by Liebowitz &
Margolis (1995a), each with progressively stronger assertions depending on
whether inefficiency is implied and whether it could have been avoided. First-
degree path dependence merely implies the existence of an intertemporal re-
lationship, i.e., that a past decision (initial conditions) will have an impact
on subsequent conditions but this impact need not imply any kind of ineffi-
ciency of the outcome. Also, it is possible that the maker of the past decision
has fully appreciated the long-term effects of his/her decision and has taken
them into account. Second-degree path dependence implies that a past deci-
sion, seemingly efficient at the time of its making, turns out to be inefficient in
retrospect due to better knowledge available. In such a case, sensitive depen-
dence on initial conditions leads to outcomes that are regrettable and costly
to change. Since little can be done retroactively to solve the problem of lim-
1Arthur (1989) discusses the problem also from the perspective of policy makers, arguing
that in the constant and diminishing-returns cases, the usual policy of letting the superior
technology emerge as the outcome that dominates is indeed appropriate, whereas in the
increasing-returns case, however, a laissez-faire policy lacking any regulatory intervention
does not guarantee that the superior technology in the long-run sense is actually going
to be the one that prevails in the competition for adoption. A possible solution could
include an inter-agent market to induce early adopters to explore promising but costly
nascent technologies that might prove lucrative for later adopters, or alternatively, a central
authority could fund the exploration of promising but less popular technological paths.
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ited knowledge, this type of path dependence is not considered meaningfully
inefficient even when the outcomes are suboptimal. Finally, third-degree path
dependence means a situation where sensitive dependence on initial conditions
leads to an outcome that is indeed inefficient but also “remediable” (avoidable)
in the sense that there either exists or existed some feasible method for rec-
ognizing and achieving a preferred outcome but that outcome is not obtained
due to that method (erroneously) not being used.
In a manner similar to examining the path dependence of industries and stan-
dards, it is possible to examine individual firms in terms of their adoption
of technologies, business models, and their strategic choices in general. If we
study the legacy of a firm, we are likely to observe that many historical de-
cisions have influenced the firm’s current actions and that the firm’s legacy
continues to have an influence on its present and future.
2.1.2 Angle of Entry and Its Impact on Ecosystem and
Platform Strategies
The hypothesis on the angle of entry of firms is supported by the perception
that many large incumbents that currently occupy a major role in the mobile
smartphone business have an older, more mature business in PC or CE man-
ufacturing, computer operating systems and/or software, or alternatively, in
the relatively new business domain of Internet services, content, and online
advertising. As these companies have expanded or refocused their business on
the rapidly growing mobile sector, they have made strategic choices regarding
which roles in the ecosystem or value network they desire to occupy, and also
how they intend to capture value. Based on the legacy of these firms, their
existing businesses, and their capabilities and assets, the firms have been and
are in somewhat different positions as they have entered the mobile business
arena, and thus stand to capture value from their ecosystem in somewhat
different ways.
Case Example: Apple
Apple, whose legacy is in the design and manufacture of proprietary com-
puter hardware and accompanying software, has based its monetization model
mainly on selling hardware: computers, tablets, smartphones, and personal
media players. One could argue that because of its legacy as a premium-
priced, niche computer manufacturer, Apple is repeating the same scheme in
its newer business domains such as smartphones, selling less in absolute volume
terms than companies that also produce low-cost, mass-market products but
capturing the bulk of industry’s revenue and profits by maintaining a very high
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average sales price (ASP) and gross margin for its products. Apple’s closed
platform approach for its computers, using proprietary, non-PC-compatible
hardware (before the 2005 Intel migration decision), a proprietary OS, and
proprietary or otherwise incompatible peripheral interfaces, has been carried
over to its portable CE devices, including smartphones.
Still today, there is no standard Universal Serial Bus (USB) connector on the
latest iPhone or iPad, although Apple has replaced its familiar, 30-pin dock
connector with a new 8-pin ‘Lightning’ connector. Consumers are required to
purchase (costly) adapter cables if they wish to continue using their existing
hardware accessories with the new Apple devices. While also a form of mone-
tization for Apple through the charging of license fees from accessory vendors
for allowing the use of the proprietary interface and “Made for iPhone” brand-
ing, this approach also allows Apple stricter control of the accessory vendors
(Wall Street Journal, 2012). In comparison, most other smartphone vendors
have adopted an open accessory ecosystem strategy and use the micro-USB
interface for which connectors, cables, and accessories are abundant and af-
fordable.
From the perspective of path dependence as described by Liebowitz & Margo-
lis (1995a), it would appear that Apple exhibits the first-degree type, as it has
clearly made conscious decisions early on that have influenced the company’s
technology and product design choices to this day. While these decisions have
been quite different from those of other PC/CE manufacturers, they do not
imply inefficiency — today, Apple (NASDAQ: AAPL) has the largest market
capitalization of all publicly traded companies in the world, having overtaken
Exxon Mobil (NYSE: XOM) in the first quarter of 2012. As noted in Sec-
tion 1.1.1, however, Apple has accomplished several major technology transi-
tions in situations where it could have been described to operate inefficiently
due to third-degree path dependence (e.g., relying on PowerPC processors in
its computers when the market-dominant Intel processors already had a major
lead in performance).
Case Example: Google
Google, the current search giant, started out with search keyword advertising
as its sole method of monetization. While the SaaS business model and its
applications, e.g., Google Apps for Business, rely on continuous subscription-
based monetization models, advertising revenue mostly on a cost-per-click
(CPC) basis remains Google’s primary source of revenue, i.e., advertisers pay
when users click their ads. An alternative pricing scheme is based on cost-
per-impression (CPI). In addition to search advertising, Google also provides
display advertising services through its DoubleClick advertising technology
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that includes video, text, images, and other interactive ads. These ads appear
on YouTube, Google Finance, and Google Network member websites (BMI-
Matters, 2012).
Already before Google acquired the struggling handset maker Motorola (which
already used Google’s Android OS platform in its smartphones), it was widely
speculated whether Google would start making money by selling its own
“Googlephone” or, in general, CE devices enabled with Android and Google
software. As of January 2014, however, Google has taken a step back from
in-house smartphone manufacturing with the decision to divest the former Mo-
torola handset business but has interestingly expanded into new domains such
as automotive (e.g., autonomous driving as well as automotive Android plat-
form development through the Open Automotive Alliance (OAA)), robotics,
and home automation (MIT Technology Review, 2013; Fast Company, 2014).
These developments can be taken as a definitive sign that Google is very se-
rious about the Internet of Things, seeking to further expand its presence in
people’s daily lives.
To date, Google has mostly relied on its hardware partners to produce Android
handsets and ‘Chromebooks’ (see Google, 2012a), laptops running Google’s
Linux-based Chrome OS, but it has also directly sold its ‘Nexus’-branded An-
droid devices which are intended to showcase the latest “Google experience”
on a device, often at a reasonable price. This applies also to Android tablets
(see Google, 2012b). Google also introduced a media-streaming entertainment
device (set-top box) called ‘Nexus Q’ in June 2012 but later cancelled it amidst
criticism for having too few features for its price. So, even today, while def-
initely the hub of the largest smartphone ecosystem currently in existence,
Google is mostly sticking to its roots in terms of monetization, earning as
much as 96% of its revenue from advertising (BMIMatters, 2012).
Google is a relatively new company, having been founded in 1998, but never-
theless, it can be seen to exhibit first-degree path dependence in its innovation
process and business model. For example, much like the original Google search
engine (circa 1997–1998), almost all of its newer services were first launched as
a public “beta”, eventually maturing to commercial grade services or ramped
down (such as Google Wave) if they did not meet adoption targets. Also,
Google has been adamant in keeping its services “free” to the general public
— of course, free essentially means ad-funded, and Google is increasingly prof-
iting from mining the “big data” that hundreds of millions of consumers have
trusted the company with.
Kenney & Pon (2011), who extensively discuss the OS platform strategies of
smartphone players such as Apple and Google, also speculate that the busi-
ness models of those companies are legacies of the path-dependent evolutions
of the firm and the sector within which they were dominant and that this no-
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tion can at least partially explain the different business models that firms have
adopted as they have entered the mobile smartphone business. Further exam-
ples and evidence on the validity of the ‘angle of entry’ concept are presented
in Chapter 4, where it is applied to the analysis of the case companies.
2.2 Concepts for Modeling Value Creation
In this section, a number of popular concepts for modeling the value creation
process of firms are reviewed and discussed. In particular, the value chain, the
value shop, and the value network are examined, referencing the key literature
on each concept.
2.2.1 Value Chain
The value chain is a popular business management concept that was originated
by Porter (1985). Porter argues that every firm has a collection of strategically
important activities that are performed to design, produce, market, deliver,
and support its product, and that those activities can be grouped into a series
of sequential, value-adding stages, forming a chain. Products pass through
every activity of the chain, gaining some value at each successive activity.
The goal of the activities of a firm is to offer the customer a level of value that
exceeds or offsets the combined costs of the activities, thus resulting in a profit
margin. In essence, the value chain is a tool for identifying and analyzing the
sources of firm-level competitive advantage.
Porter asserts that a firm’s value chain and the way it performs its individual
activities are a reflection of its history, its strategy, its approach to implement-
ing its strategy, and the underlying economics of the activities themselves, and
that although firms in the same industry may have similar value chains, the
value chains of competitors often differ. Porter uses a generic value chain
model as illustrated in Figure 2.1 to describe the common value activities of
firms. These value activities can be grouped into five generic categories of
primary activities which directly contribute to creating and bringing value to
the customer, and four generic categories of support activities which enable
and improve the performance of the primary activities. (Porter, 1985)
The primary activity categories are:
• Inbound Logistics : the receiving, warehousing, and disseminating of in-
puts, and their transportation to manufacturing as required.
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Figure 2.1: Porter’s generic value chain model
• Operations : transforming inputs into final products: e.g., machining,
packaging, assembly, testing, and facility operations.
• Outbound Logistics : collecting, warehousing, and distributing the fin-
ished goods to buyers.
• Marketing & Sales : providing means (sales channels, sales force) by
which buyers can purchase the product and inducing them to do so
through advertising, promoting, etc.
• Service: after-sales support of customers who have purchased the prod-
uct, covering installation, maintenance, repair, training, part supply, etc.
The support activity categories are:
• Firm Infrastructure: general management, planning, finance, account-
ing, legal, government affairs, quality management, standardization, in-
formation systems, etc.
• Human Resource Management : recruiting, hiring, training, develop-
ment, and compensation of all types of personnel for both primary and
support activities.
• Technology Development : broad range of activities aiming at product or
process improvements, or more generically, to improve any technology
embodied in the value activities.
• Procurement : purchasing inputs such as raw materials, supplies, and
other consumable items, as well as assets including machinery, equip-
ment, buildings, etc.
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 41
A firm’s ability to generate margin or profit is dependent on its effectiveness
in performing the activities efficiently, so that the price that the customer is
willing to pay for the products more than offsets the costs of the activities.
Each activity in the value chain, in principle, provides an opportunity to gen-
erate superior value as compared to competitors. Therefore, a competitive
advantage may be attained by reconfiguring the value chain to provide either
lower cost or better differentiation.
The value chain concept has been extended beyond the boundaries of indi-
vidual firms. A firm’s value chain can be considered part of a larger system
that includes the value chains of upstream suppliers, downstream channels,
and buyers. Porter has named this series of value chains as the value system,
illustrated conceptually in Figure 2.2 (Porter, 1985).
...
Firm
Value Chain
Channel
Value Chain
Supplier
Value Chain
Buyer
Value Chain
Figure 2.2: Porter’s value system
While the activities within a value chain are related through linkages, these
linkages exist not only in a firm’s value chain, but also between value chains
of different firms. Managing linkages often involves trade-offs between opti-
mization and coordination. Although a firm with a high degree of vertical
integration (i.e., a wide scope of internal activities spanning partially or fully
the domains of suppliers, channels, and/or buyers) is better equipped to coor-
dinate upstream and downstream activities, a firm with a lesser degree of ver-
tical integration can nevertheless make agreements with suppliers and channel
partners to achieve better coordination, e.g., through geographical co-location
or proximity. Thus, the exploitation of vertical linkages does not necessarily
require vertical integration, but integration may make it easier to reap the
benefits of those linkages. It is clearly evident that a firm’s success in develop-
ing and sustaining a competitive advantage depends not only on its own value
chain, but also its ability to manage the value system it belongs to. (Porter,
1985)
Criticism
Although still widely used as an analysis tool, the value chain framework has
been criticized for focusing too much on the unidirectional flow of materials
and transformation of inputs into products as a means to create value. Un-
doubtedly, the primary activity taxonomy of the value chain is well suited
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to describing and analyzing a traditional manufacturing firm, but less so for
many firms operating in the services and knowledge industries, as argued by
Stabell & Fjeldstad (1998). Moreover, for industries such as insurance and
banking, trying to assign and analyze activities in terms of the five primary
activity categories is not only difficult, but can also obscure the value creation
logic rather than illuminate it. Although it is possible to describe, e.g., the
document flow of an insurance company using the value chain model, such a
model hardly captures the essence of the value creation, as the logic of many
strategically important activities (reinsurance, risk assessment, customer rela-
tionship management, etc.) cannot be effectively described using the logistics
and transformation focused approach of the value chain. A similar case can
be made for banking, where the value chain is unable to deal explicitly with
both lenders and borrowers as bank customers. The model also serves to ob-
scure the value creation logic by putting too much emphasis on transaction
processing and its associated unit costs, while all but ignoring interest spread
and risk management (Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998).
Through the identification of alternative means of value creation, Stabell &
Fjeldstad (1998) have generalized value chain analysis into what they call value
configuration analysis. Porter’s value chain is seen as one of three alternative
value configuration models, the others being the value shop and the value
network. These models are discussed in the following sections.
2.2.2 Value Shop
The generic value chain is arguably suitable for modeling a so called long-linked
technology, where value is created by transforming inputs into products, and
the product acts as the medium for transferring value between the firm and its
customers (Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998). However, this is in stark contrast to a
large number of firms whose value creation logic relies on using knowledge to
solve specific problems for clients. The value shop model introduced by Stabell
& Fjeldstad (1998) describes the value creation in these firms as consisting of
activities related to the diagnosis of the problem, the development, testing
and selection of alternative solutions, as well as the implementation and eval-
uation of the selected solution. This makes the value shop an ideal model for
describing knowledge intensive firms, e.g., consulting companies, engineering
companies, law firms, hospitals, and in general, firms that compete in the
knowledge economy (Fjeldstad & Andersen, 2003). Nevertheless, often some
important functions or parts of a firm can be better understood as a value
shop in terms of their value creation logic, even though the primary activities
of the firm as a whole would conform to the value chain model. The value
shop model is illustrated in Figure 2.3 (Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998).
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Figure 2.3: Stabell and Fjeldstad’s value shop
In a similar fashion to the value chain, the value shop has primary and sec-
ondary activities. The five generic categories of primary value shop activities
are (Fjeldstad & Andersen, 2003; Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998):
• Problem Finding and Acquisition: identifying, recording, reviewing, and
formulating the problem to be solved as well as choosing the overall
problem-solving approach
• Problem Solving : development and evaluation of alternative solutions to
the problem
• Choice: selecting one of the alternative solutions to be pursued
• Implementation: communicating, organizing, and implementing the cho-
sen solution
• Monitoring and Evaluation: measuring and evaluating to what extent
the implemented solution has solved the initial problem statement
However, contrary to the value chain, the activities of the value shop are not
strictly sequential, but interruptible and recurring in the sense that if the se-
lected approach does not resolve the problem, a new iteration of the activity
cycle is started, usually with a different set of resources committed. Using an
analogy from healthcare, a doctor will initially try straightforward and inex-
pensive diagnostic methods and treatments and then scale up both diagnostics
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and treatments until the patient has recovered. (Fjeldstad & Andersen, 2003;
Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998)
The secondary or support activity categories are the same as those identi-
fied by Porter (1985). They are not always explicitly included in value shop
diagrams, as Stabell & Fjeldstad (1998) argue that many of them are co-
performed with the primary activities. Although the support activities are
not distinct, they are deemed as crucial to a firm’s competitive advantage.
Stabell & Fjeldstad (1998) emphasize the importance of value drivers over
cost drivers in value shops. They argue that clients of knowledge intensive
firms are primarily looking for relatively certain solutions to their problems
rather than services with the lowest price tag as their main attribute. The
canonical value driver in such firms is success as it materializes in reputation
and relationships. A firm’s success improves access to the best personnel for
hire as well as the best clients and projects. Also Porter (1985) recognized
that reputation signals value.
For any value shop, learning is an integral and important part of the problem-
solving cycle, as is evidenced by the primary activity category Monitoring and
Evaluation. It is a means to improve the shop’s capabilities to deal with the
problem at hand, increasing effectiveness through better problem definition,
better solution alternatives, and better implementation. Moreover, learning
across projects and problems of different clients is a critical shop-level linkage
which is seen as especially important for interrupted problem-solving cycles
that appear inconclusive but provide valuable feedback if monitored and eval-
uated systematically. (Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998)
2.2.3 Value Network
The value network, contrary to the more straightforward value chain and value
shop, is a multifaceted concept described by several authors, most notably
Christensen (1997) and Stabell & Fjeldstad (1998), although it can be said
that the foundation for the concept was laid in the research of Normann &
Ramirez (1993) on value constellations where they identified the shortcomings
of the value chain in the post-industrial economy. Normann & Ramirez (1993)
argued that value should be created in any way that is appropriate, without
being limited by the organizational boundaries of suppliers and customers as in
the value chain model, and that the offering of a firm determines the boundary
points where different participants come together to co-produce value.
Before going deeper into the theory of value networks, some foundational con-
cepts are discussed briefly.
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Network Externalities and Positive Feedback
The concept of a network is familiar to everyone — communications networks
such as telephone networks and the Internet as well as transportation networks
such as railroad networks and airline networks are well-known examples of
real, physical networks. There are, however, other types of networks which
are virtual in nature and as such do not require physical interconnections
between their nodes. Examples of such networks include, e.g., the users of
many high-tech or consumer electronics products, such as Mac users. In this
example, the users are in the same network because they share a computing
platform that allows them to use the same software and hardware components
due to compatibility. (Shapiro & Varian, 1998)
The fundamental economic characteristic of networks, whether real or virtual,
is that they exhibit network effects, also known as network externalities (Katz
& Shapiro, 1985). This means that the value of the network for a user is
dependent on the number of other people who are connected to (and reachable
via) the network. A positive network externality provides incremental value
to the entire network for each additional user connected to it. The classic
example illustrating the concept is the telephone network: the more users own
a telephone and are connected to the network, the more valuable the network
is to each of its users. Thus, a user joining the network ends up creating
value for the other existing users, although this may have not been the user’s
original motivation. Negative network externalities, where additional users
make a network less valuable to its existing users, are commonly referred to
as congestion. Positive network externalities can be likened to demand-side
economies of scale, as opposed to supply-side economies of scale, the latter
being the prevalent form in manufacturing industries.
Sustained positive network externalities can lead to a positive feedback loop
where the network gains increasing value due to new users, which then attracts
even more new users to the network. This phenomenon is often referred to
as a virtuous circle (or cycle), meaning that “the strong get stronger”. The
flip side of positive feedback is that “the weak get weaker” as well, caught in
a vicious circle. Shapiro & Varian (1998) argue that positive feedback is a
prevalent, potent force in the network economy, especially affecting industries
such as consumer electronics and personal computing. When two or more
firms compete in a market that exhibits strong positive feedback, only one
may emerge as the winner, tipping the market in its favor and driving the
competition out of business. Such a market is commonly referred to as a
winner-take-all market.
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Stabell and Fjeldstad’s Value Networks
Firms that create value by acting as mediators to their customers in the ex-
change of goods, information, or capital can appropriately be modeled as value
networks, according to Stabell & Fjeldstad (1998). A value network firm re-
lies on a mediating technology that facilitates the various types of exchange
relationships between its customers which are geographically and temporally
distributed. Value is created by linking customers through the contract set
and infrastructure. The linking can be either direct or indirect, a telephone
service being a prime example of the former (a call between two customers),
and banking an example of the latter (a group of customers linked through a
common pool of funds). Examples of value network firms include telephone
companies and Internet service providers (ISPs), banks, insurance companies,
stock brokers, credit card companies, airlines, postal services, etc.
It is important to note that the firm itself does not constitute the network but
rather provides a networking service by means of its infrastructure. The firm,
in its mediating capacity, can be thought of as a club manager of sorts. The
mediating firm admits those firms that are perceived to complement the ex-
isting member base as members to the network, and excludes (in some cases)
those that don’t. A value network firm has primary and secondary (support)
activity categories, illustrated in Figure 2.4 (Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998). Once
again, the support activity categories are the same as those in the value chain
and the value shop, but the primary activities are distinct. In the value net-
work, there is no sequence between the activities as they are performed fully
in parallel, setting the model apart from the fully sequential flow of the value
chain and iteratively sequential, interruptible flow of the value shop.
Promotion and Contract Management is about marketing the network, invit-
ing and recruiting new members, and managing the contracts that determine
the privileges and obligations for each member. The contractual terms govern-
ing the service provisioning can define, e.g., the size of credit lines, bandwidth
and traffic quotas, and the associated charging. The mediating firm has within
its power to establish, monitor, and terminate direct or indirect relationships
among the members of the network. From its point of view, all members of
the network are its customers, although supplier-customer relationships may
exist between members. (Fjeldstad & Andersen, 2003; Stabell & Fjeldstad,
1998)
Service Provisioning equates to assisting the customers in making exchanges
(of money, information, goods, etc.) between each other. The mediator’s
role here is to enable multilateral interactions between the customers through
the bilateral interactions between itself and the customers. The activities
within this category include those associated with establishing, maintaining,
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Figure 2.4: Stabell and Fjeldstad’s value network
and terminating links between customers, and billing accordingly. (Fjeldstad
& Andersen, 2003; Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998)
Infrastructure Operation includes activities associated with maintaining and
running the infrastructure of the network, e.g., maintaining access points to
the network and ensuring sufficient capacity is available to serve the customers.
(Fjeldstad & Andersen, 2003; Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998)
Value network firms compete mainly on the basis of three key determinants: 1)
the size of network (number of member firms), 2) the degree to which the net-
work members have exchanges with each other, and 3) the types of exchanges
that can be organized via the network. These factors involve trade-offs, so the
value network firm must maintain the right balance between network scope
(reach) and the capacity and range of services provided (richness). This is also
instrumental in ensuring network profitability. (Fjeldstad & Andersen, 2003)
The cost side is largely determined by the activities associated with acquiring
members for the network as well as operating the infrastructure and providing
the services, and the proportion of fixed costs is typically high compared to
variable costs, making the attribution of costs to any particular unit of ser-
vice difficult. Value, on the other hand, is closely linked to network size and
composition. Some members and links in the network are more valuable than
others, and it is typical of value networks that strategic pricing is applied to
individual links, as is the case, e.g., with airlines and their process of yield
management. As a general principle, the revenue yield of a value network
must be managed on a network basis rather than an individual link basis.
Fjeldstad & Andersen (2003) suggest three strategies for this purpose:
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1. Optimizing pricing : pricing a service for its expected value to customers
at a given time rather than marginal cost; this is done as part of yield
management as noted above
2. Increasing the number of exchanges that can be facilitated over a network :
using complementary networks to increase network attractiveness and
stimulating good activity in the networks to increase the value of own
services
3. Internalizing transactions : transactions that occur within a firm’s own
network are generally cheaper than those that require interconnection
with other networks, so internalizing transactions not only helps drive
costs down but also increases flexibility to manage the network yield
It is imperative that a value network firm initially recruits the customers that
are more connected than others as members, allowing the firm to maximize the
value-adding, positive network effects gained through increased connectivity.
Moreover, doing so allows them to overcome the barrier that the lack of these
network effects presents during the initial roll-out phase of a new service, as
the service becomes more valuable earlier. As some firms bring in significantly
more value to the network than others due to their unique assets or capabil-
ities, they are to be recruited earlier than others. Yet, while customers value
connectivity, especially to their particular nodes of interest, providing that
connectivity within your network may not always be the most economically
viable option due to the costs involved. In such cases, it may make sense to
form alliances with other networks in order to allow interconnections, effec-
tively combining the network effects of the individual networks. (Fjeldstad &
Andersen, 2003)
Christensen’s Value Networks
Christensen (1997) defines the concept of the value network as the “context
within which a firm identifies and responds to customers’ needs, solves prob-
lems, procures input, reacts to competitors, and strives for profit”. He further
argues that within a value network, each firm’s competitive strategy, and its
past choices of markets in particular, determines its perceptions of the eco-
nomic value of a new technology, and that these perceptions shape the rewards
expected through pursuit of sustaining and disruptive innovations. Through
the concept, he attempts to understand why large, established incumbents (or
so called “great companies”) so often fail when new disruptive technologies are
ignored for too long due to a lack of market pull from current customers.
This short term customer needs focused optimization of business operations
and resources, while a management cornerstone of many successful industry
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leaders, effectively also inhibits the companies to pursue technological innova-
tions that are seemingly insignificant in terms of business opportunity at first,
but later disrupt the incumbent’s business as the market shifts in favor of new
technology and the new entrants pushing it. In other words, incumbents often
pursue continuous, incremental innovations to sustain the value of a key prod-
uct in the value network, while innovations more disruptive in nature, enabling
new products that are not part of the firm’s current value network, are often
neglected. This is due to the fact that the new products often provide lower
margins at first and are not very well suited for existing customers but rather
target new segments for which demand is still embryonic.
Christensen (1997) argues that companies form value networks because they
provide products or services that together constitute a solution for a partic-
ular market. Often, the structure of the value network reflects that of the
end product or solution where products and their components are nested hi-
erarchically in a complex manner. Thus, the value network can be described
as a nested network of producers and markets through which components at
each level are made and sold to integrators in the next higher level, with the
computing hardware industry as an example.
Competition between firms exists on the level of each value network compo-
nent, e.g., a mass memory manufacturer competes against other mass memory
manufacturers but they all occupy the same position in the value network,
acting as suppliers to computer manufacturers. In different value networks,
however, the firms competing for the same component may differ. The spe-
cific characteristics of a value network often make it difficult for firms in that
particular network to adapt to the requirements of other value networks.
Allee’s Value Networks
Allee (2000) argues that virtually any organization can be understood as a
value network, including government agencies and non-profit organizations,
and value network perspectives can help explain the dynamics of various eco-
nomic clusters and national economies as well. In her view, however, most
approaches to analyzing and reconfiguring value networks have not taken into
account the role of knowledge and intangible value exchange as the founda-
tion for these emerging networked enterprises, in spite of widespread research
interest in the knowledge economy, intellectual capital, and intangible assets
in general. According to her definition, a value network generates economic
value through “complex dynamic exchanges between one or more enterprises,
customers, suppliers, strategic partners, and the community”.
A framework of “the three currencies of value” which defines the bases of value
exchange between organizations, not limited merely to transactions around
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 50
goods, services, and revenue, is presented by Allee (2000) in order to explain
the exchange of knowledge and other intangible assets such as sense of com-
munity, customer loyalty, and opportunities related to, e.g., branding. They
are called currencies of value because they serve as a medium of exchange, this
being the basic definition of currency as well. The three currencies of value
defined by Allee (2000) are as follows:
1. Goods, services, and revenue: Exchanges for services or goods, including
all transactions involving contracts and invoices, return receipt of orders,
request for proposals, confirmations, or payment. Knowledge products
or services that generate revenue or are expected as part of service (such
as reports or package inserts) are part of the flow of goods, services, and
revenue.
2. Knowledge: Exchanges of strategic information, planning knowledge,
process knowledge, technical know-how, collaborative design, policy de-
velopment, etc., which flow around and support the core product and
service value chain.
3. Intangible benefits : Exchanges of value and benefits that go beyond the
actual service and that are not accounted for in traditional financial
measures, such as a sense of community, customer loyalty, image en-
hancement, or co-branding opportunities.
Allee (2000) argues that as an increasing number of products and services
depend on the exchange of knowledge and information between organizations,
knowledge and intangible assets become mediums of exchange or currencies in
their own right. Hence, direct exchanges of revenue, goods, and services are
only a part of the overall picture, and knowledge and intangible benefits are
of equal importance, and the success of a networked firm indeed depends on
building a rich web of trusted relationships. These relationships between firms
in a value network may be worthy indicators of present and future capabilities
to sustain a competitive advantage.
2.3 Business Ecosystem
2.3.1 Introduction
The concept of business ecosystem, first introduced in the Harvard Business
Review article Predators and Prey: A New Ecology of Competition by Moore
(1993) and further elaborated on in a subsequent book (Moore, 1996), is a
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 51
relatively new but nowadays widely adopted concept in strategic management
for describing communities of interacting organizations that cooperate, com-
pete, and coevolve together over time in order to adapt themselves to an
ever-changing environment. The business ecosystem is understood as a dy-
namic or even volatile structure, constantly evolving in response to internal
and external stimuli such as competition between firms inside and outside the
ecosystem as well as changes in the external conditions and business environ-
ment, technology and innovation, etc.
Moore (1993) argues that successful businesses are those that evolve rapidly
and effectively, but this cannot be accomplished in a vacuum. Instead, they
must draw in resources and capital and attract various partners, suppliers,
and customers to create cooperative networks. As a starting point for his
biological analogy, Moore refers to anthropologist Gregory Bateson’s definition
of coevolution, a process in which interdependent species evolve in an endless
reciprocal cycle, in which “changes in species A set the stage for the natural
selection of changes in species B” and vice versa. Moreover, citing biologist
Stephen Jay Gould, Moore acknowledges that just as natural ecosystems may
collapse when environmental conditions change too radically, often resulting in
the previously dominant species losing their central role, business ecosystems
and their member organizations face similar challenges.
Ecosystem as an Analogy
Moore (1993) was not the first to user the biological ecosystem as an analogy
in a business context. Frosch & Gallopoulos (1989) introduced the concept of
industrial ecosystem as an ideal state of sorts where all industrial operations
and manufacturing processes are optimized in such a way that all material is
recycled infinitely and efficiently, with environmental sustainability as the goal.
However, this concept is quite far from the one developed by Moore. Roth-
schild (1990), on the other hand, is much closer with his perception of the
economy as an ecosystem, called “bionomics”. Rothschild argues that several
key phenomena observed in nature, such as competition, specialization, coop-
eration, exploitation, learning, growth, etc., are also central in the business
world, and in fact, the basic mechanisms of economic change are remarkably
similar with those found in nature, the main difference being speed which is
obviously much greater in economic change.
Rothschild (1990) uses various other biological analogies in describing eco-
nomic phenomena. He states that an organization is defined by its technology
and by its associations with its suppliers, competitors, and customers, just
like a living organism is defined by the information in its genes as well as by
its relationships to its prey, competitors, and predators. From a bionomics
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perspective, he argues, organisms and organizations are nodes in networks of
relationships. With the passage of time, some nodes are wiped out and new
ones emerge, triggering adjustments that ripple across each network. Roth-
schild likens firms to biological organisms and industries to species. Following
the laws of natural selection, efficiency is rewarded by survival whereas ineffi-
ciency is punished by extinction.
In his book on complexity theory, Lewin (1999) links biology and the world of
business through an explanation that companies, much like biological organ-
isms, operate within a rich network of interactions, both on a local scale and
on a global scale. He argues further that biological ecosystems and economic
ecosystems are complex adaptive systems in nature and thus follow the same
fundamental laws and share some fundamental properties.
It should be noted, however, that there are some pronounced differences be-
tween biological and business ecosystems. Iansiti & Levien (2004a) point out
that, first of all, the actors in business ecosystems are intelligent and thus ca-
pable of planning and envisioning the future with a certain degree of accuracy.
Related to the intelligence of the ecosystem actors is also the ability to make
conscious decisions, whereas biological ecosystems lack a similar conscious in-
tent (Lewin, 1999). Another difference is that business ecosystems typically
compete over potential members although such behavior cannot be observed
in nature. Moreover, according to Iansiti & Levien (2004a), business ecosys-
tems aim at delivering innovations, whereas the goal of natural ecosystems is
merely survival.
Peltoniemi & Vuori have studied the concept of business ecosystem and its
various uses as an analogy extensively. The interested reader should consult
their publications (Peltoniemi, 2004; Peltoniemi & Vuori, 2004; Peltoniemi,
2006) for a more thorough overview.
2.3.2 Moore’s Business Ecosystem
As a management theorist and consultant, Moore (1996) attempts to under-
stand why so many previously prosperous businesses fail despite having good
products and services and well-run processes in place to produce them. Moore
attributes this to mainly two types of business problems: the fall of the eco-
nomic fabric (environment and conditions) around a business, and the invasion
of the business’s market territory by too many similar contributors, i.e., be-
ing commoditized as a result of excessive competition. The failure to respond
to either of these problems stems from a conventional view to competition.
Traditional models of management, based on product and service competition
and process improvement are necessary but no longer sufficient for firms to
survive in a modern, rapidly evolving business environment.
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Moore argues that a new systematic approach to strategy is needed here,
and that traditional responses are of little avail. For example, diversification
strategies typically assume the fixedness of industry structure although that
condition rarely holds true anymore as industries undergo rapid structural
development. Moreover, the traditional notions of vertical and horizontal in-
tegration or economies of scale that are so prominent in Porter’s school of
thought, have reduced significance in the new world of cooperating commu-
nities as these capabilities are not necessarily crucial in attaining competitive
advantage. According to Moore, however, scale and scope do matter, but only
as they contribute to a continuing innovation trajectory, allowing a company
to continually lower its costs while increasing its performance.
For a firm to prosper, paying close attention to its economic environment as
well as to other firms influencing its evolution is essential. The new paradigm
necessitates thinking in terms of entire systems, seeing a business as part of a
wider economic ecosystem and environment. This systems thinking is present
throughout Moore’s work, and is also evident in his many biological analo-
gies and examples which, he argues, are quite simply the most direct way to
explain difficult systems concepts. Though biological analogies and concepts,
e.g. Darwinian selection, have been applied to the study of business, Moore
criticizes many such attempts for their too narrow application and scope. In
his view, although firm (species) level improvement is undoubtedly crucial for
the success of firms, there are complementary forms of evolution occurring on
higher levels of abstraction, playing vital but often grossly underrated roles.
These include interactions occurring across an entire ecosystem or between
ecosystems. Moreover, it is competition between ecosystems as opposed to
individual companies that is largely fueling the transformation of many indus-
tries today. (Moore, 1996)
Moore (1993, 1996) suggests that a firm be viewed not as a member of a single
industry but as part of a business ecosystem that spans a number of indus-
tries. The central idea is a that firms within a business ecosystem coevolve
capabilities around a new innovation, working both cooperatively and compet-
itively to support new products, satisfy customers, and incorporate the next
round of innovation. Moore also acknowledges the special role that certain
firms, so-called keystones, hold as leaders of their respective ecosystems, being
valued by the rest of the community and enabling all ecosystem members to
invest toward a shared future in which they anticipate profiting together. This
shared fate is a central principle pertaining to business ecosystems as we shall
see also in more recent renditions of the concept such as the one provided by
Iansiti & Levien (2004a).
Moore (1996) attempts to give out a definition for business ecosystem: “an eco-
nomic community supported by a foundation of interacting organizations and
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individuals — the organizations of the business world. This economic com-
munity produces goods and services of value to customers, who are themselves
members of the ecosystem. The member organisms also include suppliers, lead
producers, competitors, and other stakeholders. Over time, they coevolve their
capabilities and roles, and tend to align themselves with the directions set by
one or more central companies. [...]”. Figure 2.5 illustrates the structure of a
typical business ecosystem (Moore, 1996). As we can see, the boundaries of
an ecosystem span a wide range of organizations and individuals far beyond
the core business (which includes direct supply chain and distribution channel
partners) or even the extended enterprise.
Government agencies and other
quasi-governmental regulatory organizations
Stakeholders, including investors and 
owners, trade associations, labor unions
Competing organizations having shared product and 
service attributes, business processes, and 
organizational arrangements
Standards bodies
Suppliers of 
my suppliers
Direct 
suppliers
CORE 
CONTRIBUTIONS
Distribution 
channels
Direct 
customers
Customers 
of my 
customers
CORE BUSINESSBUSINESS 
ECOSYSTEM
EXTENDED 
ENTERPRISE
Suppliers of complementary 
products and services
Figure 2.5: Moore’s business ecosystem
The economic model on which successful ecosystems are based according to
Moore is fairly simple. Firms in the ecosystem possess certain core capabilities
which form the basis of value creation and are utilized to produce core products
to customers. These core products are further complemented by a variety of
complementary products and services that enhance the customer experience,
and together they constitute the “total experience” or total offering provided
to the customers. Moreover, the profits earned from sales of core products
and services are partially invested in further development of the core capa-
bilities and future offering, enabling a sustained innovation trajectory leading
to lower costs and enhanced performance. However, part of the returns are
also invested in leadership and support for the ecosystem itself which includes
activities such as community development (recruiting new members), evange-
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lism, standardization, conflict resolution, etc., which generally benefit all the
firms engaged in the ecosystem. (Moore, 1996)
Moore’s Four Stages of a Business Ecosystem – A Life Cycle Model
A central hypothesis in Moore’s theory of business ecosystems is that much like
biological ecosystems, business ecosystems undergo different stages of succes-
sion. This succession can be understood as progressive change in composition
of a community of organisms (or in business context, firms). This successive
series of changes pertains not only to the size and scope of the ecosystem but
also to its structure and organization. Moore encourages business leaders to
identify and define the “great eras” of change in their business ecosystems,
arguing that the sequence and nature of the great eras in the development of
a business ecosystem are to some extent predictable. Through a better un-
derstanding of where a firm is currently situated in its ecosystem life cycle,
its executives can attempt to anticipate important potential changes taking
place in the future and take appropriate action to respond to these challenges,
whether it means preparing to provide the next key contribution to the com-
munity or precautionary actions to protect the firm’s position. (Moore, 1996)
From his experience of working with various firms in different industries, Moore
has identified a pattern of roughly four distinct, sequential stages in the evo-
lution of a business ecosystem. These stages are: 1) pioneering (also called
birth), when the basic paradigm of the ecosystem is being worked; 2) expan-
sion, when the community broadens its scope and consumes resources of all
types; 3) authority (also called leadership), when the community structure be-
comes stable and competition for leadership and profits within the ecosystem
gets brutal; and finally, 4) either renewal, when continuing innovation must
take place for the community to thrive and remain vibrant, or death, if the
community stagnates. In reality, however, the evolutionary stages may be
difficult to discern from one another as the borders between them are often
blurry, and the challenges of one stage may instead appear in another. One
thing that does remain consistent, as Moore argues, is the process of coevolu-
tion, i.e., the complex interplay between competitive and cooperative business
strategies. (Moore, 1993, 1996)
Business Ecosystems and Competition Policy
Moore revisited the concept of business ecosystem in an article for the An-
titrust Bulletin (Moore, 2006). He argues that markets and hierarchies have
long dominated thinking about economic organization, and that a third con-
cept, the business ecosystem, should rightfully receive equal recognition in
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both theory and policymaking, as it has become a pervasive form of economic
coordination. These three concepts, in his view, should provide the founda-
tion for competition policy, regulation, and antitrust actions. Furthermore, he
attempts to educate the judicial system and policymakers about the reality
of business ecosystems and the public goods that they create, in part with
the goal of countering a tendency in the antitrust courts to attack ecosystems
and their mechanisms of coordination. Moore argues that antitrust cases that
do not recognize the ecosystem level of organization run the risk of ignoring
and potentially damaging important collaborative, innovation-furthering pub-
lic goods. He does acknowledge, however, that there are some particular ways
in which the ecosystem form can be abused, and for which competition policy
and antitrust regulation are indeed necessary.
The focus of companies, according to Moore, has progressed from competing
on efficiency and effectiveness to competing on the basis of continuous innova-
tion. Moreover, for every advance there are complementary innovations that
must be combined for customer benefit. As a single firm rarely possesses all
the specialized knowledge required for the whole system, the complementary
advances must often coevolve across firms. Moore advocates openness and
states that one of the most exiting ideas in business today is that business
ecosystems can be “opened up” to the whole world of potential contributions
and creative participants (Moore, 2006). In a business ecosystem, if the sys-
tem modules are properly defined and the interfaces are well documented, and
the business contracts are not too restrictive either, then the ecosystem can be
said to be open to new entrants in some niches. Ecosystem-reinforcing invest-
ments by an incumbent in opening the ecosystem by, e.g., promoting neutral
standardization efforts can be both pro-competitive and pro-innovative.
For the coevolution of firms’ products and services to succeed, firms need to
align their visions. Furthermore, they need to ensure that their R&D and cap-
ital investments as well as operating processes are mutually supportive and
synergistic. Most importantly, however, they must maintain close dialogue
with customers to ensure that the end result matches customer expectations.
Mastering the challenges of “distributed creativity” is a key goal for the ecosys-
tem form of organization, whereas a traditional hierarchical firm, according to
Moore, is unable to effectively address the breadth and importance of interfirm
relationships. The unaided market, without business ecosystems, is not able
to achieve such interfirm coordination that would justify firms’ aligning their
dreams, plans, and product roadmaps. (Moore, 2006)
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2.3.3 Iansiti and Levien’s Business Ecosystem
Perhaps the most modern rendition of the business ecosystem concept is that
of Iansiti & Levien, presented both in their book (Iansiti & Levien, 2004a)
and a Harvard Business Review article (Iansiti & Levien, 2004b). Much like
Moore, they too have studied numerous firms in various industries and inter-
viewed hundreds of managers, attempting to understand why some companies
in today’s network economy thrive while others fail. Their approach inte-
grates deep managerial research with a broader understanding of networks
drawn from various academic fields. The research problem is viewed from the
angle of business networks, the key question being how firms should manage
the complex business networks which they are a part of. To an increasing ex-
tent, firms rely on assets which they do not own but have access to through a
business network. Strategy, according to Iansiti & Levien (2004a), is therefore
increasingly about the art of managing these distributed assets in an efficient
manner.
Iansiti & Levien (2004a) note that the problems of business networks are by
no means unique, and similar networks are found in a wide range of domains.
Indeed, the study of networks in fields such as physics, biology, and social psy-
chology has advanced dramatically in recent years. Iansiti & Levien (2004a)
argue that perhaps more than any other type of network, a biological ecosys-
tem provides a powerful analogy for understanding a business network. “Like
business networks, biological ecosystems are characterized by a large number of
loosely interconnected participants who depend on each other for their mutual
effectiveness and survival. And like business network participants, biological
species in ecosystems share their fate with each other. If the ecosystem is
healthy, individual species thrive. If the ecosystem is unhealthy, individual
species suffer deeply. And as with business ecosystems, reversals in overall
ecosystem health can happen very quickly.” (Iansiti & Levien, 2004a)
Ecosystems are not homogeneous in structure. The majority of them, accord-
ing to Iansiti & Levien (2004a), have richly connected hubs that have a great
influence among the members and thus can have a profound impact on the
overall health of the ecosystem based on their behavior. In almost all cases,
these hubs appear as active keystones whose interests are aligned with those
of the overall ecosystem and who have the critical role of regulating its health.
Keystones, whether in biological or in business context, enhance stability, pre-
dictability, and other measures of system health by regulating connections and
creating stable and predictable platforms on which other network members can
rely.
Each ecosystem is comprised of several domains which may be shared with
other ecosystems. As an example, in the software ecosystem of Microsoft,
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the largest domains (measured by number of firms) are system integrators,
development service companies, and ISVs. A prerequisite to a well-functioning
ecosystem is that each domain that is critical in the delivery of a product or
service should be healthy. Thus it follows that the fragility of any single domain
can undermine the performance and health of the whole ecosystem. In order
to assess the health of business ecosystems in the sense that the ecosystem
as a whole is durably creating opportunities for each of its domains, Iansiti
& Levien (2004a) propose three critical measures for a business ecosystem:
productivity, robustness, and niche creation.
Productivity
Productivity attempts to capture the effectiveness of an ecosystem converting
raw materials and other factors of production into products and services. In
traditional economic productivity analysis, return on invested capital (ROIC)
is one of the most common measures. However, many business ecosystems
are constantly subject to new conditions in the form of new technologies, new
processes, and new demands. Moreover, measures of productivity should also
capture the effectiveness of an ecosystem in converting innovation into lowered
costs and new products and functions. Thus, Iansiti & Levien (2004a) suggest
at least three types of productivity-related metrics: factor productivity (e.g.
ROIC), change in productivity over time, and delivery of innovations (i.e., an
ecosystem’s inclination to share and promote innovation — one measure of
this could be the time lag between the appearance of a technology and its
wider dissemination).
Robustness
An ecosystem must persist in the face of environmental changes in order to
provide sustained benefits to its participants. Robustness is mainly a measure
of resilience against various perturbations and disruptions that could threaten
the existence of the ecosystem. The benefits of a robust ecosystem are rather
obvious: firms belonging to it are able to operate in a relatively stable and
predictable environment, as the impact of external shocks is dampened. The
most basic metrics of ecosystem robustness are survival rates of participants,
i.e., a healthy ecosystem will promote the survival of a diverse set of firms
in various niches. Iansiti & Levien (2004a) depict survival rates through the
number of firms in a given ecosystem. However, this simplification does not
reveal churn — a high number of firm entries coupled with a high number of
exits is not revealed when only observing the number of firms at a given time.
The use of additional metrics of robustness is encouraged by Iansiti & Levien
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(2004a), and they suggest a few more. Persistence of ecosystem structure
means most connections between firms or between technologies remain in the
event of external shocks, and that firms can rely on certain structural features
of the ecosystem. Predictability means that change in an ecosystem is not
only contained but also predictably localized. Although different parts of
the ecosystem are affected by different shocks, a predictable “core” generally
remains unaffected. Limited obsolescence, on the other hand, means that there
is no major abandonment of so-called obsolete capacity in response to an
external perturbation, meaning that most of the installed base or investment
in technology finds continued use after the dramatic environmental changes
have taken place. This emphasizes the adaptability of technology. Finally,
continuity of user experience and use cases refers to the general expectation
of consumers that the user experience of the ecosystem’s products evolves
consistently and gradually as new technologies are introduced, as opposed to
being radically transformed.
Niche Creation
As a third measure of ecosystem health, niche creation is the capacity to cre-
ate valuable new niches which can also be thought of as the capacity to create
meaningful diversity. Iansiti & Levien (2004a) emphasize that not just any
diversity matters, but rather diversity that creates value. Thus, the new cat-
egories of business should provide new functionality, enable new scenarios, or
expose new technology or ideas. In short, niche creation is about the ecosys-
tem’s capacity to provide valuable opportunities for new and existing firms.
Iansiti & Levien (2004a) suggest that this measure can be assessed through
two related metrics: growth in firm variety (i.e., number of new firms created
in the ecosystem in a given period of time) and growth in product and techni-
cal variety (the number of new product options, technological building blocks,
categories, products, or businesses being created within the ecosystem in a
given period of time).
Criticism and Complementary Measures of Ecosystem Health
A point of criticism of the ecosystem health metrics outlined by Iansiti &
Levien (2004a) is that while they may be fully appropriate for meso (interme-
diate) level analysis, which can be based on public data available from, e.g.,
census bureaus (such as number of startups per industry sector, etc.), micro
(company) level analysis typically requires more detailed data. Den Hartigh
et al. (2006) recognize this problem and present a number of operational mea-
sures that are, in their view, better suited for measuring business ecosystem
health on the company level and of more practical value and use to managers.
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Their stated aim for such metrics is that they be user friendly, measurable with
commonly available data and usable over the longer term as well as usable on
multiple levels, i.e., for individual companies in ecosystems, for cross-sections
of ecosystems, and for ecosystems as a whole. Based on a selection process
involving both industry expert interviews and literature review, they arrive at
an inventory of measures that is tested and validated against the set criteria.
Table 2.1: Partner and network health measures
Partner Health Network Health
- EBIT/total assets - Number of partnerships
- Total revenue/total assets - Visibility in the market
- Liquidity - Covariance of partner variety with
- Solvency (periods t & t-1) the market
- Retained earnings / total assets
- Total asset growth
- Working capital / total assets
The validated measures form the basis of their ecosystem health metrics which
are broken down into two groups of measures: partner health and network
health. The former reflects the long-term financial well-being of the business
ecosystem, whereas the latter reflects its long-term network strength. To-
gether, Den Hartigh et al. (2006) view these two metrics as representative of
business ecosystem health, of more practical value to firms and their managers
in governing business ecosystems than the higher level determinants of produc-
tivity, robustness, and niche creation. The measures which together compose
partner health and network health are shown in Table 2.1. For further de-
tails on the measures and the justifications for selecting them, the reader is
suggested to refer to Den Hartigh et al. (2006).
Ecosystem Roles and Strategies
Iansiti & Levien (2004b) identify three distinct roles in ecosystems that firms
may occupy or strive for, each with a corresponding ecosystem strategy. These
roles are keystone, physical dominator, and niche player. A fourth role called
value dominator is identified as well, but it is suggested that such firms are
detrimental to an ecosystem’s health, leading to starvation and ultimately
even the destruction of the ecosystem. Let us discuss each of these roles in
detail.
The firms and organizations known as keystones play a crucial role in business
ecosystems. What sets them apart from the other roles is that they aim to
improve the health of their ecosystem by providing a stable, predictable set
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of common assets available to other organizations in the ecosystem. Exam-
ples of such assets include operating systems, e-commerce and distribution
platforms, development tools, etc. As a result, other organizations are able to
build their own offerings on these assets, creating value not only for themselves
or the keystone, but generally also for the overall ecosystem. In this sense, the
keystones often make the creation of new products by third parties more ef-
ficient. Keystones can further increase ecosystem productivity by simplifying
the complex task of connecting ecosystem participants to one another, as in a
network. They can also serve to increase ecosystem robustness through con-
stantly incorporating innovations and by providing a reliable point of reference
to other organizations in the face of new and uncertain conditions. Finally,
keystones can encourage niche creation by offering innovative technologies for
third parties to build on. (Iansiti & Levien, 2004b)
In most cases, removal of a keystone is a severe blow to an ecosystem, often
leading to its collapse. While keystones actively promote the health of their
ecosystem, they don’t do it for altruistic reasons but rather because it serves
their own strategy and long-term goals well. It is also worth noting that key-
stones do not occupy a large number of the nodes in an ecosystem network
whereas dominators do. Keystones leave parts of the ecosystem intentionally
unoccupied to encourage diversity and niche creation in those areas. This is
not the case with dominators, who often become much of the ecosystem by
themselves, leaving little room for other players to operate sustainably, thereby
reducing diversity and often productivity as well. Diversity, in turn, often di-
rectly enhances the stability of an ecosystem by ensuring that the ecosystem
has the capacity, in terms of variation in genetics and behavior, to respond
and adapt to changes or disruptions in the environment. Thus, keystones of-
ten enhance the diversity, and as a consequence, the stability of an ecosystem.
However, keystones do often act as “selective predators” and may adversely
affect the growth of some players, but this is to keep potential dominators in
check. Iansiti & Levien (2004b) suggest that if a firm is at the center of a
complex network of asset-sharing relationships and operates in a turbulent en-
vironment, a keystone strategy may be the most effective alternative, provided
that the firm is willing to share a part of the value generated with others in
the ecosystem.
While keystones leverage their position in an ecosystem in a somewhat indi-
rect manner, dominators use their power to take over the network directly
or drain value from it. The former type of dominator is called a physical
dominator, a firm that aims to integrate vertically or horizontally a large por-
tion of its ecosystem. Once physical dominators become large enough, they
are responsible for most of the value creation and capture in the ecosystem,
leaving little opportunity for diversity and niche creation. While such a strat-
egy has been successfully applied by, e.g., IBM for a long period of time, the
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long-term sustainability of the approach is questionable, as keystone strategies
tend to allow for more innovation and flexibility in the ecosystem. The latter
type of dominator, called a value dominator, has little direct control over its
ecosystem but is nevertheless in a position where it can extract value from
other members of the ecosystem. Value dominators tend to create little if any
value to their ecosystems, instead robbing most of the value created by others.
This kind of parasitic behavior is detrimental to the health of the ecosystem,
eventually leading to starvation and the collapse of the ecosystem, bringing
down the value dominator with it. This makes such an ecosystem strategy
fundamentally flawed.
In contrast to the value dominator strategy, Iansiti & Levien (2004b) do argue
that the physical dominator strategy can make sense when a firm relies on a
complex network of external assets but operates in a mature industry where
the innovation that comes with diversity isn’t a high priority. In such a setting,
the firm can directly take over the assets it needs by acquiring its partners or
suppliers or by taking over their functions otherwise. As a physical dominator
ultimately becomes its own ecosystem, it is able to extract the maximum
value from the assets under its control without the complex relationships that
characterize an ecosystem, and so an ecosystem strategy becomes irrelevant
— this may, however, change at some point in the future, and the physical
dominator may find itself challenged or even disrupted by a firm following a
keystone strategy in its ecosystem.
Most of the firms or organizations that populate a business ecosystem follow a
niche strategy, relying on specialized capabilities that differentiate them from
other members of the ecosystem. Iansiti & Levien (2004a) state that if a firm
faces rapid and constant change and can focus on a narrow and clearly de-
fined business segment by leveraging the assets of other firms, then a niche
strategy is viable. In other words, niche players are able to focus their efforts
and resources on a specific domain of expertise by leveraging the complemen-
tary resources of a keystone or other niche players. They not only represent
the bulk of the ecosystem but are also responsible for most of the value cre-
ation and innovation occurring in the ecosystem — that is, if they are not
marginalized or exploited by a powerful dominator. As niche players are very
much dependent on relationships within their ecosystem, much more so than
the other ecosystem roles, they indeed need to carefully analyze their business
environment and ecosystem, assessing the relative strengths of current and
potential keystones and dominators. Iansiti & Levien (2004b) argue that even
despite the best, highly specialized strategies, niche players usually come into
conflict with other niche players, keystones, and especially dominators. Niche
players unable to maintain a sufficient pace in differentiation and expansion
towards the edges of their ecosystem may find themselves swallowed up by an
expanding keystone, e.g., through the incorporation of the niche player’s prod-
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uct into the keystone’s platform. While such developments can be beneficial
for the overall good of the ecosystem, they sometimes come at the expense of
individual niche players.
Finally, it’s important to note that the roles in an ecosystem aren’t static and
evolve over time. Also, a company that is a keystone in one business domain
may be a dominator or niche player in other domains. Moreover, niche players
may be eventually become the keystones of their own ecosystems. (Iansiti &
Levien, 2004b)
2.4 Software Ecosystems and Two-Sided Mar-
kets
2.4.1 Introduction
For purposes of studying business ecosystems from the perspective of mobile
software and applications in particular, the concepts of software ecosystem
and two-sided market are discussed in the following subsections. Software
ecosystems extend the basic principles of networked relationships and business
ecosystem roles to the specific context of firms operating in the ICT and soft-
ware industry. The concept of two-sided market, discussed from Section 2.4.3
onwards, can be used to describe and explain the dynamics of mobile appli-
cation business, particularly from the perspectives of application developers,
consumers, and the keystone firms or ecosystem orchestrators that provide
and control the platforms that serve the two distinct groups of users and their
needs.
2.4.2 Mobile Software Ecosystems
In the computer software industry, no single firm can satisfy the demand
for every software product that customers need. There are certainly large-
scale software powerhouses such as Microsoft, Oracle, SAP, and Adobe to
name but a few, but still the overall software market is very diverse and
fragmented. Contrary to more traditional industries where firms have sought
vertical integration to establish control over assets as a source of competitive
advantage, the relationships between software vendors are more complex and
networked in nature. Often, these firms resort to virtual integration through
alliances to establish networks of influence and interoperability (Iyer et al.,
2006). In particular, software firms form relationships with other firms to
gain access to different types of resources, and such links form a network of
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relationships that shape competition and value delivery.
Indeed, these networks of relationships exhibit many characteristics of an
ecosystem as described earlier, including cooperation and competition. Of-
ten, software vendors need to ensure interoperability with complementors, i.e.,
other firms that provide complementary software applications, but also com-
petitors to enable a viable ecosystem with stronger network effects. It can
be argued that most software vendors no longer function as fully indepen-
dent units that can deliver separate products, but they have rather become
dependent on other software vendors for vital software components, such as
operating systems, libraries, component stores, and platforms (Jansen et al.,
2009). The rapid pace of technological chance is likely a key factor in explain-
ing why most software firms choose to build on networked relationships in
sofware ecosystems rather than integrate vertically by acquiring all the assets
they need.
Definition
No universally accepted definition exists for what constitutes a software ecosys-
tem or SECO, as some authors like to abbreviate the term. Instead, most
scholars who deal with the concept have come up with their own definitions.
For example, Bosch (2009) defines a software ecosystem as consisting of a
“set of software solutions that enable, support and automate the activities and
transactions by the actors in the associated social or business ecosystem and
the organizations that provide these solutions”. In his taxonomy, he also makes
a distinction between commercial and social ecosystems, noting that in a com-
mercial ecosystem, the actors are businesses, suppliers, and customers, the
factors are goods and services, and the transactions include financial transac-
tions as well as information and knowledge sharing, inquiries, pre and post-
sales contacts, etc. In contrast, social ecosystems consist of users, their social
connections, and the exchanges of various forms of information. Bosch (2009)
further adds that a software ecosystem is also a commercial ecosystem, and
thus it follows that the goods and services are the software solutions and
software services that enable, provide support for, or automate activities and
transactions.
Software Ecosystem Roles and Strategies
According to Iyer et al. (2006), three roles are important in most software
networks: the hub, a firm with a disproportionately high number of links, the
broker, a firm that creates a connection between two sets of firms, and the
bridge, a link critical to the overall connectedness within the network. Hubs
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are usually large, established firms who typically act as platform providers
to complementors. In line with the ecosystem strategies described by Iansiti
& Levien (2004a), hubs may choose between three operating strategies: key-
stone, dominator, or niche. Brokers often act as arbitrators between two or
more firms, attempting to establish a common standard within a standards
body. Finally, the bridge role is attributed to firms who promote and enhance
software application interoperability through middleware and other software
techniques (Iyer et al., 2006).
The keystone role in an ecosystem equates to firms providing a standard or
platform technology that provides a foundation for the ecosystem. Despite
the central role that keystones play in an ecosystem, they do not typically
constitute the bulk of the ecosystem by themselves as measured by generated
revenue or profit but leave room for other firms to sustainably operate in the
same ecosystem. This is not true for dominators, firms that progressively
eliminate other firms in their ecosystem through acquisitions or driving them
out of the market, capturing an increasing share of the value generated in the
ecosystem and also being increasingly responsible for the innovation (and thus
renewal) of the ecosystem, decreasing diversity. While dominators being able
to serve the full customer base of the ecosystem may be successful for a period
of time, they are bad for the overall health of the ecosystem in the long term.
According to Jansen et al. (2009), several examples have shown that strong
dominators either destroy the ecosystem or are regulated by external factors
such that the ecosystem can survive.
The niche player role corresponds to a firm that is dependent on the standard
or platform technology provided by the keystone player for creating business
value. Some niche players may also depend on other niche players and vice
versa without the presence of a keystone, but usually such roles are unsus-
tainable in the long term. Jansen et al. (2009) notes that eventually, such
relationships evolve into a dependency on a keystone, or one of the niche
players may itself become a keystone.
Categorization and Success Factors
Bosch (2009) identifies three distinct categories of software ecosystems each
with its own characteristics, challenges, and success factors: operating system
centric, application-centric, and end-user programming software ecosystems.
As software product line companies transition to a software ecosystem ap-
proach, the most likely scenario is to introduce an application-centric software
ecosystem. This can be done on desktop (e.g., Microsoft Office), on the web
(e.g., Salesforce.com, eBay, Amazon), or in a mobile environment. He argues
that introducing a new OS and building an ecosystem around it is an extremely
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difficult challenge, and there is a lengthy history of failed attempts.
The primary cause of difficulty is the need to convince developers to build
compelling applications on the OS in order to attract end users as customers.
Without a sizable base of customers willing to purchase applications, however,
few developers are willing to invest in application development on the OS. This
affirms the chicken-and-egg problem observed in nascent two-sided markets
by, e.g., Rochet & Tirole (2003) and Parker & Van Alstyne (2005). As can be
ascertained from the works of several authors (e.g., Hyrynsalmi et al. (2012),
Idu et al. (2011), Tuunainen et al. (2011), Hagiu (2009)), the concept of two-
sided market is, in fact, a common way to describe and analyze OS-centric
ecosystems, also in the context of mobile business.
The following success factors apply particularly to OS-centric ecosystems, as
suggested by Bosch (2009):
• Minimal effort required by developers to build applications on top of
the OS, thereby enabling both breadth and quality of the application
offering.
• Generic, evolving functionality and set of features provided by the OS
that maintains attractiveness for developers. It is important for an OS
to incorporate commoditizing functionality early on without alienating
existing developers.
• The number of customers that use the OS and that are accessible to
developers for monetization.
For the purposes of the research conducted as part of this thesis, we will do
well to focus on OS-centric software ecosystems particularly in the mobile
smartphone business context. Therefore, further discussion of other types of
software ecosystems is omitted.
Mobile Application Stores
Since 2007 when the first large-scale mobile application marketplaces were an-
nounced, software ecosystems have become a significant part of the mobile
domain. These software ecosystems are largely characterized by their applica-
tion stores, most often run by the keystone or orchestrator of the ecosystem.
Apple’s App Store, Google Play (formerly Android Market), Microsoft’s Win-
dows Phone Store, and Blackberry App World are the leading mobile appli-
cation stores, each catering to a specific mobile OS platform, but they are by
no means the only ones. For example, there are multiple alternative applica-
tion stores for the Android platform such as Amazon Appstore for Android,
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GetJar, Slide ME, AppsLib, Samsung Apps, and F-Droid to name a few (Dig-
ital Trends, 2013a). Additionally, there are many regional or operator-specific
application stores.
For platform proprietors, mobile application stores are an important part of
their overall developer offering, acting as the primary (or only) distribution
channel for applications developed by third parties. They help stimulate com-
plementary innovation by offering developers a straightforward way to mon-
etize their work. They create stickiness to the platform, as apps purchased
from one app store are usually not transferable to other platforms without
repurchase. Also, some apps are only available for a certain platform and
when a large enough number of such applications exist, the apps may become
a true differentiator for that platform. Nowadays, however, the most popular
applications are available on multiple platforms, thus leaving less potential for
differentiation.
Mobile application stores are also examples of a theoretical concept called
‘two-sided market’. To understand the dynamics of mobile application stores,
one needs to first understand this concept thoroughly. In the next subsection,
the theory behind this concept is thoroughly explained.
2.4.3 Two-Sided Markets as an Economic Platform
The theoretical foundations for the concept of two-sided market were laid in
the research on network externalities by Katz & Shapiro (1985, 1986, 1994)
and Shapiro & Varian (1998), but Parker & Van Alstyne (2000, 2005) were
the first to put forth a formal model of cross-market externalities that could
be used to explain some observed firm strategies such as those of Microsoft,
Netscape (AOL), Sun, and Adobe, among others. Moreover, Rysman (2000,
2004) wrote the first known empirical paper on network effects in a two-sided
context, studying specifically the market for Yellow Pages.
A key question that Parker & Van Alstyne (2000) attempted to answer was
related to free giveaways — how could firms benefit from unpaid goods? As an
example, both Microsoft and Netscape went to great lengths to distribute their
web browsers for free and through as many channels as possible. Similarly,
Adobe distributes its Portable Document Format (PDF) reader software for
free. Parker & Van Alstyne (2000) claim that under specific market conditions,
firms can increase their profitability and gain other benefits by giving away
products for free. Especially in the business domain of information products,
they argue, free strategic complements can raise a firm’s profits while free
strategic substitutes can lower profits for competitors.
Rochet & Tirole (2003, 2004, 2006) have also pioneered the research on two-
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sided markets, and they originally approached the topic from the angle of credit
card markets, presenting elaborate mathematical modeling for price allocation
on the two sides of the market based on a number factors. As the formal
definitions, quantitative models, and formulas provided by different authors
are not fully compatible, the theory is discussed mainly from a qualitative
perspective, from the angle of content providers and end consumers in the
information products market (as elaborated by Parker & Van Alstyne (2000,
2005); Eisenmann et al. (2006)) which includes software applications.
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, the most traditional conceptual model of value
capture, the value chain, represents value moving from left to right, or up-
stream to downstream. To the left of the firm is cost, represented by the
upstream suppliers, and to the right is revenue, represented by the down-
stream channels and customers. But what if both sides could include both
cost and revenue elements? This is the fundamental idea of two-sided mar-
kets. A firm that brings together two distinct groups of users into a network
of sorts, facilitates their transactions through some kind of infrastructure or
platform (possibly in the form of a service or product), and is able to draw
revenue from both groups, is the provider of an economic platform, a two-sided
market.
Real world examples of two-sided markets are numerous: the credit card is
perhaps one of the most well-known and tangible ones, linking together mer-
chants who accept credit card as payment and consumers who purchase goods
using credit cards. In this example, the credit card companies draw revenue
from the merchants who typically have to pay a commission as a percent-
age (known as the merchant discount rate) of the transaction value, and the
consumers, who typically have to pay at least an annual fee for the credit
card. Still, both the merchant and the consumer benefit from the credit card
which forms a common platform for everyday financial transactions, facilitat-
ing business. Another common example is newspapers which join advertisers
and readers together. Beyond physical products, also services like online re-
cruitment databases, bringing together job seekers and employers, count as
two-sided markets. (Eisenmann et al., 2006)
As noted in Section 2.2.3, systems that can be described as a network of users
exhibit network effects, also called network externalities, that can be either
positive or negative. The existence of positive network effects means that the
more users a network has, the more valuable it is to each user. Two-sided
markets, with their two distinct groups of users, can be thought of as two-
sided networks that exhibit cross-side network effects. As these two groups
are attracted to each other, the value of the network to any given user is largely
based on the number of users on the other side of the network. The value of
the mediating platform grows as it matches demand from both sides of the
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market.
A two-sided market is often described as manifesting a “chicken-and-egg” prob-
lem in the sense that it’s crucial to get both sides on board for this matched
market to grow and generate profit (Rochet & Tirole, 2003; Parker & Van
Alstyne, 2005). This presents a profit optimization problem for the mediating
platform provider, and a common and straightforward solution is to discount
one market in order to grow both, and to profit more from the other. This
model favors an intermediary that straddles both sides of the market and can
set the prices more efficiently by internalizing the two-sided network exter-
nalities. This advantage is lost when independent firms serve either market
separately. (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005)
Rochet & Tirole (2003) argue that actually many if not most markets with
network externalities are two or multiple-sided markets. According to their
definition, a market with network externalities is a two-sided market if plat-
forms can effectively cross-subsidize between different categories of end-users
that are parties to a transaction. In other words, the volume of transactions
on and the profit generated by a platform depend not only on the total price
charged to the parties to the transaction, but also on its decomposition. Plat-
forms may be unable perform cross-subsidization due to mainly two reasons:
1. Both sides of the market coordinate their purchases. Examples include
a debit card platform negotiating with a government for the handling
of interagency financial transactions, an Internet service provider (ISP)
offering an intranet solution to a company, or a streaming-media plat-
form offering streaming audio and video to a firm primarily for internal
use — they all deal with a single party. When the total price of goods
or services is not affected by subsidization, there is no impact on the
demand for the platform.
2. Pass-through and neutrality. Even when the users on each side of the
market act independently, monetary transfers between them may undo
the redistributive impact and prevent any cross-subsidization. The value-
added tax can be considered a classic example of the possibility of neu-
trality, as it really does not matter whether the seller or the buyer pays
the tax. Eventually, prices adjust so that any tax paid by the seller is
passed through to the consumer. In the event that such neutrality holds,
the market should be treated as one sided. In one-sided markets, only
the total per-transaction price charged by the platform matters and not
its decomposition between the two distinct groups of users.
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Definition
The proposed definition for a two-sided market by Rochet & Tirole (2006) is
as follows:
A market is two-sided if the platform can affect the volume of
transactions by charging more to one side of the market and
reducing the price paid by the other side by an equal amount;
in other words, the price structure matters, and platforms must
design it so as to bring both sides on board. The market is
one-sided if the end-users negotiate away the actual allocation
of the burden (i.e., the Coase2 theorem applies); it is also one-
sided in the presence of asymmetric information between buyer
and seller, if the transaction between buyer and seller involves a
price determined through bargaining or monopoly price-setting,
provided that there are no membership externalities.
Another good example of two-sided markets is video game development. Game
developers favor platforms that have a large enough user base, constituting an
audience of potential purchasers of their game titles, as they need to offset the
substantial upfront development costs for a particular platform. Conversely,
players tend to favor platforms with a greater variety of game titles available.
Hence, due to positive cross-side network effects, successful platforms enjoy
increasing returns to scale and improving margins as users are willing to pay
more for access to a bigger network.
It is worth noting, however, that same-side network effects do matter also
in two-sided markets. As opposed to cross-side effects that are most often
positive, same-side effects can be negative when they mean, e.g., increased
competition among content publishers or congestion due to a very large num-
ber of end-users accessing a service simultaneously. They can be positive just
as well though, as in the case of online gaming communities which benefit from
a larger pool of players. (Eisenmann et al., 2006)
These types of dynamics also mean that platform leaders, who are able to
extract higher margins from their two-sided networks, are also capable of in-
vesting more in R&D or lowering prices to drive weaker competitors out of the
market. Eisenmann et al. (2006) argue that, as a result, mature two-sided net-
work industries are usually dominated by a handful of large platforms. This is
2The Coase theorem states that if property rights are clearly established and tradable,
and if there are no transaction costs nor asymmetric information, the outcome of the ne-
gotiation between two (or several) parties will be Pareto efficient, even in the presence of
externalities. If outcomes are inefficient and nothing hinders bargaining, the parties will
negotiate their way to efficiency. (Rochet & Tirole, 2006)
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evident in our earlier example of credit card companies, and even more so in
the extreme example of the PC operating systems market which is dominated
by a single company, namely Microsoft. Even in the face of such winner-take-
all dynamics, there are examples of platforms that have successfully resisted
much stronger rivals by specialization and finding their own niche. Linux, for
example, has been steadily growing its market share in the server space at
the expense of Windows and Unix based servers, having accounted for 28.5%
of all server revenue in the fourth quarter of 2013, up 4.6 percentage points
when compared with the fourth quarter of 2012, as reported by the research
company IDC (2014). Nevertheless, competition in two-sided markets can be
fierce, and companies cannot afford to rest on their laurels even if their im-
mediate rivals have been vanquished. As noted by Eisenmann et al. (2006,
2007), platform providers face a threat of envelopment by large companies of-
ten operating in adjacent markets that have the ability to offer multi-platform
bundles. Platform envelopment is discussed in Section 2.5.4.
Discussion
Two-sided markets (or platforms) have been studied and discussed from a
theoretical perspective by quite a few authors over the past decade. Many
have come up with quite abstract models and rather complex formulas for
demand and price allocation with respect to the different sides of the market.
Also, as noted by Evans & Schmalensee (2008), the existing theoretical and
empirical research seems to suggest that the functioning of two-sided mar-
kets is highly dependent on the specific institutions and technologies of an
industry, so one must proceed with care in making any generalizations. More-
over, there has been little rigorous empirical research on two-sided platforms
or competition among them. In recent years, however, a number of papers
have been published that examine mobile operating systems and application
stores as two-sided platforms, as an example, the papers by Hyrynsalmi et al.
(2012) and Tuunainen et al. (2011). The case studies conducted as part of this
thesis, in part, aim to reduce the gap in empirical research on two-sided mar-
kets, especially in the rapidly evolving, dynamic context of mobile smartphone
business.
2.4.4 Pricing and Subsidies in Two-Sided Markets
Setting prices and possible discounts with respect to the two sides of a network
is no simple affair. Obviously, the choices made by the platform provider can
have a huge impact on the growth of the network, both in terms of number
of users on each side and derived value. A key contribution of a two-sided
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network model is determining which side receives a discount. Different firms
choose different beneficiaries, depending on the industry in question and the
characteristics of the two groups of users involved. Parker & Van Alstyne
(2005) argue that this depends on cross-price elasticities as well as the rela-
tive sizes of the two-sided network effects. Also Evans & Schmalensee (2008)
acknowledge that prices on one side of the market may be below marginal
cost and possibly negative in long-run equilibrium. Moreover, they argue that
the percent markup of price over marginal cost is not inversely related to the
elasticity of demand for either customer group, as would be the case in many
traditional markets.
Willingness to pay on each side must be considered carefully, as poor choices
can lead to stagnation of the network. Often it is the case that there is
a “subsidy side” that the platform provider chooses to subsidize in order to
attract users to that side in large numbers, the reason being that these users in
high volumes are valued by the other side of the network, namely the “money
side”. In other words, having a large number of users on the subsidy side is
crucial to developing strong positive cross-side network effects to attract users
to the money side. To encourage this development, the platform provider
charges users on the subsidy side less than they would be charged in the case
that they represented an independent market, hence the usage of the term
subsidy. Ultimately, these subsidies are paid for by the money side users
(e.g., merchants, publishers, developers, etc.), who value the high number of
addressable users on the subsidy side so much that they’re willing to pay
the platform provider a premium to gain access to them via the platform.
(Eisenmann et al., 2006)
For example, in streaming video, portable documents, and advertising, to sub-
sidize content consumers and charge content developers is the industry norm.
Operating systems and multiplayer games are an example to the opposite in
which content developers receive subsidies and consumers pay to join the net-
work. It is important to recognize that in the case of content providers and
end consumers, either market can be a candidate for discounting or free give-
aways. Deciding which market to subsidize depends on the relative network
externality benefits. At a high level of externality benefit, the market that
contributes more to demand for its complement is the market to subsidize.
At lower levels of externality benefit, platform providers may charge positive
prices in both markets but keep the price on one side artificially low by dis-
counting it (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005). This is also in line with the research
of Armstrong (2006) which identifies three factors that determine the structure
of prices offered to the two groups:
• Relative size of cross-group (cross-side) externalities. If a member of
group 1 exerts a large positive externality on each member of group 2,
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then platforms will aggressively try to persuade group 1 to join them. In
general terms but especially in competitive markets, it is group 1’s ben-
efit to the other group that determines group 1’s price, not how much
group 1 benefits from the presence of group 2. Furthermore, positive
cross-group externalities act to intensify competition and reduce plat-
form profit, unless they act to tip the industry to monopoly.
• Fixed fees or per-transaction charges. Platforms providers may charge
for their services on a fixed, lump-sum basis, so that a user’s payment
does not explicitly depend the platform’s performance on the other side
of the market. An alternative scheme is that the payment is an explicit
function of the platform’s performance on the other side. The major dif-
ference between the two charging bases is that cross-group externalities
are weaker with per-transaction charges, since the total cost of transac-
tions with users on the other side increases with each new transaction,
eroding the total benefit gained from those transactions. Because exter-
nalities are lessened with per-transaction charging, it is plausible that
platform profit is higher when this form of charging is used, except in
the case of monopoly platforms. The distinction between the two forms
of tariff only makes a difference when there are competing platforms, not
in a monopoly situation.
• Single-homing or multi-homing. A user is said to “single-home” when
he or she chooses to use only one platform for a specific purpose. In
contrast, when the user has joined multiple competing platforms, he or
she is “multi-homing”. Multi-homing can occur on either side of the
market, or on both sides. (Multi-homing is discussed in more detail in
Section 2.4.7.)
In a two-sided market, the attraction between the two groups of users typi-
cally works both ways, as having a greater number of money-side users (who
typically provide the goods, content, or services that subsidy-side users are in-
terested in) indeed attracts even more subsidy-side users to the platform, cre-
ating a virtuous circle though a positive feedback loop. The platform provider,
exercising pricing power on both sides of the market, has to find the delicate
balance between subsiding one side and demanding premium from the other
side.
Understanding the price sensitivity of users on each side plays a crucial role
here. Typically, end users or consumers are much more price sensitive than
content publishers, and therefore, the former group of users are subsidized
while the latter do not mind paying charges so much. As already noted,
however, each case and pair of user groups must be evaluated on an individual
basis.
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User sensitivity to quality is another point to consider in choosing the side
to subsidize. Eisenmann et al. (2006) state that the side that must supply
sufficient quality is to be charged, through royalties and/or other kinds of
transaction-based or fixed fees, whereas the side that strongly demands qual-
ity is to be subsidized. This can also be interpreted as increasing the barriers
to entry on the money side, as the suppliers must have good enough sales
prospects to be able to offset their fixed costs. For suppliers to have rea-
sonably good sales prospects, they usually have to be serious about quality.
Using mobile game development as an example, developers often have to pay a
one-time registration fee to gain access to the development tools and/or mar-
ketplace. Additionally, they typically have to share a fixed portion of their
revenue from titles sold through the marketplace. Moreover, some mobile
application marketplaces require that applications be thoroughly tested and
vetted by the marketplace owner before they can be admitted to the catalog.
The combined cost and effort of developing and bringing applications to the
market acts as a deterrent to unscrupulous developers seeking to make quick
money through poor quality applications. On the other hand, too stringent,
costly, and/or tedious policies set by the platform provider may put off some
typically smaller developers and thus limit diversity and innovation in the ap-
plication catalog. Mobile application stores are examined in more detail later
in this section.
Output cost or the incremental cost of each added subsidy-side user to the
platform provider needs to be considered when deciding the extent of the
subsidies provided. When this cost is negligible, subsidy decisions are more
straightforward. This is the case with digital goods such as software applica-
tions and downloadable content. Also, when the platform provider has plenty
of idle server capacity or storage, adding more users to the network is cheap.
In contrast, when the subsidized giveaways take the form of physical goods
such as computers, handsets, or other electronic equipment, risks to the plat-
form provider are much higher and can materialize in substantial losses, should
the money-side users not provide enough revenue to cover the subsidy costs.
(Eisenmann et al., 2006)
As already discussed, two-sided networks often exhibit positive cross-side net-
work effects, and thus adding users on either side positively impacts growth on
the opposite side. Sometimes, however, excessive growth of one side can be a
negative development for users on that side, in which case the network is said
to exhibit negative same-side network effects. This is most often due to rivalry
either on the supply side (too many sellers may introduce downward pricing
pressure) or demand side (too many buyers fighting over a scarce supply of
goods). Under such circumstances, Eisenmann et al. (2006) suggest that plat-
form providers consider granting exclusive rights to a single supplier in each
transaction category and extracting high rent for this concession. Exclusivity
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is not without problems though, and the platform provider must therefore en-
sure that sellers do not abuse their monopoly positions, which in turn would
have buyer-side repercussions.
Eisenmann et al. (2006) recognize that users’ brand value can be an important
determinant of growth in two-sided markets. The participation of so called
“marquee users” can be crucial for attracting users to the other side of the
network. Often these marquee users are high profile suppliers or exceptionally
big buyers. For a platform provider, they present an opportunity to accelerate
the growth of its network, especially in the case of exclusive arrangements, i.e.,
agreeing that the marquee users do not join rival platforms. Such arrangements
can be quite costly, however, especially so for smaller platform providers that
have limited bargaining power. Conflict over the division of value between
platform providers and large (marquee) users are common, especially when
the large users’ role is critical in mobilizing the network in the first place.
Finally, it is important to recognize that two-sided network pricing follows a
different set of rules and logic than conventional business. No matter what
the merits of the platform, failing to set prices and subsidies accordingly can
ruin the business.
2.4.5 Competitive Dynamics of Two-Sided Markets
In developing their growth strategies, platform providers need to consider the
dynamics of the competition in their market. In particular, they must deter-
mine whether the market is likely to be served by a single platform provider
in the long run, or there is room for multiple providers to operate sustainably.
In the case of the former, the platform provider must then decide whether
it will “fight to the death” or share its platform with rivals. In the case of
technical standards related to consumer goods and content distribution, it is
often the case that a single standard or solution emerges as the winner after a
phase of intense rivalry, as was the case with JVC’s VHS vs. Sony’s Betamax
video cassette standards war, and more recently, the battle between Sony’s
Blu-ray vs. Toshiba’s HD DVD for dominance of the high-definition video
disc format which ended in Blu-ray’s victory and the dissolution of the HD
DVD Promotion Group in March 2008 (RegHardware, 2008).
Eisenmann et al. (2006) argue that fighting it out is often a bet-the-company
decision where the winner ultimately takes it all, and there is little value
left for those who suffer a defeat. Hence, they identify factors that typically
contribute to a market being served by a single platform:
• Multi-homing costs are high for at least one user side. Homing costs
include all the expenses that network users incur to establish and main-
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tain affiliation with a particular network, including the costs of adoption,
operation, and also opportunity cost. Users need a good reason or incen-
tive to affiliate with multiple platforms in the case of high multi-homing
costs.
• Cross-side network effects are positive and strong. As discussed above, a
large user base on one side of the network encourages growth on the other
side and (often) vice versa. A small-scale platform will have difficulty
attracting users unless it is the only way to reach certain users on the
other side.
• Same-side network are positive. On top off cross-side network effects,
positive same-side network effects increase the likelihood that a single
platform will ultimately prevail, as they further encourage user base
growth on one or both sides of the network.
• No strong preference for special features exists on either side of the net-
work. Homogeneous, non-differentiated user needs tend to lead to con-
vergence on a single platform. On the other hand, if there are unique,
specialized needs among users, opportunities are ripe for smaller, differ-
entiated platforms to capture their own niches.
A downside with battles for dominance in two-sided markets is that some users
will delay adoption in fear of being stranded with obsolete investments, in the
case that the platform they have chosen loses out. To overcome such user
uncertainty, the rivaling platform providers often spend vast sums on upfront
marketing. If they instead cooperated and enabled a shared platform, they
would jointly have access to a larger user base and their marketing spend could
be reduced. (Eisenmann et al., 2006)
2.4.6 Expansion Strategies for Two-Sided Markets
Modeling two-sided demand and pricing as well as competition between plat-
forms has been the focus of most research on two-sided markets (Rochet &
Tirole, 2003, 2004, 2006; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2000, 2005; Rysman, 2004;
Weyl, 2006, 2009; Armstrong, 2006; Armstrong & Wright, 2007). This has
led to some criticism that other factors and issues of equal or higher impor-
tance for the growth and expansion of two-sided markets have received too
little attention. Hagiu (2009), who discusses multi-sided platforms (MSPs) as
a generalization of two-sided markets, argues that strategic design defines the
relevant space in which the MSP is operating, its multiple constituents and its
competitors, both actual and potential, and in short, its relevant ecosystem.
This strategic design, in his view, should precede business model decisions
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such as pricing. He argues, however, that designing and expanding MSPs is a
complex, daunting, and most importantly a dynamic process, as the most suc-
cessful MSPs do not sit still, but rather they are constantly evolving, increasing
their depth and/or reach, and in the process, redefining their boundaries and
those of entire industries. This is said to be especially true for MSPs in high
technology markets, but even very traditional businesses can “unlock powerful
sources of indirect network effects with a little technological help and a good
amount of creativity” (Hagiu, 2009).
Hagiu (2009) approaches the strategic design of MSPs by defining two types
of fundamental functions, namely reducing search costs, and reducing shared
costs, arguing that the platform design essentially relies on the choice of its
functionalities. Search costs are costs incurred by the various sides before they
actually interact, for purposes of determining the best “trading partners”, and
they can be further divided into two subtypes, two-sided (or multi-sided) and
audience making. This classification depends on whether each of the two (or
multiple) sides is searching for each other or only one is, or in other words,
whether the cross-side network effects are positive in both (all) directions
or only one direction. In the former case, reducing search costs generally
means reducing two-sided asymmetric information, which makes “sampling” of
candidates for transactions easier. Common examples include various online
buyer-seller matching services and dating services.
An example of the latter subtype is a platform that joins consumers and
advertisers together. Here, the advertisers obviously value a larger audience
of consumers, but consumers do not perceive much added value in a greater
number of advertisers and may even perceive excess advertisers negatively. In
such cases, the platform provider should be extra careful not to compromise
the product or service offered to the side of the market that is indifferent to the
presence of the other side or does not strongly benefit from it. Hagiu (2009)
mentions Google having made a conscious decision not to allow pictures or
videos in the sponsored ad space of search results, in order not to degrade the
consumer search experience, for which relevance is key. As such, audience-
making MSPs generally reduce search costs by facilitating one side’s provision
of information about new products or services to the audience on the other
side.
Reducing the costs incurred during the transactions themselves (i.e., after
the search is over and the transacting parties have found each other) is the
second fundamental function defined by Hagiu (2009). These costs are called
shared costs since a portion of them is generally common to all transactions
between users on different sides of the MSP. Video game consoles and software
operating systems are good examples of MSPs that have lowered shared costs
for game and application developers on one side, and end-users of games or PC
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applications on the other side. If developers had to separately build a console
for each game, development would be rather inefficient indeed.
According to Hagiu (2009), well-established one-sided markets (and the firms
running them) can often expand in a powerful way to become two-sided mar-
kets without facing the “chicken-and-egg” problem that so commonly plagues
nascent providers of two-sided platforms. Firms that have, and are able to
leverage, a strong existing relationship with either side (e.g., merchants or
consumers) are in a much better position to succeed. The key here is to find
the most powerful leverage for a firm’s established one-sided strength, which
implies identifying a new side that could create strong cross-side network ef-
fects with the existing one. Hagiu (2009) suggests a simple two-step process
to achieve this is by:
1. Identifying the fundamental function a business performs for its cus-
tomers;
2. Identifying other customer groups with whom the existing customers
conduct frequent transactions, for which the existing business can en-
hance the value or lower the cost.
One prominent example of a one-sided firm having successfully expanded to
become two sided is Google, the company that is credited with pioneering
the now established Internet business model of associating sponsored links to
search results, enabling targeted search advertising. Despite its beginnings as
a one-sided search service, Google quickly realized that its technology allow-
ing consumers to search the web could also be used to reduce search costs
between advertisers and consumers. It then created AdWord and AdSense,
the programs which allow it to offer and charge for search-related advertising.
Compared to traditional, non-targeted advertising (such as ads in the Yellow
Pages), this was a major improvement in advertising efficiency. (Hagiu, 2009)
Depth vs. Breadth
When expanding a two-sided (or multi-sided) platform, a key strategic trade-
off has to be made between deepening the fundamental functions performed
for the existing sides of the market and their users, and expanding to distinc-
tively new functions which might bring new sides (and thus new, previously
unreached groups of users) on board. However, pursuing new functions and
user groups without sufficient depth in the existing functionality risks leaving
open opportunities for focused competitors who may occupy a niche in the
market. On the other hand, breadth may sometimes be a necessary condition
for generating a critical level of cross-side network effects which are required
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for the platform to thrive or hold its ground against potential competitors,
also players from adjacent industries seeking lateral expansion. (Hagiu, 2009)
Depth creates more value for the existing users of the platform and intensifies
the cross-side network effects by making transactions between parties more
efficient, more frequent, or both. This creates “stickiness” on the existing sides
and makes their users less likely to be attracted away to other platforms. In
some cases, however, adding too much depth of functionality can be harmful
as well, as some additions may not be welcomed by all users and can in fact
introduce negative network externalities. As an example, many eBay users
were put off by the inclusion of Skype voice communication into the service
(Hagiu, 2009).
Breadth is driven by the desire for unlocking new sources of value and cre-
ating new cross-side network effects through the addition of new sides to the
platform. The need for more breadth can also be driven by competitive dy-
namics and survival as rival platforms can also expand their functionalities to
new domains, potentially attacking an incumbent platform. Besides the dif-
ficulties involved in entering new industries, two other important factors can
limit MSP breadth. The first factor, resource constraints, is not specific to
MSPs, it may limit a company’s ability to expand by serving new customer
groups. The second factor, conflicts of interest, is specific to MSPs and may
seriously constrain the platform’s growth well before it has reached the limits
of its resources. Should conflicts of interest arise among the parties involved
in an MSP, managers are faced with hard decisions which may involve drastic
trade-offs. (Hagiu, 2009)
Openness
Rysman (2009) acknowledges that openness, alongside pricing, is one of the
two most important strategies that a potential two-sided platform provider
needs to choose. He notes that while the pricing decision has been the subject
of rigorous research, openness has proven more difficult to analyze. More-
over, in the literature on two-sided markets, openness refers to two strategic
choices: the number of sides to pursue (as in one-sided, two-sided, or multi-
sided markets) and how to relate to competing platforms (aiming for either
incompatibility, compatibility, or some sort of integration).
In the example case of computer operating systems, let us consider Apple
and Microsoft. Both companies produce their own operating systems, and
both rely on ISVs and third-party developers for most of the available soft-
ware application offering. A key difference between the two is that Microsoft
did not (at least not until the recent Surface line of products, see Microsoft
(2012a, 2012b)) produce computer hardware of its own but instead relied on
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independent PC manufacturers to supply the hardware, whereas Apple has
always been a branded computer vendor. Rysman (2009) argues that in this
sense, Microsoft is more open than Apple, as Microsoft can be characterized
as managing a three-sided market between consumers, software providers, and
hardware providers, whereas Apple manages only a two-sided market between
consumers and software providers.
The choice of openness as in the number of sides to support in a platform can
be likened to the choice over vertical integration, although the relationship
between hardware and operating systems is not strictly vertical. The lesser the
extent of integration in a platform, the more sides are potentially introduced
to the multi-sided market equation. According to Rysman (2009), the special
case of being one-sided is an extreme move away from openness where a firm
integrates to the degree that two-sided market interaction ceases. Much like
Hagiu (2009), Rysman (2009) perceives it as more natural that firms start out
with a one-sided model and switch to a two-sided model as they become more
established and seek expansion. In this case, the “chicken-and-egg” problem
of getting customers on board can be avoided, since one side of the market is
already established, and the platform provider can initially provide the needed
complements itself.
A case example of the benefits of openness in transforming a single-sided
market into a two-sided one and enabling an open innovation ecosystem is de-
scribed in detail by Raivio & Luukkainen (2011). Their paper discusses Open
Telco, a concept referring to open network interfaces and APIs on operators’
side of a telecommunications network enabling novel end user services. It al-
lows operators to diversify their single-sided business model mainly based on
subscriber revenue by becoming the providers of two-sided platforms, serving
also application and service developers, content providers and aggregators,
advertisers, and other parties in addition to subscribers, the end users. Multi-
sided platforms enable operators to reap the benefits of cross-side network
effects in addition to the obvious same-side network effects that already en-
able their core business in voice telephony, text messages, etc., and enable
more versatile business innovations. For the operators, this diversification
and expansion of their traditional business model and role in the ecosystem
is necessary, should they wish to resist being relegated to pure data transport
providers (or “dumb bit pipes”, as some industry professionals like to say).
Openness is discussed further in the context of product platforms in Sec-
tion 2.5.5.
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2.4.7 Multi-Homing in Two-Sided Markets
In many two-sided markets, a fraction of the users on either side (or both
sides) connect to multiple platforms instead of just one. Using an analogy from
Internet terminology, they are said to “multi-home” (Rochet & Tirole, 2003).
Common examples of multi-homing include merchants who accept multiple
credit cards (e.g., Visa, MasterCard, American Express) and PC users who
have more than one web browser installed on their computer (e.g., Microsoft
Internet Explorer and Mozilla Firefox). In the former example, multi-homing
actually occurs on both sides, as many consumers also carry more than one
credit card. In the latter case, many (though not all) web sites are fully
compatible with either browser.
Multi-homing has profound implications on the competitive dynamics and
pricing of platforms. More specifically, a large proportion of multi-homing
users on one side of the market intensifies price competition on the other side
from the perspective of platform providers. Therefore, platform providers of-
ten need to lower prices to stay competitive and attempt to secure exclusive
relationships with users on the other side. As an example, merchants may
be inclined to turn down the more costly3 American Express credit card, if
they accept other cards such as Visa and also know that a large percentage
of their American Express carrying clientele also have a Visa in their wallet.
Such a situation increases price pressure towards the platform provider (Amer-
ican Express in this case) who has to either close the price gap or somehow
convince their users that the price premium is justified. As noted by Rochet
& Tirole (2003), American Express has afforded to charge higher merchant
discount rates because their clientele was perceived as very attractive by mer-
chants. The gap between American Express’s and the non-profit associations’
merchant discount rates has narrowed in the 1990s as an increasing number
of American Express customers also got a Visa or MasterCard, thus lowering
the incentive for merchants to accept American Express cards.
In general terms, multi-homing as a phenomenon stems from the users’ desire
to benefit from network externalities in an environment of incompatible or
non-interconnected platforms. Using an analogy from the real estate market,
in the absence of common listing, the seller of a house may want to establish
multiple, non-exclusive arrangements with real estate agencies in order to reach
a wide range of potential buyers. Similarly, potential buyers may also deal with
multiple real estate agencies. As a further example, video game developers may
port their game to several game platforms. More generally, software developers
may multi-home to competing but incompatible software platforms. (Rochet
& Tirole, 2006)
3in terms of merchant discount rates; as an example, refer to UniBul (2012).
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Armstrong (2006) has studied the phenomenon of multi-homing especially in
situations where one side of the market is single-homing and the other is multi-
homing. Such situations, which he refers to as “competitive bottlenecks”, have
special implications on the pricing of the platform with respect to the two
sides of the market. In such situations, if users on the multi-homing side wish
to interact with a user on the single-homing side, they have no other option
but to deal with that particular user’s platform of choice. Hence, platforms
have monopoly power over providing access to their single-homing customers
for the multi-homing side. This monopoly power, according to Armstrong
(2006), leads to high prices being charged to the multi-homing side, limiting
the number of users on that side. A notable exception to this is a market
that tips to monopoly, in which case an incumbent’s profits typically increase
with the importance of network effects, since barriers to entry remain high
even when the incumbent sets high prices. The tendency towards high prices
for the multi-homing side is, however, tempered when the single-homing side
benefits from having many users on the other side of the market (i.e., the
cross-side network effects are strong in that direction). In such cases, high
prices to the multi-homing side would drive away users on that side and cause
an overall disadvantage to the platform as it tries to attract users to the single-
homing side. In contrast, platforms do have to compete for the single-homing
users, and the profits generated from the multi-homing side are largely used
to subsidize the single-homing side. (Armstrong, 2006)
Multi-Homing in Mobile Application Stores
Mobile application marketplaces or stores, examples of which include the Ap-
ple App Store, Google Play (formerly Android Marketplace), BlackBerry App
Center, and Windows Phone Store, are a common manifestation of two-sided
markets in the mobile business domain. They are also a prime example of
a two-sided market where multi-homing occurs, to an extent, on both sides
of the market. Specifically, either developers or consumers (end users) can
multi-home, and there are incentives and deterrents to each. For developers,
the primary incentive to multi-home is to expand their addressable market
by reaching more consumers than they would reach by targeting only a single
platform. Obviously, the smaller the overlap between the user bases of differ-
ent platforms, the greater the benefit of targeting additional platforms. Con-
versely, if it’s possible to reach a large enough mass of consumers by developing
applications for a single platform, adding support for an additional platform
may not be financially attractive enough, considering the additional invest-
ments required and the increased risk level. For developers, multi-homing is
therefore largely a cost-benefit consideration between revenue and profit po-
tential as well as market share and development costs and risks.
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Consumers, on the other hand, have relative freedom of choice in deciding
which devices they purchase, but as most smartphones and tablets have an
expected consumer life cycle of roughly two years, there tends to be at least
some degree of lock-in to the ecosystem. Some users may opt to purchase
devices from different ecosystems (e.g., an Android-based smartphone but an
iPad tablet), thus gaining access to two distinct software ecosystems and their
application stores. In this way, they satisfy their desire to benefit from net-
work externalities in an environment of incompatible or non-interconnected
platforms, as already noted above. Also, while Windows-based PCs still dom-
inate the personal computing market, it is quite safe to assume that a major
share of iPhone users use a Windows-based PC instead of a Mac computer,
making them multi-homing users. While gaining access to a larger catalog
of diverse applications may be a benefit for some users, multi-homing on the
consumer side is also discouraged by compatibility issues (e.g., in transferring
personal data and content between devices) and increased complexity, as the
consumer will often need familiarize him/herself with different user interfaces
and application logic.
In the mobile business domain, multi-homing has been studied by, e.g., Hyryn-
salmi et al. (2012) across competing mobile application stores, and by Idu et al.
(2011) in the specific case of three sub-ecosystems of the Apple ecosystem, each
centered around a product line: the iPhone, the iPad, and the Mac. The latter
paper analyses the behavior of companies that target more than one Apple
sub-ecosystem using statistical analysis and survey methods. Its findings con-
firm a strong relationship between the number of platforms a company targets
and the type of applications it publishes as well as the number of these ap-
plications. It also recognizes that the most common trend for developers was
that of first targeting the iPhone platform and then the iPad. Idu et al. (2011)
argue that multi-homing from a strategic perspective is motivated mainly by a
wider customer base and the portability the Apple sub-ecosystems offer. This
is well in line with the notion that access to a wider addressable market is the
main incentive for multi-homing, and the downside of increased development
costs is mitigated by the portability of applications across the sub-ecosystems.
Hyrynsalmi et al. (2012) acknowledge that from the software developer’s per-
spective, the choice of ecosystem (platform) might be a crucial decision and
that some developers have chosen to target two or more ecosystems, balancing
between a greater potential market share and the costs of porting the product
for different platforms. They note that generally speaking, a publishing strat-
egy where content, products, or services are published for multiple ecosystems
is not new even in the mobile business domain, but there are relatively few
studies and little knowledge on the effects of multi-homing on applications,
developers, and ecosystems, or the scale of the phenomenon. They also argue
that the level of competition between mobile ecosystems is high, and the appli-
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cation offering can be used as a means of differentiating from the competitors.
However, if multi-homing were indeed a common strategy for developers, then
the catalogs of rivaling application stores would be very similar and differen-
tiating on that basis would be hard.
Based on a quantitative analysis of three large application stores (Apple App
Store, Google Play, andWindows Phone Marketplace) and a total of more than
850,000 applications, it turns out that the number of multi-homing developers
is small, constituting only 6.8% of the total number of developers identified
(Hyrynsalmi et al., 2012). Considering that the ecosystems analyzed seem to
contain lots of hobbyist or semi-professional developers who publish “just for
fun” or without a clear monetization plan, the result is less surprising. Also,
based on the data, it seems that the content consumption of consumers is
mostly focused on a tiny fraction of applications which are usually published by
professional developers and which are also often available for several mobile OS
platforms. Hyrynsalmi et al. (2012) argue that these professional developers,
who often also tend to multi-home, are the crucial ones to bring on board for
any ecosystem.
Hyrynsalmi et al. (2012) mention the example of Rovio Entertainment’s then-
latest mobile game in the Angry Birds franchise called Angry Birds Space
which was initially announced for iOS and Android but not for Windows
Phone. Later, however, the game and a subsequent title have been made avail-
able also for Windows Phone, but it is not publicly known whether Microsoft
or its OEM partners (mainly Nokia) had to subsidize the porting of the games.
As noted, adding support for a platform requires usually significant additional
investments from a developer. If those investments cannot be justified by the
expected revenue increase, outside financing in the form of development or
marketing subsidies may be required to incentivize multi-homing. Such subsi-
dies could be costly for the ecosystem orchestrators, but they have few viable
options available to foster innovation as long as they lack the market share to
create enough developer pull by themselves. For an ecosystem, not having the
most popular applications available would likely lead to a negative consumer
perception which would hinder the growth of said ecosystem. Hence, it is quite
reasonable to deduce that the presence of key professional developers and their
applications can make or break a mobile software ecosystem.
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2.5 Platform Strategy
2.5.1 Introduction
Let us imagine a company that would develop each individual product it of-
fers from scratch, starting from customer requirements and ending up with
the final product design ready for manufacturing. This would effectively mean
that there are little or no synergies between products developed in parallel or
in succession as far as R&D effort is concerned, and the development costs of
each product have to be born in their entirety over again. While such an oper-
ational model might be viable for companies catering to highly individualized,
diverse customer needs where no customer project resembles another, most
companies seek to maximize the utility of their R&D investment. This can
be done by identifying generic, common components or building blocks that
are frequently or always needed across products. These common components
form a foundation on which a product line can be designed and built.
The foundation, let us call it a product platform, usually needs to be defined
and implemented only once, at least for a particular product generation. This
implies significant to major cost savings for the individual product programs,
as they can directly utilize and build upon the functionality of the platform,
not having to implement it themselves. Of course, the platform itself needs
development on a regular basis in order to enable the latest product innova-
tions. An outdated platform can be a severe bottleneck to the performance of
products built on it. Nevertheless, platforms often evolve in somewhat slower
cycles than the products built on them. Eventually, some innovations first
introduced in an individual product may also become part of a platform, thus
becoming available to a broader range of products.
The rough definition of a product platform as stated above is also aligned with
that of Cusumano (2010) who describes a product platform as “a foundation or
base of common components around which a company might build a series of
related products”. However, it is worthwhile to note that platforms are not nec-
essarily restricted to the boundaries of an individual firm. Cusumano (2010)
makes a clear conceptual distinction between product and industry platforms,
the latter being an enduring subject of research for him and his fellow re-
searchers (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Cusumano, 2010; Gawer & Cusumano,
2002, 2008). Gawer & Cusumano (2002) argue that two essential differences
set industry platforms apart from in-house product platforms. Firstly, while
an industry platform provides a common foundation or core technology lend-
ing itself to reuse in different product variations as is the case with product
platforms, it provides this function as part of a technology “system”, the com-
ponents of which are likely to come from different firms (or perhaps at least
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different departments of the same firm) called “complementors”. Secondly,
an industry platform has limited value to users without the complementary
products or services created by these complementors.
Gawer & Cusumano (2008) note that managers sometimes underestimate the
importance of deciding early on between pursuing a product or a platform
strategy. This decision is highly relevant because the industry conditions and
business choices that favor a platform can differ from those that favor a prod-
uct. As a result, the incentives for owners of industry platforms differ from
those of companies that make proprietary products. Owners of industry plat-
forms, in particular, benefit from the wealth of innovation in complementary
products as well as from competition at the overall system level that would
bring prices down.
According to Gawer & Cusumano (2008), failure to decide early enough be-
tween a product or platform strategy can result in dangerous strategic confu-
sion. In order to achieve platform status, firms need to make specific decisions
that govern technology evolution, product and system design, and business
relationships within the ecosystem, and as noted, they are different decisions
than those made when pursuing a product strategy. Another common mis-
take managers of firms can make is to simply overlook the platform potential
of their products, instead clinging on to a product approach.
Not many platform-making firms have the resources and capabilities needed to
produce all the useful complements by themselves. In order to allow their tech-
nology to become an industrywide platform, firms generally need a strategy to
open their platform technology to complementors, coupled with economic in-
centives for encouraging other firms to join the same ecosystem and adopt the
platform. This also helps stimulate innovation and diversity in the firm popu-
lation, as it enables the founding of new firms dedicated to building products
and services on platform assets developed by others while allowing these new
firms to focus their R&D effort on building differentiating capability (Muegge,
2013).
Many firms have indeed opened up their platforms, be it a hardware compo-
nent such as a microprocessor or an operating system, so that other firms may
build complements on these platforms. These complements may be complete,
standalone products that merely utilize the platform, or they may be add-on
applications, accessories or other types of complementary products that serve
to enrich the platform itself or other products built on it. In the context of this
study, the concept of platform most often refers to an OS platform for which
software applications can be developed, either by the platform proprietor or
by third parties.
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2.5.2 Elements of Platform Leadership
The success of companies today is often dependent not only on internal as-
sets and capabilities or economic forces in the surrounding world, but also the
innovations of other companies. Such is the case with, e.g., Intel who acknowl-
edged that it is “tied to innovations by others” to make its innovation valuable
(Cusumano & Gawer, 2002). In Intel’s case, any innovation done by the com-
pany in processor design needs to be matched by a corresponding innovation
by the OS vendor, primarily Microsoft, or ISVs. Interestingly, despite Intel’s
crucial role in the PC ecosystem and the key importance of its microproces-
sors as a platform for building computers, a spokesperson described Intel’s
situation as “desperate”, as quoted by Cusumano & Gawer (2002). This is
because a microprocessor can do little useful by itself — it is a component in
a broader platform or system. Therefore, Intel cannot be sure that its own
key complementors will continue to produce corresponding innovations as fast
as the company innovates itself, creating uncertainty that affects its market
expansion. Similarly, it cannot be sure that the target platform, the PC, will
evolve in compatible ways.
In a world of complex, interconnected relationships between companies espe-
cially in the IT industry, Gawer & Cusumano (2002, 2008) have studied the
core elements of platform leadership, i.e., the factors that play a major role
in determining whether companies successfully become platform leaders, or
whether they are relegated to other roles, e.g., platform leader wannabes, or
complementors. These roles are not mutually exclusive, and indeed, a company
can simultaneously be both a platform leader and a complementor depending
on the business context and perspective. Using Intel and Microsoft as exam-
ples, both are complementors in the sense that PC manufacturers need them
to build products. The two companies are, however, also platform leaders
due to their influence over the PC system architecture and interfaces that
other companies rely on to produce complements for PCs, whether hardware
or software based. (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002)
Platform leaders generally face three types of problems: the first is how to
maintain the integrity of the platform, i.e., its compatibility with complemen-
tary products vis-à-vis future technological innovations. This implies a certain
degree of forward compatibility, defined as the ability of the platform design
to gracefully accept input or complements intended for a future version of
itself. The second, related problem is how to let platforms evolve technolog-
ically so as to avoid obsolescence while maintaining compatibility with past
complements (an attribute also known as backward compatibility). The third
problem is how to maintain platform leadership over a longer period of time,
a nontrivial task in an environment of constant technological development and
rivalry. (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Gawer & Cusumano, 2002)
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As only few platform leaders have the capabilities or resources to produce all
the complements needed to make a complete system by themselves, collabo-
ration with complementors is required. This collaboration, in turn, increases
the potential market for all parties involved. Ultimately, platform leadership
is the ability of a company to drive innovation around a particular platform
technology at the broad industry level. Cusumano & Gawer (2002) note the
similarities to concepts such as network externalities and positive feedback
effects (as discussed in Section 2.2.3) in the sense that the more people use
platform products, the more incentives there are for complement producers
to make more complementary products for the platform, thereby creating a
virtuous cycle. Having analyzed Intel, Microsoft, Cisco, and NTT DoCoMo,
Cusumano & Gawer (2002) have identified four distinct but closely related
levers of platform leadership that, as they claim, can assist managers in both
strategy formulation and implementation. Next, let us discuss each of these
levers briefly.
Lever One: Scope of the Firm
Scope determines the amount of innovation that a firm does in-house as op-
posed to letting external parties do. This is probably the most important and
defining decision a firm can make as far as its platform strategy is concerned.
Also firms aspiring to become platform leaders must weigh whether to develop
extensive internal capabilities to produce complements, let the market pro-
duce complements, or follow a middle-of-the-road approach. The first step is
to assess how dependent the firm is on complements, followed by determining
how to increase demand for the firm’s platform. Developing own complements
should only be considered if the firm has the technical, financial, and organiza-
tional capabilities required to compete in the relevant markets. A well-known
example is that of Microsoft introducing its own productivity software suite
(Microsoft Office) and web browser (Internet Explorer) to complement its OS,
largely displacing former complementors like Novell, WordPerfect, Lotus, and
Netscape. Cisco, on the other hand, has been known to make acquisitions to
expand its product offering into new areas. (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002)
For a platform leader (or wannabe) deciding to work with outside developers,
the choice of incentives for prospective complementors is an important topic
of consideration, both to get complementors with the right set of capabilities
on board as well as to exert influence or even control over the design and
production of complements. This could involve sharing technical information
on the platform and its interfaces or own products, or perhaps even provid-
ing engineering support services or other staff to help complementors build
compatible products. Platform proprietors can develop enabling technologies,
such as APIs and other programming interfaces and SDKs and other tools,
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and provide them to third parties for free or a modest fee. Marketing sup-
port is another common type of incentive offered by platform proprietors to
complementors. (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002)
Ultimately, the question of scope is not a simple one - firms need to individually
weigh whether it makes sense for them the produce complements in-house or
not. A good rule of thumb would be to have at least some level of in-house
capability not only for producing complements internally but also to provide
constructive direction and competition for third-party complementors.
Lever Two: Product Technology
Platform leaders and wannabes must make decisions on product and platform
architecture, including the high-level platform design as well as the interfaces
that link subsystems together and allow complements to work with the prod-
uct or the broader platform. Complements aside, these decisions can have a
profound impact on the structure of a whole industry as well as on the inno-
vation that follows, e.g., who does what type of innovation and what is the
share of investments occurring outside the platform leader.
An important decision related to product and/or platform architecture is how
much modularity to allow. Having a modular architecture with easily sepa-
rable components and well-defined interfaces can reduce innovation costs and
encourage the emergence of specialized companies dedicated to producing cer-
tain components. Having open interfaces publicly specified by the platform
leader further contributes to the effectiveness of a modular architecture, as it
allows complementors to directly connect components to the platform. How-
ever, disclosing too much information also makes it easier for competitors
to spy on the technical implementation of the platform. This is the reason
for many firms opening up only certain specific interfaces and keeping oth-
ers private to safeguard their innovation. Such is the case with, e.g., Intel
who openly provides information about peripheral interfaces such as the Pe-
ripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus and the USB bus, but keeps the
microarchitecture of its processors a secret from others.
Similarly, Microsoft is known for publishing a set of detailed APIs for applica-
tion programming on Windows as well as information for peripheral hardware
manufacturers to write device drivers for Windows, but otherwise keeping the
source code of the Windows OS closed, i.e., inaccessible to parties outside of
Microsoft. Only recently has Microsoft shown signs of openness in this respect
— the company joined the Open Compute Project, a consortium created by
Facebook to share the designs of servers and other equipment that form the
foundation of the Internet’s largest data centers. Interestingly, Microsoft said
it is open-sourcing the software code it created for the management of hard-
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ware operations, such as server diagnostics, power supply, and fan control (Ars
Technica, 2014). Also earlier, Microsoft gave .NET developers the opportunity
to have a look into its .NET Framework source code for debugging purposes
but without the possibility to modify the source code (eWeek, 2007).
Stimulating innovation involves a trade-off between secrecy and disclosure.
Secrecy is good for protecting intellectual property and blocking substitute
innovation, whereas disclosure is the better approach for enabling complemen-
tary innovation. (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002)
Lever Three: Relationships with External Complementors
Platform leaders need to decide the extent of their collaboration or competi-
tion with complementors. This involves balancing the need to seek consensus
with key complementors and resolve possible conflicts, and the need to assert
control over technical specifications and standards relating to the platform
and the products complementing it. Pursuing both objectives at the same
time is often uneasy, yet essential for a successful platform leader. Consensus-
seeking among industry players is usually driven by one firm, and that firm
needs to have a certain degree of control over the interfaces between system
components, e.g., between a hardware platform and software OS as well as
other components. In this capacity, the firm exerts control not over others’
specific choices but rather the premises of choice. Cusumano & Gawer (2002)
call this ecological control and further argue that control presupposes some de-
gree of consensus because leadership is possible only if others agree to follow.
For complex systems of interconnected components like the PC, consensus
is required in the sense that a critical mass of key players has to agree on
common interface specifications. If no such agreement is reached, not enough
complementary and compatible products will be produced or the industry will
innovate too slowly. (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002)
Generally speaking, platforms leaders should strive to be industry enablers,
helping other firms to innovate around them in increasingly better ways. Of-
ten this may imply sacrificing short-term interests in favor of the common
good, which in practice could mean, e.g., investment in definition of stan-
dard interfaces allowing the creation of compatible complements and efforts
to promote compliance of products. Moreover, platform producers should
build reputations for consistency, not for impulsively “stepping on the toes”
of complementors, i.e., expanding into their product domains. In this way,
they can also demonstrate to potential complementors that they are acting on
behalf of the whole industry and establish credibility in the areas where they
want to influence future standards or product designs. (Cusumano & Gawer,
2002)
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Lever Four: Internal Organization
As discussed, dealing with external firms both as complementors and as poten-
tial competitors requires a tricky balancing act, and this ambiguity of relation-
ships can generate tensions and conflicts of interest that need to be addressed
by platform leaders and complementors like. Designing a firm’s internal orga-
nization appropriately is one way to do this.
In order to manage external relationships with complementors effectively, plat-
form leaders need to create an internal organization that supports this goal. A
typical example is that of internal groups within the platform leader compet-
ing with complementors, while other groups within the firm depend on those
same complementors to adopt the platform and its standards. The conflicting
goals of internal sub-organizations therefore pose a challenge. To deal with
such situations, the executives and managers of a platform leader need to ac-
knowledge the necessity of pursuing conflicting goals and communicate the
multiple goals through the organization. Additionally, a process for conflict
resolution should be established, and senior executives should be prepared
to arbitrate if and when conflicts arise, while simultaneously fostering an or-
ganizational culture that tolerates ambiguity and encourages discussion and
debate. Groups with very different, possibly conflicting goals are often kept
separate in the organizational structure, either as separate divisions capable of
direct business or cooperation with complementors, or separated through an
internal “Chinese wall”. The latter option typically involves an organization
within an organization that is separated both physically from the rest of the
firm or the larger organization it is a part of, as well as through restrictions
in information handling and sharing practices. Through such an organization,
the platform leaders may appear more neutral.
2.5.3 Problematic of Platform Leadership
Cusumano & Gawer (2002) identify also problems and pitfalls associated with
platform leadership. Firstly, not all companies can be platform leaders, and
there are certainly other ways to compete and other roles to occupy, such as
that of a niche player offering superior quality or differentiated products and
services. Platform leaders, on the other hand, risk being too platform-centric.
Sticking to certain key technologies or architectural design choices may make
it hard for platform leaders to evolve their platforms and thus to keep up the
pace of innovation. Some firms may also shun policies and movements like
open source that could help stimulate external complementary innovation.
These are but examples of reasons why platform leaders might eventually find
themselves struggling with platform evolution. (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002)
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Having Too Many Complementors
Much of the classic literature dealing with systems competition and network
effects, whether direct/same-side (Katz & Shapiro, 1994) or indirect/cross-side
(Eisenmann et al., 2006), is founded on the premise that the more users a sys-
tem or platform has, the more valuable the platform is to these users, or in the
case of two or multi-sided platforms, to the users on the other side of the plat-
form (e.g., complementors). The assumption has largely been that the more
complementors the better, and any increase in the number of complementors
drives a virtuous circle to the benefit of the platform proprietor as well as its
customers through increased innovation and business opportunities in comple-
mentary goods (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). Based
on a substantial body of research (Langlois & Robertson, 1992; Grindley, 1995;
Bresnahan & Greenstein, 1999; von Burg, 2001), it would indeed appear that
such a virtuous circle exists circle between attracting complementors, stimu-
lating platform adoption, and encouraging complementary innovation.
Boudreau (2008) notes that a consistent message across these studies is that
network effects and so-called “bandwagon” dynamics propelled the creation of
complementary goods around platforms and that complementor entry tended
to drive the entry of even more complementors, in a way “softening” compe-
tition. This, as he argues, is a clear indication that adding complementors
had a tendency to raise the profit potential for complementors. In contrast,
he acknowledges that there are a few formal models that consider the effect
of adding complementors to a platform when there are already many com-
plementors on board, indicating that the resulting competition-toughening
effects may outweigh market expansion effects. He cites the empirical study of
Augereau et al. (2006) on the adoption of 56k modem technologies by ISPs in
the United States as rare evidence supporting this idea. The authors of that
study find that high levels of adoption of a given technology standard slowed
subsequent adoption of the same technology, leading to the inference that
increasingly high entry toughened competition, making entry less attractive.
Therefore, while initial growth and adoption of a platform may benefit from the
competition softening and market expansion as a result of more complemen-
tors getting on board, high numbers of complementors may actually lead to
market splitting and competition-hardening effects. This, as Boudreau (2008)
argues, is primarily because progressively increasing numbers of complemen-
tors should lead to complementary products being less and less differentiated,
suffering from increasing substitution.
Based on the perceptions above, Boudreau (2008) contends that it is quite pos-
sible to have too many complementors, and that after a certain point, adding
more complementors to a platform serves only to toughen competition, and
more specifically, leads to tougher competition between complementors to the
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extent that they offer undifferentiated products. Toughened competition, in
turn, usually means reduced profits, and ultimately in the case of extreme
competition, no profit. This is his first hypothesis, the second one being
that adding complementors to a platform with already many complementors
reduces complementary innovation, and more specifically, reduces complemen-
tary innovation to the extent that complementors offer undifferentiated prod-
ucts. At least the latter hypothesis appears to be supported by Parker & Van
Alstyne (2008), who develop and discuss a model related to innovation around
a platform. Their main finding is that while adding complementors to a plat-
form can indeed increase complementary innovation, this happens only on the
premise that doing so does not reduce differentiation among complementors’
products — in other words, where differentiation declines, innovation should
also decline respectively.
Applying an econometric analysis approach to a large data set of monthly
outputs from the online mobile software application marketplace Handango
between November 1999 and December 2004, Boudreau (2008) sets out to val-
idate his hypotheses. Handango was one of the first online mobile software
stores to sell applications for multiple platforms, mainly Palm, Microsoft, Sym-
bian, RIM (BlackBerry), and Java. Boudreau (2008) notes that roughly 90%
of the sample observations relate to the then-market leaders Palm, Microsoft,
and Symbian. For quantitative analysis, he uses software title price-setting
as a proxy for the intensity of competition and the timing of new versions
reflecting discretionary development decisions as a proxy for the amount of
complementary innovation.
It can be acknowledged that while the data samples are from a time period
preceding the smartphone “revolution” of Apple and Google, it is fair to as-
sume that the mechanisms and effects influencing the level of competition and
innovation have remained the same. As for the first hypothesis, the results
suggest that adding complementors toughened competition, but only in the
case of complementors selling the same type of software, e.g., games. This
would appear to be consistent with the notion that the more similar products
or substitutes are available, the tougher the competition. However, adding
complementors selling different types of software in fact softened competition,
so generally, the effect of adding complementors to a platform is positive,
again consistent with usual views of competition softening with network ef-
fects. Similarly, adding complementors initially did positively affect overall
rates of new software title development, but after a specific point (just below
1000 complementors), the effects became negative, and the crowding-out effect
was thus dominant. (Boudreau, 2008)
For managers in high-technology industries, the results obtained by Boudreau
(2008) have an important implication: as platforms mature and grow, platform
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owners may wish to abandon a strategy of attracting many complementors and
building a “critical mass” in favor of one of more carefully regulating the num-
ber of complementors. Moreover, the discovery of ambivalent effects created
by adding complementors further suggests that platform owners may want to
evaluate the composition of the complementor population surrounding a plat-
form more carefully, by type. In doing so, they might engineer interactions
that best create value around the platform.
2.5.4 Platform Strategy and Governance
Gawer & Cusumano (2008) contend that while the benefits of becoming a
platform leader seem clear, not every market has to have a platform leader.
Especially in larger markets, such as video game consoles, Web portals, and
smartphones, several platform firms can coexist and survive without one clear
winner. The prerequisite for this scenario to occur seems to be that the market
has enough room for differentiation in user needs, so that multiple firms can
persist in specific niches or segments, especially if users can switch among
more than one platform without too much difficulty.
While not every product can become a platform, research suggests that a
technology or product or service must satisfy two prerequisite conditions in
order to have platform potential: 1) It should perform at least one essential
function within what can be described as a “system of use” or solve an essential
technological problem within an industry, and 2) it should be easy to connect to
or to build upon to expand the system of use as well as to allow new and even
unintended end-uses. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, Gawer & Cusumano
(2008) argue, the strategic game of platforms cannot begin.
Gawer & Cusumano (2008) have identified two strategic approaches for firms
aspiring to become platform leaders. The first strategy, called “coring”, is
applicable to creating a new platform where one has not existed before. The
second strategy, called “tipping”, addresses the challenges of winning platform
wars by building market momentum.
Coring
Coring comprises the set of activities that a company can use to identify or
design an element (typically a technology, a product, or a service) and turn
this element into something that is fundamental to a technological system as
well as to a market. When an element or component of a system resolves
technical problems affecting a major proportion of other parts of the system,
it is considered “core”. However, inventing platform-like technologies may well
be easier than coming up with business strategies that successfully encourage
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industry partners and customers to adopt a particular technology. Both tech-
nical and business aspects do, nevertheless, need to be addressed appropriately
for the process of coring to succeed. One of the key questions for an aspiring
platform leader is how to create economic incentives for complementors to in-
novate and allow them to profit sufficiently while protecting its own sources of
profit. This requires a delicate balancing act which may well be the greatest
challenge to platform leadership. (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008)
Tipping
Competition among technical standards and incompatible technologies is com-
monplace in platform battles. For an industry standard or platform leader to
emerge victorious from standards wars, the markets have to tip in favor of a
particular technology standard or platform comprising that standard. Tipping
constitutes the complete set of strategic moves or activities that companies
can utilize to shape market dynamics in their favor and win a platform war.
These moves can include sales, marketing, product development, and coalition
building. (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008)
Similar to coring, successful tipping requires actions taken from both the tech-
nology and the business sides of the platform. When fighting standards wars
to become a platform leader, firms should attempt to gain control over an
installed base while licensing their intellectual property in a comprehensive
manner and facilitating partner investments in complementary innovation.
Investment in building brand equity as well as manufacturing, distribution,
or service capabilities should also be a priority for platform-leader wannabes.
In doing so, they will signal support of their platform. (Gawer & Cusumano,
2008)
Gawer & Cusumano (2008) consider pricing as another useful strategic weapon
in platform wars, but its complexity in platform markets exceeds the signifi-
cantly simpler product markets. As platforms can be understood as two-sided
(or multi-sided) markets, platform leaders and wannabes may need to subsi-
dize one side of the market first in order to bring on the other, paying side.
Unfortunately, there is no simple formula to prescribe how much exactly to
subsidize one side of the market over the other. Moreover, the decision on
pricing and subsidies depends on whether short-term profits or sustainable,
longer term ecosystem growth is pursued. Attempting to maximize the out-
come with regard to one of these goals will not lead to optimal results with
regard to the other goal.
Tipping may also happen effectively in the form of competitors or users band-
ing together in a coalition, defending themselves from the entry of a platform-
leader wannabe. In trying to make a market tip toward their platform, firms
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often encounter common obstacles and make similar mistakes. In particu-
lar, established platform leaders with powerful positions in their market must
exercise caution not to violate antitrust laws. Sometimes problems occur be-
cause tipping strategies dependent on narrow technical standards are effective
only as long as platform boundaries remain relatively stable and predictable.
Converging technologies often create opportunities for firms to extend their
platforms into areas previously occupied by other platforms, which in turn
may cause pressure on the providers of these platforms to maintain their po-
sition. (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008)
Platform Envelopment
A firm can also accomplish tipping in a powerful way by “tipping across mar-
kets”, crossing over the boundary of its current market to absorb technical
features from an adjacent market and bundling them to extend its platform.
This phenomenon has been called platform envelopment by, e.g., Eisenmann
et al. (2007), who argue that by leveraging common components and shared
user relationships, one platform provider may combine its own functionality
with that of another provider active in an adjacent market, resulting in a
multi-platform bundle. They also note that entrenched incumbents who may
be otherwise sheltered from entry by standalone competitors (due to strong
network effects and high switching costs) may nevertheless be vulnerable to
an adjacent platform provider’s envelopment attack.
Eisenmann et al. (2007) identify three types of envelopment attacks by plat-
form providers, depending on the relationship between the platforms of the
attacker and the target, the platforms being defined as either functionally
unrelated, weak substitutes, or complements. The corresponding types of
envelopment attacks are conglomeration attack, intermodal attack, and fore-
closure attack. Each type has its own merits and potential with regard to price
discrimination gains, efficiency improvements, and strategic advantages.
According to Eisenmann et al. (2007), conglomeration attacks are frequently
the mechanism behind convergence, a phenomenon that is particularly perva-
sive in industries that produce, process, and distribute information in digital
form. Convergence can be described as the unification of function, or the com-
bining of previously separate, distinct products. Performance improvements
of semiconductors and broadband communications networks are among the
most notable drivers of convergence.
Digital convergence has taken place prominently in the CE industry, where
new device categories such as smartphones haven integrated the functionality
of mobile phones, music players, and even computers in their ability to access
the Internet and run sophisticated applications catering to various needs. Sim-
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ilarly, gaming consoles have long since become media centers capable of DVD
and Blu-ray disc playback as well as Internet browsing. Finally, convergence is
also evident in the triple play offerings of cable and telephone network opera-
tors who often bundle TV and/or telephone services with broadband Internet
access. What is common to these examples of conglomeration attacks is that
the bundled platforms are largely functionally unrelated, but they share com-
mon users and components, yielding significant economies of scope through
bundling (Eisenmann et al., 2007). Also Gawer & Cusumano (2008) argue
that tipping across markets, or platform envelopment, appears to be particu-
larly important in the context of technological convergence which is happening
among computers, telecommunications equipment, and digital appliances and
CE in general.
The second type of envelopment attack, the intermodal attack, can occur when
the platforms are weak substitutes for each other, i.e., they serve the same ba-
sic purpose but satisfy different sets of user needs. This is typically because
they rely on fundamentally different technologies or distinct modes for ac-
cessing relevant functionality. An intermodal attack may serve to neutralize
an emerging competitive threat, and may also help realize efficiency improve-
ments through economies of scope in initial marketing as well as potentially
significant reductions in production and operating costs. Furthermore, inte-
grating weak substitutes may yield quality improvements over two platforms
offered by different firms. (Eisenmann et al., 2007)
As an example, Eisenmann et al. (2007) note that prior to 1982, Federal Ex-
press (FedEx) and United Parcel Service (UPS) broadly speaking fulfilled the
same purpose of package shipping, although they served different user needs.
The former relied on a network of air freight hubs to ship small, high-value
packages overnight or in a very short time, whereas the latter relied exclusively
on trucks for transport, being better suited for larger and less time-sensitive
shipments. In 1982, however, UPS launched its own overnight air delivery
service, constituting an intermodal attack on FedEx. As many customers re-
quire both fast delivery services as well as larger, less time-sensitive freight
transportation, UPS was able to capture efficiency gains.
Finally, the third type of envelopment attack in the taxonomy discussed above,
the foreclosure attack, can occur when the target’s platform serves as a com-
plement to the attacker’s platform. In such a case, the target is either a nested
network user or a nested component of the attacker’s platform. By bundling
the functionality of the target’s platform with its own, the attacker forecloses
access to its users. From a strategic perspective, a foreclosure attack can also
strengthen the attacker’s core platform by denying its rivals access to a crucial
complement. (Eisenmann et al., 2007)
As a well-known example cited by Eisenmann et al. (2007), Microsoft launched
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its Windows Media Player in 1998, enveloping RealNetworks’ then-dominant
streaming media platform. While both RealNetworks and Microsoft provided
their player software to consumers for free, Microsoft bundled its streaming
media server software with the Windows NT server OS alongside other com-
monly used server software, at no additional cost. This bundling approach
by Microsoft and the consequent platform envelopment caused RealNetworks’
solution to rapidly lose market share. Eisenmann et al. (2007) note that in
general, foreclosure attacks like those of Microsoft can play a powerful role in
the evolution of multi-layer industries like the PC industry. Also in broader
terms, platform envelopment provides a mechanism for platform leadership
change that does not require breakthrough innovation or Schumpeterian “cre-
ative destruction”4.
Proprietary or Shared Control
A recurring consideration of critical importance that firms developing platform-
mediated networks face is the choice between proprietary and shared control
of the platform. As noted by Eisenmann (2008), both approaches offer ad-
vantages and can be successful, as evidenced by numerous firms such as the
proprietary platform providers like Federal Express, Google, Nintendo, Tick-
etmaster, and Verizon Yellow Pages, and by firms leveraging shared platforms
such as Century 21, Maersk, NASDAQ, Red Hat Linux, and Visa. These
firms operating in diverse industries orchestrate platform-mediated networks,
where the users (individuals or firms) rely on a common platform to interact
with each other. The platform, managed by one or more intermediaries of-
ten called platform proprietors or sponsors, comprises the infrastructure and
rules employed in users’ interactions. These interactions, in turn, are subject
to network effects as discussed earlier in the context of two-sided markets in
Section 2.4.3.
Eisenmann (2008) examines factors that favor proprietary versus shared mod-
els when designing new platforms, also looking at the differing management
challenges in each case during the life cycle of the platform. He identifies three
distinct life-cycle stages that occur in sequential order: 1) platform design, 2)
network mobilization, and 3) platform maturity. Let us discuss these stages
briefly.
4Creative destruction as a term was coined by Joseph Schumpeter in his book titled
‘Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy’ (Schumpeter, 1942) to denote a “process of indus-
trial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly
destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one”.
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Platform Design
When aspiring platform providers choose between proprietary versus shared
models, two attributes in particular are of importance. In the case that launch-
ing a new platform requires very substantial investments in centralized infras-
tructure or user subsidies, proprietary platform providers have an advantage
over shared platform providers, as the latter are subject to free rider prob-
lems. To illustrate the free rider problems, let us consider the following: When
significant investments in user subsidization or centralized infrastructure are
required to develop a new platform, the party that makes the investment must
be able to reap the resulting profits to justify the spending. By definition, this
condition holds true for a proprietary platform as there are no free riders. For
comparison, when multiple providers share a platform, one provider could be
responsible for the bulk of the investments, only to see other providers subse-
quently exploit these investments as free riders, quite possibly without putting
in any investment of their own. Thus, proprietary platform providers have an
inherent advantage over their shared platform counterparts.
As mentioned, free rider problems can plague platform providers not only in
infrastructure investments but also in, e.g., network user subsidies. Subsidies
can take various forms, but a common form is penetration pricing, i.e., sub-
sidizing early adopters of a platform in order to fuel its growth and gain a
critical mass of users early on. Due to network effects, growth of the user
base increases willingness to pay among later adopters. In such a case, users
joining later on are typically charged fees that recover the upfront investments
and subsidies. This makes economic sense, however, only if the provider of
the subsidies is also able to fully capture the payoff of the users, without free
riders eating away at the profits. (Eisenmann, 2008)
When the entire market is likely to be served by a single platform in the long
run, a shared approach may be more appealing for both users and aspiring
platform providers. This may be the case when the market exhibits winner-
take-all dynamics (as explained in Section 2.2.3), which in turn are likely to
occur at the platform level in the presence of strong network effects, high
multi-homing costs, and limited demand for differentiated features, all at the
same time. Eisenmann (2008) further notes that winner-take-all dynamics
occurring at the platform level are equal to similar dynamics at the individual
provider level only for proprietary platforms. In other words, winner take-
all-dynamics for a proprietary platform imply a monopoly for a single firm.
However, a proprietary platform monopoly as the alternative would expose
users to the threat of hold-up in the form of aggressive price hikes due to lack
of competition, and also prospective rivaling platform providers would face
severe financial risk if they were to lose the winner-take-all battle.
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Network Mobilization
In mobilizing new networks, Eisenmann (2008) argues, platform providers and
their managers face different challenges depending on whether their platform
is proprietary or shared. As already noted, one possibility for proprietary plat-
form providers is to rely on business models that subsidize certain users. There
are, however, multiple ways to offer subsidies to users, so finding the right for-
mula for creating value for users is a key challenge for proprietary providers
during network mobilization. Penetration pricing is commonly applied to sub-
sidize early adopters and reduce their upfront investment, speeding up early
growth of the platform’s user base. However, with two-sided platforms, each
side of the platform must first have a sufficient number of users before prospec-
tive users on the other side are willing to invest and join. To overcome this
problem, platform providers often subsidize users on one side permanently,
creating an attractive subsidy side whose growing user base boosts users’ will-
ingness to pay on the money side due to cross-side network effects as elaborated
by Eisenmann et al. (2006); Eisenmann (2008).
For shared platform providers, in contrast, free rider problems often make it
economically difficult to offer subsidies. Before being able to attract network
users at all, architects of a shared platform need to solve the problem of re-
cruiting peer providers. A key concern for prospective peer providers is the
ability to earn enough profit by competing on the shared platform. If peers
believe it to be difficult for them to earn a profit, they will be deterred from
participating. Thus, disputes over how to divide captured value can desta-
bilize a shared platform. Similarly, standards-setting processes can become
stalemated when the contributing partners of shared platform each push their
own technologies, hoping to earn license fees or realize time-to-market advan-
tages over others. As a result, the principal challenge for a shared platform
during network mobilization is capturing value for peer providers in an ade-
quate manner so as to convince the peer providers of the commercial viability
of participation. (Eisenmann, 2008)
Platform Maturity
As platforms grow and become mature, depending on whether they are pro-
prietary or shared, their providers will again face different management chal-
lenges. For proprietary platforms, managing scope will be the primary concern,
as continuous innovation creates opportunities for diversification. Moreover,
proprietary platform providers must decide whether to depend on other parties
for essential complements or instead, become vertically integrated.
It can be difficult for shared platform providers to agree on diversification and
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vertical integration initiatives due to their often conflicting strategic agendas.
Eisenmann (2008) suggests that instead, shared platform providers should
focus on managing innovation. It is commonplace that firms create proprietary
features to differentiate their offerings from those of shared platform partners.
When such a development is pushed too far, it can fragment (or fork) the
platform and cause incompatibility. In a similar manner, major upgrades
to a shared platform are not without problems either and can cause various
annoying problems. The desire of incumbents to preserve their dominance
often comes at the expense of newcomers with innovative proposals.
Capturing Value from Shared Platforms
Eisenmann (2008) suggests three possible approaches to capturing value specif-
ically for shared platform providers:
• Restricting membership: When organizing a shared platform, firms often
exclude their closest rivals. If, however, exclusion leads the rivals to
sponsor a competing platform, this strategy can backfire.
• Profiting from intellectual property : If license fees are set too low, plat-
form providers that possess a lot of IP may flock to a platform that offers
a better deal. Conversely, if license fees are set too high, providers with
little IP may avoid the platform as they would bear a cost disadvantage.
Also, high fees can encourage firms to devote a lot of effort to building
their technologies into the shared platform, which can lead to stalemates
in standards-setting processes.
• Profiting from implementation: It is common for providers of shared
platforms to seek to differentiate their offerings through proprietary ex-
tensions to a common standard. This strategy has the potential to splin-
ter a shared platform when taken to extremes.
All three approaches should be pursued with moderation, as they run the risk
of destabilizing the platform’s coalition if taken too far. Managers should
carefully consider the tradeoffs between them, especially between profiting
from IP versus implementation. Should firms be able to incorporate their own
IP into common standards, they are likely to realize time-to-market advantages
over shared platform rivals due to their engineering personnel’s familiarity with
the technologies. Similarly, a firm’s engineers may be able to create proprietary
extensions that differentiate the firm’s offerings if the firm’s technologies are
at the core of platform standards. Due to these reasons, firms often have an
incentive to contribute technology to the shared platform for free, foregoing
potential profits from IP licensing. (Eisenmann, 2008)
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2.5.5 Open vs. Closed Considerations
How open should a platform be in order to maximize innovation or value cre-
ation on it? Choosing the optimal level of openness is a critical decision
for firms acting as platform proprietors as noted by a number of authors
(Boudreau, 2010; Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2008; Gawer & Hen-
derson, 2007; Gawer & Cusumano, 2002), involving a tradeoff between growth
and appropriation (West, 2003). Parker & Van Alstyne (2008) and Eisenmann
et al. (2008) note that opening a platform can spur growth by harnessing net-
work effects, reducing end user concerns about lock-in, and stimulating down-
stream production of complements and other differentiated goods that meet
the needs of user segments. Simultaneously, however, opening a platform typ-
ically also reduces switching costs for users, increases forking and competition,
and reduces the platform proprietor’s ability to levy a tax on complementors
or other firms utilizing its platform.
According to Eisenmann et al. (2008), a platform is “open” to the extent that:
1) no restrictions are placed on participation in its development, commercial-
ization or use; or 2) any restrictions are reasonable and non-discriminatory,
i.e., they are applied uniformly to all potential platform participants. The latter
point would apply to, e.g., requirements to conform with technical standards
or pay licensing fees. It is also important to consider that there are several
distinct roles in platform-mediated networks, including: 1) demand-side plat-
form users, or end users ; 2) supply-side platform users, who offer complements
employed by demand-side users in tandem with the core platform; 3) platform
providers, who serve as users’ primary point of contact with the platform; and
4) platform sponsors, who exercise ownership and property rights and decide
who may participate in a platform-mediated network and for developing its
technology (Eisenmann et al., 2008). The relationships between these roles
are depicted in Figure 2.6. As each of the roles may be either open or closed
for a given platform, it would be prudent to reference the relevant roles when
calling a platform ‘open’ or ‘closed’.
As an example, the Linux OS platform is open with regard to all four roles
described above. On the demand (end user) side, any organization or indi-
vidual can use Linux. Similarly, on the supply side, any party can offer a
Linux-compatible software application. Also, any party can bundle the Linux
OS with server or PC hardware, thus acting in the platform provider role.
Finally, any party can make contributions to further develop and improve the
Linux OS as long as it abides to the rules of the open source community that
is responsible for maintaining the Linux kernel, thereby acting in the platform
sponsor role.
Also more recent empirical research on open versus closed business models
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Figure 2.6: Roles in a platform-mediated network
in the particular case of mobile application stores suggests that the question
of platform openness is not either/or, black or white, but is rather a choice
within a continuum composed of multiple dimensions, each of which can be
described as open or closed. In particular, Müller et al. (2011) identify 12
distinct value network roles where the store owners can have varying levels of
control and influence, either by being the sole owner of a role or function, or
partial owner through a consortium, and exerting influence on other parties
through exclusive arrangements or some other means. Thus, they conclude
that pure open vs. closed model discussion is somewhat outdated and ex-
pected to become less relevant, particularly as the leading mobile app stores
exhibit a mix of open and closed characteristics, the so-called ‘open’ platforms
often including some closed elements and also the ‘closed’ platforms includ-
ing some open elements. They also argue that Boudreau’s (2010) distinction
between the platform strategies characterized by closed platforms, openness
to complementary services, and relinquishing of the control of the platform is
not sufficient, but a more granular approach to analyzing openness is needed
to fully capture the mobile platform business models of players like Apple and
Google.
Parker & Van Alstyne (2008) note that in contrast to traditional R&D, man-
agers can capture open innovation by offering default contracts that grant
ecosystem partners “permissionless innovation”, i.e., a right to build comple-
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ments without having to negotiate. This, as they argue, reduces risk, increases
profits as network effects grow, and reduces hold-up. Another implication in
their view is that managers in networked businesses must open their platforms
and be willing to sacrifice current platform profits in order to subsidize un-
known developers. According to Parker & Van Alstyne (2008), if you know
how to pick the winning ideas that are going to succeed and also know who
has them, then vertical integration is superior, but without this information,
open innovation is superior.
2.5.6 Vertical Integration and Exclusivity
Typically in networked industries and platform markets, consumers visit, join,
or adopt a platform (or some other kind of intermediary) such as a hardware
device, computer OS, content distribution service, online payment platform,
or health insurance network, in order to gain access to that particular plat-
form’s complementary goods and services offering. As has been discussed,
a key activity for platform providers competing with one another is to get
enough complementors on board to produce complements that in turn attract
end users to their platforms. It is not just the quantity of complementors
that matters, however. In many cases, platform providers seek to differen-
tiate themselves from their rivals through either vertical integration (provid-
ing certain differentiating complements in-house) or exclusivity arrangements,
i.e., getting access to particular complements or content as the sole platform
provider — obviously for an exclusivity fee or contribution. Lee (2013) notes
that the question whether such arrangements are pro- or anti-competitive (or
harmful to consumers) is a topic of active debate and an open empirical ques-
tion.
Lee (2013) studies the impact of vertical integration and exclusivity arrange-
ments on industry structure, competition, and welfare. He does this using an
econometric analysis based approach, using empirical data from the U.S. video
game industry between the years 2000 and 2005 where such arrangements did
take place. To simulate counterfactual environments where exclusive vertical
arrangements were prohibited, he has developed and estimated a structural
discrete choice model of dynamic consumer demand for both hardware plat-
forms and their affiliated products, and combined these estimates with a model
of hardware adoption by software developers. Through modeling both sides of
the market, he argues, the dynamic indirect network effects exhibited in the
industry are captured, also allowing agents to respond to past and anticipated
future actions of others. In a particular equilibrium state specified and com-
puted by Lee (2013), all agents’ beliefs are adjusted in such a way that they
are consistent with the counterfactual evolution of the industry. He also notes
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that the counterfactuals are only partial in that they assume that platform
providers offer the same non-discriminatory contracts to all firms. Addition-
ally, he makes the assumption that the quality and set of available products
do not change.
The main finding of Lee (2013) is that prohibiting exclusive arrangements
would have benefited the incumbent platforms and harmed the smaller plat-
form entrants. The underlying explanation from his analysis is that without
exclusive arrangements, high quality software would have primarily been re-
leased on the incumbent platform due to its larger installed base (and therefore
stronger cross-side network effects), and only later, if at all, on either platform
entrant included in his analysis. As a consequence, he finds that in a market
without any exclusive arrangements, neither entrant would have been able to
significantly differentiate itself from the incumbent. Exclusive software thus
appears to have been a key leverage for platform entrants to gain traction in
the networked video game industry, increasing opportunity for differentiation.
Prohibiting exclusivity, however, would appear to have stimulated increased
sales of both hardware and software, by 7% and 58% respectively, primarily
driven by increased software compatibility, according to the market conditions
simulated by Lee (2013). Moreover, consumer welfare would have increased
by $1.5 billion, but all other financial gains would have been largely captured
by the incumbent platform provider.
2.5.7 Platforms and Interrelated Concepts
From the literature review and discussion on industry platforms above, we can
appreciate that there are many similarities and relationships with other theo-
retical concepts already reviewed in this thesis. Firstly, network effects as dis-
cussed in Section 2.2.3 play a key role in attracting users to platforms, whether
end users or complementors. Secondly, as also acknowledged by Cusumano
(2010), platforms tend to have more than one market side to them with cross-
side effects between users on different sides, as described by Parker & Van
Alstyne (2000, 2005); Rochet & Tirole (2003), and other authors in what is
known as two-sided market theory (discussed in Section 2.4.3). Also they used
the term ‘platform’ to refer to the entity that brings the different sides of the
market together. Their perspective was mainly that of economics, however,
not of technology or standardization. In today’s Internet media industries we
can see that two market sides are often not enough to capture the complexity
of relationships between platform users. As an example, online video por-
tals need to attract end users, content producers, advertisers, and possibly a
content aggregator on board to be successful. Thus, the classic problem of
subsidization of market sides become significantly more complex.
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We can also see that the concept of ‘business ecosystem’ (Moore, 1993) with
its notions of cooperation and competition, occurring in varying degrees si-
multaneously between firms, is closely related to that of industry platforms.
Also Brandenburger & Nalebuff (1996) discuss cooperation and competition,
or “co-opetition”, and describe complementors as companies that make ancil-
lary products that expand a platform’s market and make it more valuable to
customers.
Cusumano & Gawer (2002) acknowledge that firms may often have ambivalent
roles, being platform leaders in one context and complementors in another, and
that some level of competition between platform leaders and complementors
is often inevitable, especially when the platform leader chooses to expand
the scope of its business operations. Although they did not use the term
‘ecosystem’ in their early publications, they have since likened the term to
industry platform in the sense that ecosystems tend to form around industry
platforms. In later publications, the theory of two or multi-sided markets is
also referenced by Cusumano (2010).
Platforms, Communities, and Business Ecosystems as a System
Muegge (2013) is one of the few authors who have explicitly recognized and dis-
cussed the interrelatedness of the concepts platform, community, and business
ecosystem, all of them relevant for an entrepreneur or would-be complemen-
tor planning to offer products or services based on shared platform assets. In
his example, neither a mobile application developer nor a provider of online
services is choosing “just” a specific platform or community or ecosystem, but
rather a “bundled system” comprised of instances of all three subsystem types.
In other words, choosing a platform often goes hand-in-hand with choosing a
business ecosystem as well. Similarly, these choices also influence the choice
of membership or participation in various communities, such as collaborative
innovation communities and open source software communities.
According to Muegge (2013), research related to community innovation typ-
ically examines the role of communities outside the boundaries of firms in
creating, shaping, and disseminating technological and social innovations and
providing valuable support to others. As an example, Boudreau & Lakhani
(2009) discuss the circumstances under which companies should pursue and
organize collaborative communities rather than competitive markets as the
source for their outside innovation. Chesbrough & Appleyard (2007) have
studied open innovation related strategy and management practices exten-
sively.
The second body of relevant research on communities relates to open source
communities and projects. West & O’Mahony (2008) have studied 12 open
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 107
source projects initiated by corporate sponsors and a further group of five
projects originating from autonomous open source communities. Based on
the obtained results, they argue that sponsors consider three design dimen-
sions that together create a specific participation architecture or model of in-
teraction and contribution in the community: 1) production (the way pro-
duction processes are conducted), 2) governance (decision-making processes),
and 3) intellectual property rights (allocation of rights to use the community’s
output). They also distinguish between two dimensions of openness, namely
transparency (i.e., allowing those outside the community to follow and under-
stand a community’s production efforts) and accessibility (allowing external
participants to influence a community’s production efforts). Further discus-
sion of communities, a term with a plethora of definitions and disparate uses,
is outside the scope of this thesis.
The main conceptual argument of Muegge (2013) is that platforms, communi-
ties, and business ecosystems can be understood as different levels of analysis
in a complex hierarchical system, and that architecture is the unifying concept
linking the three levels together. Here, architecture is not meant in a tradi-
tionally technical sense only but also as describing organizational structure
and form as well as patterns of interaction. Therefore, Muegge (2013) de-
scribes three levels of organization each involving a distinct type of actor: an
organization of things (a platform), an organization of people (a community,
such as a developer or user community), and an organization of economic
actors (a business ecosystem), each representing organizational forms in an
interconnected system as opposed to more traditional organizational forms.
Discussion
Muegge (2013) contends that for the most part, research and practitioner
literature rarely considers platforms, communities, and business ecosystems
together or observes their interactions in detail. Extensive bodies of research
do exist on each topic individually, but they are kept largely separate due to
differing publication venues. He argues further that the knowledge is scat-
tered in many places such as practitioner books, specialized scholarly books,
journal articles, and various online sources, making it rather difficult and time-
consuming to collect and put all the pieces together. Yet, this is required to
gain a holistic understanding of the status quo and ongoing developments in
the topic area, not to mention actionable knowledge. This is largely also the
gap that the author of this thesis sees in the current literature on industry
platforms and business ecosystems. Thus, a key purpose for this thesis from
a theoretical perspective is to bring together and, where possible, reconcile
the latest research on platforms, two-sided markets, and business ecosystems
into a holistic whole, a conceptual framework that would capture the essential
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dimensions of analysis for the comprehensive study of business ecosystems and
their success factors, and ultimately, guidelines for strategic decision-making.
Chapter 3
Analysis Framework
In this chapter, an analysis framework is formulated that brings together and
builds upon many of the existing concepts and frameworks discussed in the
previous chapter. The goal of the framework is to capture both firm-level and
ecosystem-level factors that enable value-adding complementary innovation
in a thriving, vibrant ecosystem. The platforms on which complementary
innovation is created and that mediate and facilitate transactions in a two or
multi-sided market are analyzed as a key part of the framework. In particular,
the art and practice of managing the platforms, communities of complementors
and the broader ecosystem is of special interest.
In the following sections, each part of the framework is examined separately,
but for a quick overview, the framework is illustrated in Figure 3.2, at the end
of the chapter.
3.1 Firm-Level Analysis
3.1.1 Firm Scope and Angle of Entry
Firm scope here refers to the breadth of the firm’s business activities, such
as the products it makes and sells, the services it provides, and to whom
and where. In the specific context of mobile smartphone business, I make a
distinction between firms that primarily make money through selling CE hard-
ware, those that monetize operating systems and commercial applications, and
those that offer services or digital content that are either fully paid by cus-
tomer, freemium, or advertiser funded. The models of value creation discussed
in Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 2.2.3 offer valuable theoretical concepts and tools
for analyzing the process of value creation in different firms.
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Of the concepts mentioned above, the value chain of Porter (1985) remains
the best known and most widely used, but it has been criticized for its focus
on the unidirectional flow of materials into and out of a firm, largely ignoring
other kinds of transactions such as knowledge or information exchange, making
the value chain poorly suited for describing many knowledge-based industries
such as consulting or services such as insurance, banking, or healthcare. The
traditional value chain, when confined into a single firm operating in a single
industry, also ignores the role of interfirm relationships as a source of com-
petitive advantage and value creation, this being the central argument of the
relational view of Dyer & Singh (1998). In line with this view, the analysis
framework of this study shall consider the investments firms have made into
relation-specific assets, any substantial knowledge exchange between firms,
the existence of complementary resources or capabilities enabling the joint
creation of new products, services, and technologies, as well as the governance
mechanisms resulting in lower transaction costs between firms.
In order to analyze value creation that stems from outside the boundaries
of the firm itself, it is relevant to consider the concept of value network, as
defined by Christensen (1997) and Stabell & Fjeldstad (1998). Christensen
(1997) aptly defined the value network as the “context within which a firm
identifies and responds to customers’ needs, solves problems, procures input,
reacts to competitors, and strives for profit”. Preceding this definition, Nor-
mann & Ramirez (1993) argue that value should be created in any way that is
appropriate, without being limited by the organizational boundaries of suppli-
ers and customers as in the value chain model, and that the offering of a firm
determines the boundary points where different participants come together to
co-produce value, which is also compatible with later definitions of two-sided
markets and platforms.
In line with Allee (2000), who argues that existing approaches to analyzing and
reconfiguring value networks have largely ignored the role of knowledge and
intangible value exchange, the analysis framework of this study shall observe,
where appropriate, Allee’s framework of the three currencies of value, defining
the bases of value exchange between organizations being 1) goods, services,
and revenue, 2) knowledge, and 3) intangible benefits.
In reality, various monetization models may be often mixed and employed
simultaneously by firms. Nevertheless, when studying the case companies, I
am keen to consider the question of monetization and existing capabilities and
assets, also from a historical perspective. For this purpose, I use the concept
of angle of entry that I first introduced in Section 1.2.2 and discussed in
more detail in Section 2.1.2, exploring the related theory of path dependence
(David, 1985, 1994, 2001) which appears to support the foundations of this
novel concept.
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Angle of entry refers to the historical legacy of a firm mainly in terms of its
previous business activities, capabilities, and assets which, as is argued, has
had an impact on more recent choices the firm has made in its ecosystem and
platform strategies. This argument is backed by the central assertion of path
dependency theory, i.e., that the set of options in decision making for any
given circumstance is limited by the decisions one has made in the past, even
though past circumstances may no longer be valid or have any relevance.
Mobile (smartphone) 
business & 
ecosystems
Apple
(Traditional 
telecommunications 
equipment, pagers, 
handsets ...)
Software, content, and services orientationHardware orientation
Emphasis on mobility and 
universal access
Emphasis on personal computing 
needs, productivity & entertainment
(Mobile 
operators)
(Web 
Browser)
Figure 3.1: Angles of entry into mobile smartphone business (revisited)
In the context of this study, angle of entry means that when firms have ex-
panded or refocused their business on the rapidly growing mobile sector, they
have made strategic choices regarding which roles in the ecosystem or value
network they desire to occupy, and also how they intend to capture value, and
that these decisions have been influenced, at least partially, by the legacy of
these firms, their existing businesses and positions in the markets that they
occupied at the time of entry, as well as their capabilities and assets. Thus,
firms have been and are in somewhat different positions as they have entered
the mobile business arena and consequently stand to capture value from their
ecosystems in somewhat different ways, each influenced by their unique angle
of entry. For the sake of convenience for the reader, the illustration of the
concept has been repeated here in Figure 3.11.
1The company/product names and company/product name logos shown in Figure 3.1
are trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners.
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3.1.2 Platform Approach and Governance
For the study of a firm’s platform approach, no other body of research has
been cited as often as the theory of industry platforms by Cusumano & Gawer
(Gawer & Cusumano, 2002, 2008; Cusumano, 2010). The four levers of plat-
form leadership identified by them (see Section 2.5.2 for an elaborate descrip-
tion of each lever), as well as the fundamental role descriptions of platform
leaders and complementors are thus taken as a basis for the study of the case
companies’ platforms. With regard to the first lever, scope of the firm, I have
chosen to organize the analysis under the subsection titled ‘Firm Scope and
Angle of Entry’, separately for each case company, due to a firm’s angle of en-
try being closely related to the discussion of its scope. As for the other three
levers of platform leadership, product technology is discussed under the sub-
subsections titled ‘Product Technology, Architecture, and Openness’, whereas
discussion of the third lever relationships with external complementors is ac-
tually split into two groups of sub-subsections titled ‘In-House vs. External
Focus in Complements’ and ‘Managing and Incentivizing Complementors’ in
order to separate the analysis of how much the firm innovates and produces
complements in-house from how the firm manages and incentives its exter-
nal complementors, the latter point also being relevant in ecosystem analysis,
where software ecosystems and particularly application marketplaces are ex-
amined. Finally, the fourth lever internal organization is discussed under the
sub-subsections titled ‘Internal Organization and Propensity to Advance the
Overall Good of the Ecosystem’.
In line with theories above, this study focuses mostly on technical and organi-
zational concepts such as scope of offering, product architecture and modular-
ity, external relationship management, and internal organizational structure,
constituting mainly analysis on firm level. Although network effects and two
or multi-sided markets play a fundamental role in platform theory, I discuss
the analysis dimensions related to these concepts in my discussion of software
ecosystems and mobile application marketplaces in Section 3.2.2.
In Section 2.5.4, I discussed various strategic approaches to how firms can
become platform leaders, such as “coring”, i.e., creating a new platform where
one has not existed before, or “tipping”, building market momentum and tip-
ping the market in one’s favor in order to win a platform war of competing
standards or technologies as illustrated by Gawer & Cusumano (2008). An-
other strategic option is to expand one’s platform into an adjacent market
by adopting and incorporating some of the functionality of the platforms be-
ing used in the adjacent market, constituting what Eisenmann et al. (2007)
call a platform envelopment attack. These envelopment attacks are further
divided into conglomeration attacks, intermodal attacks, and foreclosure at-
tacks depending on whether the platforms of the attacker and the target are
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functionally unrelated, weak substitutes, or complements for each other. In
this study, I use the above classification to describe the platform expansion of
the case companies.
As discussed in Section 2.5.4, whether the control paradigm of a platform is
proprietary or shared has profound implications on the management challenges
its provider faces, particularly related to the management of complementary
innovation and value capture. Eisenmann (2008) notes that both models can
be successful and examines factors that favor each when designing new plat-
forms, also looking at the differing management challenges during the three
distinct life-cycle stages of the platform: 1) platform design, 2) network mo-
bilization, and 3) platform maturity. Unlike proprietary platforms, shared
platforms are prone to free rider problems that make it challenging to protect
returns from infrastructure investments or to offer user subsidies. According to
him, capturing value from shared platforms can be enhanced in three ways, by
restricting membership, by profiting from intellectual property, and by prof-
iting from implementation, but all three approaches should be pursued with
moderation, as they run the risk of destabilizing the platform’s coalition and
involve tradeoffs. In this study, the proprietary or shared aspects of the case
companies’ platforms in the various stages of their life cycles are examined
according to the concepts above.
As discussed in Section 2.5.3, Boudreau (2008) has studied the effects of the
number of complementors on the intensity of competition and level of innova-
tion on a platform through quantitative econometric analysis, coming to the
conclusion that under specific circumstances, adding too many complemen-
tors can detract from a platform’s ability to generate new innovation as well
as profits for the firms making complements on it, mainly due to crowding-out
effects and substitution as opposed to market expansion.
Due to the qualitative nature of this study, I choose not to apply economet-
ric analysis or any other form of quantitative analysis to the case companies’
platforms or their complementors, as this would add unnecessary complexity
to the specific research problem of this thesis. However, Boudreau’s findings
are considered valuable in that they confirm that crowding-out effects can be a
problem for platforms with very large numbers of complementors, threatening
both the innovation output of the platform and the profitability of individual
complementors, outcomes which ultimately would adversely affect the attrac-
tiveness of the platform from end-user and complementor perspective.
As some mobile application stores have grown to the point that they have an
active catalog of more than a million applications, it is likely that crowding-
out effects already play a significant role in those marketplaces and platforms.
Indeed, results from a mobile application developer survey conducted by App-
Promo in 2012 suggest that already then, app developers were finding it in-
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creasingly challenging to “cut through the noise” and get their app discovered
and downloaded (App-Promo, 2012). Even more discouraging is that accord-
ing to the same survey results, 59% of apps did not generate enough revenue
to actually break even on development costs, which means they actually de-
stroyed rather than created value for their developers. Furthermore, the results
suggest that 68% of developers earned $5,000 or less with their most success-
ful app, hardly signifying a goldmine of revenue. Software ecosystem and
application marketplace related dimensions of analysis are discussed further
in Section 3.2.2.
As discussed in Section 2.5.6, platform providers often seek to differentiate
themselves from their rivals through either vertical integration or exclusivity.
Lee (2013) has studied this phenomenon and its implications on competitive
dynamics, particularly the opportunity for differentiation for new entrants, as
well as consumer welfare. Based on the results of his study from the video game
industry, he contends that exclusive software is a key leverage for platform
entrants, allowing them to differentiate and gain traction in the market more
effectively, but in terms of the overall market, exclusivity actually decreases the
total market revenue as well as consumer welfare. In this study, the extent of
vertical integration and possible exclusive arrangements made by the platform
provider are taken into consideration.
3.2 Ecosystem-Level Analysis
3.2.1 Ecosystem Approach and Governance
For analyzing the mobile business ecosystems of the case companies in this
study, I rely on the definition given by Moore (1993, 1996) discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3.2 and illustrated in Figure 2.5. His definition of a business ecosystem
is as follows: “an economic community supported by a foundation of interact-
ing organizations and individuals — the organizations of the business world.
This economic community produces goods and services of value to customers,
who are themselves members of the ecosystem. The member organisms also
include suppliers, lead producers, competitors, and other stakeholders. Over
time, they coevolve their capabilities and roles, and tend to align themselves
with the directions set by one or more central companies. [...]”.
In addition to contributing the definition of a business ecosystem, Moore has
identified a pattern of four distinct, sequential stages in the evolution of a
business ecosystem. These stages are: 1) pioneering (or birth), when the basic
paradigm of the ecosystem is being worked; 2) expansion, when the commu-
nity broadens its scope and consumes resources of all types; 3) authority (or
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leadership), when the community structure becomes stable and competition
for leadership and profits within the ecosystem gets brutal; and finally, 4) ei-
ther renewal, when continuing innovation must take place for the community
to thrive and remain vibrant, or death, if the community stagnates. Although
the borders between the stages are often blurry, Moore argues that the process
of coevolution remains constant and the complex interplay between competi-
tive and cooperative business strategies remains a key topic for firm executives
and managers. They are also a key topic of interest in analyzing the case com-
panies in this study.
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, Iansiti & Levien (2004a,b) have studied the
structure and health of ecosystems, combining deep managerial research with a
broader understanding of networks drawn from various academic fields. Their
research perspective is that of business networks, the key question being how
firms should manage the complex business networks which they are a part
of, which is very closely related to the research question #2 of this study.
The focus of the research conducted in this study is, however, on fostering
complementary innovation in the ecosystem, whereas the focus of Iansiti and
Levien is on effects that promote ecosystem health that they define through
three critical measures, productivity, robustness, and niche creation. Look-
ing at these measures more closely, one can see that productivity including
the delivery of innovations and niche creation being the capacity to create
meaningful diversity are, in fact, very much related to fostering complemen-
tary innovation. Therefore, I use this terminology in the analysis of the case
companies’ ecosystem health.
Den Hartigh et al. (2006) suggest alternative metrics for micro (company)
level analysis of business ecosystem health, broken down into partner health
and network health metrics. As such analysis typically requires more detailed
data, Den Hartigh et al. (2006) argue that their set of operational measures
is better suited for measuring business ecosystem health on the company level
and of more practical value and use to managers. Where appropriate, I use
these metrics for additional analysis of the case companies’ ecosystem health.
A further contribution of Iansiti & Levien (2004a,b), as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3.3, is their definition of distinct ecosystem actor roles that firms may
occupy or strive for, each with a corresponding ecosystem strategy: keystone,
physical dominator, and niche player. They also describe the additional role
of a value dominator, but it is suggested that such firms are detrimental to
an ecosystem’s health, leading to starvation and ultimately even the destruc-
tion of the ecosystem. I use this terminology to describe the role of the case
companies’ in their ecosystems under the sub-subsection ‘Ecosystem Role and
Health’.
CHAPTER 3. ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 116
3.2.2 Software Ecosystem and Application Marketplace
The software ecosystems of the case companies in this study largely equate to
their mobile application marketplaces (or stores), being the primary touch-
point for both end users and developers alike and the main platform for
commercial transactions pertaining to software applications between the two
parties. Using the definition of Bosch (2009) of a software ecosystem that
was discussed in Section 2.4.2, I also consider any enabling, supporting or
automating software solutions such as OS software and middleware on both
client (device) and server side to be part of the software ecosystem. When dis-
cussing software ecosystems, however, the main focus of this study is on the
complementary innovation produced by third parties in the form of commer-
cial or free applications for certain mobile OS platforms, available on mobile
application stores.
The software ecosystems considered in this study are OS-centric in the sense
that the OS and its interfaces play a key role in defining what really constitutes
the software ecosystem, also setting the technical boundaries for what can and
cannot be done by complementors on a particular platform. As discussed in
Section 2.4.2, Bosch (2009) identifies the following success factors specifically
for OS-centric ecosystems that I use in evaluating the case companies’ software
ecosystems:
• Minimal effort required by developers to build applications on top of
the OS, thereby enabling both breadth and quality of the application
offering.
• Generic, evolving functionality and set of features provided by the OS
that maintains attractiveness for developers. It is important for an OS
to incorporate commoditizing functionality early on without alienating
existing developers.
• The number of customers that use the OS and that are accessible to
developers for monetization.
A mobile application store is a school book example of a two-sided market as
discussed at length in Section 2.4.3, and thus the characteristics and metrics
of a two-sided market as defined by Rochet & Tirole (2003), Parker & Van
Alstyne (2005), and others are used in this study to analyze them. Naturally,
the relative strength of both same-side and cross-side network effects needs
to be evaluated, although unfortunately, no straightforward way exists for
measuring them. The tendency of multi-homing, i.e., joining multiple plat-
forms to make one’s products available on more than one market, is a key
phenomenon exhibited by developers in mobile application stores as discussed
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in Section 2.4.7, and therefore a relevant point of consideration in the case
studies.
As discussed in Section 2.5.5, Eisenmann et al. (2008) define the openness of a
platform ecosystem along four dimensions, each corresponding to a particular
role in a platform-mediated network: demand-side platform users (i.e., end
users), supply-side platform users (e.g., developers), platform providers (who
operate the platform and interface directly with the customer), and platform
sponsors (who own the platform and decide who gets to participate). This
set of dimensions of openness lends itself to the analysis of many kinds of
platforms, not tied to a particular industry. However, Müller et al. (2011)
identify a total of 12 distinct value network roles relevant specifically to mo-
bile application stores, namely end user, network operator, payment broker,
advertisement broker, marketplace, operating system developer, testing & ver-
ification party, signing partner, software developer, content provider, software
distributor, and device manufacturer. Where feasible, I use this extended list
to evaluate the openness of the case companies’ platforms and ecosystems.
3.3 Dimensions of Analysis
Based on the discussion above, I have put together a set of metrics repre-
senting the various dimensions of analysis that I use in the case studies of
Chapter 4. This framework is presented in Table 3.1. A somewhat simplified
visual representation focusing on the key metrics of analysis is presented in
Figure 3.2.
Table 3.1: Dimensions of analysis
Dimension Metric Literature Reference
Firm scope
(value creation logic
and revenue model)
Sources of revenue and monetization methods Stabell & Fjeldstad (1998),
Fjeldstad & Andersen (2003)
Angle of entry Angle of entry into mobile smartphone business See Figure 1.2
Platform approach
and governance
For each software platform used:
– Product technology, architecture, and openness
– In-house vs. external focus in complements
Cusumano & Gawer (2002),
Eisenmann (2008),
Eisenmann et al. (2008),
– Managing and incentivizing complementors
– Internal organization and propensity to
advance the overall good of the ecosystem
– Scope of involvement and control (prioprietary
or shared)
Parker & Van Alstyne (2008),
Boudreau (2008)
Vertical integration and exclusivity Lee (2013)
Ecosystem approach
and governance
Role of the firm in the ecosystem Iansiti & Levien (2004a)
Ecosystem health metrics
(productivity, robustness, niche creation)
Iansiti & Levien (2004a),
Den Hartigh et al. (2006)
Software ecosystem and
application marketplace
Cross-side and same-side network effects:
polarity and relative strength (if possible to measure)
Eisenmann et al. (2006)
Success factors for OS-centric software ecosystems Bosch (2009)
Openness along various roles in the value network:
end users, developers, platform providers, platform
sponsors, ...
Eisenmann et al. (2008),
Müller et al. (2011)
Occurrence of multi-homing on both sides Eisenmann et al. (2006),
Hyrynsalmi et al. (2012)
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Value Creation Logic / 
Revenue Model
Firm Scope Extenal environment
Firm-Level Analysis Ecosystem-Level Analysis
Can it be described 
as a Value Chain/
System, Value Shop,
Value Network, or 
using some other 
model or concept?
Solutions, services, content, 
advertising, brokering, device 
software (OS, applications), device 
hardware, accessories, components
Angle of entry into the mobile 
smartphone business
Platform Approach
Which platforms are 
used? Are they 
proprietary, shared, 
open or closed?
Two-sided market 
strategy and pricing
Platform Leadership / 
Governance
How does the firm manage 
external complementary 
innovation on its 
platform(s)? 
Four levers of platform 
leadership:
1) In-house vs. external 
focus in complements, 
2) technology design and 
IPR, scope, modularity, 
openness of interfaces, 
3) managing and 
incentivizing 
complementors, 
4) internal organization and 
propensity to advance the 
overall good of the 
ecosystem
Ecosystem Approach
Ecosystem role: 
(keystone, physical/
value dominator, 
niche player)
Dynamics of business: customers, 
suppliers, partners, competitors
Ecosystem Leadership / 
Governance
As an ecosystem leader / 
orchestrator / keystone, 
how does the firm manage 
the health of the eco-
system?
How does the firm 
encourage growth and 
innovation in the eco-
system?
Identified Common Elements 
in Successfully Managing 
Ecosystems and Platforms
Figure 3.2: Analysis framework used for the case studies
Chapter 4
Case Studies
In this chapter, altogether three case studies conducted according to the
methodology described in Section 1.4 and the analysis framework presented
in Chapter 3 are presented and discussed. As noted in Section 1.4.2, the case
companies Apple, Google, and Microsoft were chosen because each of them can
be seen as a hub and orchestrator of a business ecosystem in the smartphone
business. Each of them is also a platform provider. From the perspective of
path dependency theory and the concept of angle of entry, it is an interesting
notion that these three companies compete in the same arena, yet they have
very different historical legacies as companies in addition to differing assets
and capabilities. Indeed, this particular dimension of analysis is expected to
have a significant role in explaining the firms’ approaches to managing their
platforms and ecosystems.
4.1 Case 1: Apple and the iOS Ecosystem
Firm Scope and Angle of Entry
According to its Form 10-K annual report filed with the United States Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Apple “designs, manufactures and
markets mobile communication and media devices, personal computers, and
portable digital music players, and sells a variety of related software, services,
peripherals, networking solutions, and third-party digital content and appli-
cations” and the company’s products and services include “iPhone R©, iPad R©,
Mac R©, iPod R©, Apple TV R©, a portfolio of consumer and professional software
applications, the iOS and OS X R© operating systems, iCloud R©, and a variety of
accessory, service and support offerings”. Moreover, the company also states
that it “sells and delivers digital content and applications through the iTunes
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Store R©, App StoreSM, iBookstoreSM, and Mac App Store”, acknowledging its
role as a digital content vendor and broker. (Apple, 2012)
The worldwide sales of Apple products happens through its branded retail
stores, online stores, and direct sales force, as well as through “third-party
cellular network carriers, wholesalers, retailers, and value-added resellers”.
The company is also engaged in selling a variety of third-party “iPhone, iPad,
Mac and iPod compatible products, including application software, and various
accessories” through its online and retail stores. The customers of Apple
include consumers, small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs), and education,
enterprise and government customers. (Apple, 2012)
An interesting notion is that Apple claims to sell its products (and resell
third-party products) in most of its major markets directly to consumers and
SMBs through its retail and online stores instead of relying mostly on indi-
rect distribution channels. This is likely due to the company’s stated belief
in a “high-quality buying experience with knowledgeable salespersons who can
convey the value of the Company’s products and services” that “greatly en-
hances its ability to attract and retain customers”. The stores are designed to
“simplify and enhance the presentation and marketing of the Company’s prod-
ucts and related solutions”, located in desirable high-traffic locations. Also,
the company believes that providing direct contact with its customers is “an
effective way to demonstrate the advantages of its products over those of its
competitors”.
The history of Apple as a company and its entry into the smartphone business
was discussed briefly in Section 1.1.1. From its founding in 1977 to present
day, the company has stayed true to its origin as a manufacturer of consumer-
friendly personal computers, yet it has gone through several major technologi-
cal transitions and has expanded its product offering to include portable media
players, mobile communication devices (smartphones), and media streaming
devices as well as related accessories. Additionally, the company has estab-
lished itself as a major player in digital content sales and distribution through
its iTunes Store, App Store, and iBookstore marketplaces.
Although Apple products continue to command a premium price in all seg-
ments (as compared to competitors’ products with similar functionality), to-
day they reach a larger group of consumers than ever before, mostly due to
the rapid overall growth of the smartphone segment and the success of the
iPhone there, with a total of 154 million units sold in 2013, accounting for
a 15% global market share (Canalys, 2014). The company also successfully
pioneered the even more rapidly growing tablet category that it dominates to
date with its iPad product line. Looking at the technology adoption rates in
the U.S. market, tablets reached 10% penetration in less than 3 years from
their market introduction whereas it took smartphones approximately 8 years
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to accomplish the same (MIT Technology Review, 2012). Establishing an
early lead in what appears to be the most rapidly growing product segment of
the mobile communications and computing industry is a vast benefit for the
company, not only because of the business opportunity, but also because of
the increased network effects shared with the iPhone, strengthening the Apple
iOS ecosystem.
Angle of Entry
As noted in the mini-case example in Section 2.1.2 discussing path dependence,
Apple can be seen to follow its legacy as a premium-priced, niche computer
manufacturer, thereby repeating the same scheme in its newer business do-
mains such as smartphones, selling less in absolute volume terms than many
competitors but capturing the bulk the of industry’s revenue and profits by
maintaining a very high average sales price (ASP) and gross margin for its
products. In other words, Apple aims its products for the premium segment
which helps ensure profitability as long as competitors cannot successfully
match its offering. Aiming high also helps build brand equity and desirability
among consumers.
To satisfy the demand for its products in slightly more affordable price tiers,
Apple has taken up the practice of selling the two previous generations of
its iPhone and iPad products at reduced prices. For example, in early 2013,
the 4th generation iPhone, more than 2.5 years after beginning sales, was
still being sold at 399 EUR (retail price in Finland), a price that put it only
somewhat below the high-end products of Samsung at that time. As of mid
2014, the nearly 3-year-old iPhone 4S is still selling for 299 EUR. So, rather
than designing new products for the mid tier, Apple caters to that segment
with discounted older generation models. The first exception to this rule was
the iPhone 5C available in five different colored casings, released at the same
time as the iPhone 5S in September 2013, but with slightly lower hardware
specifications and lower price than its high-end counterpart.
Apple’s approach of discounting older models helps keep the company’s R&D
costs down compared to developing a portfolio of new devices at different
price points. This approach is in stark contrast to that of most other handset
manufacturers, but arguably Apple has proven its viability. Also in the tablet
market, the more affordable, two generation old iPad 2 (along with the iPad
mini) helped to satisfy the demand for more affordable iPads, leaving less
room to play for other tablet manufacturers. As of mid 2014, Apple offers four
different generations of iPads in two display sizes (9.7 inch regular models and
7.9 inch ‘mini’ models), each with progressively more powerful processors. The
most affordable iPad mini lacks the high-resolution, high-pixel-density ‘Retina
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display’ of the other three models. (Apple, 2014c)
An enduring element of Apple’s legacy is its closed platform approach for its
products, using a proprietary OS and proprietary or otherwise incompatible
peripheral interfaces. Originating from the Mac computers, it has been car-
ried on to its portable CE devices, including smartphones and tablets. Some-
what ironically, the Macs of today are the most open of all Apple products,
supporting USB 3.0 and other standard interfaces and also being capable of
running Windows. However, the strong cohesion in design and UX across Ap-
ple products remains in force. The strict design and UX guidelines extend to
third-party vendors of accessories and software applications as well. Such con-
trol may seem obsessive and even innovation limiting, but as the Apple UX is
both different from the competition and typically highly appreciated by users
due to its consistency and ease of use, it acts as a positive differentiator for
multiple product lines and helps create stickiness in the Apple ecosystem. In
this sense, it would appear that Apple exhibits the first-degree type of path de-
pendence described by Liebowitz & Margolis (1995a) as noted in Section 2.1.1,
as it has clearly made conscious decisions early on that have influenced the
company’s technology and product design choices to this day. Though some
of these choices (such as sticking with Power Architecture based processors
for a long time even though Intel x86 processors were more affordable and
powerful) could be described as inefficient in retrospect, many of them have
served to make Apple effectively stand out from the gray mass, allowing for
increased differentiation and premium pricing. Also, product UX and indus-
trial design as well as prowess in software development have remained Apple’s
core strengths since the early days.
Value Creation Logic
In the angle of entry diagram, depicted in Figure 1.2 and revisited in Fig-
ure 3.1, Apple is presented as entering the mobile smartphones business from
the personal computing business domain, being originally focused on design-
ing and selling hardware products. To date, the company is arguably still
best described as a product company, making premium-priced computers but
also a number of other devices in the areas of computing, media and enter-
tainment, and mobile communications. However, the company has diversified
itself into selling digital content and services that nicely complement the com-
pany’s portfolio of devices and are consumable on them. Additionally, it has
also expanded into the mobile advertising market by launching its iAd mobile
advertising platform in July 2010 (Apple, 2010).
As its business strategy, Apple states that it is “committed to bringing the best
user experience to its customers through its innovative hardware, software,
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peripherals, and services” and that it leverages its “unique ability to design
and develop its own operating systems, hardware, application software, and
services to provide its customers new products and solutions with superior
ease-of-use, seamless integration, and innovative design”. The strategy also
includes the continued expansion of its platform for the discovery and delivery
of third-party digital content and applications through the iTunes Store that
also includes the App Store and iBookstore.
There had long been indications that Apple would expand its presence in the
mobile payments space, leveraging its already vast and growing base of iPhone
and iPad users as well as the hundreds of millions of credit cards on file in its
iTunes store and App Store. Through access to such a huge number of credit
card credentials, currently used mainly for iOS app and in-app purchases as
well as iTunes content purchases, Apple is arguably already now a major player
in mobile payments, despite the fact that those payments are currently limited
to its own closed content ecosystem. Offering a mobile payment platform that
is open to third-party merchants would be the next logical step to expand the
business, and so Apple Pay was announced in September 2014 (Apple, 2014d).
According to Wall Street Journal (2014), a payment service by Apple would
launch the company into “what is becoming a fierce battle over how people
pay through mobile devices”. In the mobile payments market, Apple’s rivals
include eBay’s PayPal service, Google Wallet, and startups such as Square
Inc. and Stripe Inc. The market is clearly becoming attractive, as Forrester
Research estimates that Americans will spend $90 billion through mobile pay-
ments by 2017, up from $12.8 billion in 2012 (Wall Street Journal, 2014).
Device Sales and Content Business
Despite its diversification, Apple still earns most of its revenue from device
sales. Out of the $170.9 billion in net sales for fiscal year (FY) 2013 (ending
September 28, 2013), Mac computer sales constituted 12.6%, iPhone sales
53.4%, and iPad sales 18.7%. The sales of iPod media players, having declined
21% compared to FY 2012, represented only 2.6% of the company’s revenue.
Branded peripherals and other hardware constituted 3.3% of total revenue. All
in all, more than 90% of Apple’s total revenue came from selling hardware and
related services, not including revenue from content or separately sold software
— this is reported as ‘iTunes, software and services’ (FY 2013) or ‘Other music
related products and services’ (FY 2012). The revenue item ‘iTunes, software
and services’ was $16.1 billion or 9.4% of total revenue in FY 2013, growing
25% from FY 2012. As of FY 2013, however, Apple no longer reports the sales
of Apple-branded and third-party Mac software and services separately, and
this source of revenue is now included in the ‘iTunes, software and services’
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item, having amounted to $3.5 billion or 2.2% of total revenue in FY 2012.
All things put together, Apple’s content, software, and services business is still
minor compared to its hardware sales revenue. (Apple, 2013c)
The role of Apple’s digital content business in driving device sales is signifi-
cant, however. The company had realized this early on, as in the year 2000, it
had acquired the software technologies on which it would base its first release
of iTunes in January 2001. When the first iPod media player was launched
later that year, the new version of iTunes added support for the device, en-
abling media transfer and synchronization with Mac computers. The online
iTunes store opened in April 2003, and it quickly gained popularity and be-
came the largest music retailer in the U.S. after less than 5 years after its
launch, surpassing Wal-Mart (Apple, 2008). Since then, Apple has been able
to maintain and even increase its lead (EdibleApple, 2010; NPD Group, 2012).
This and the iTunes revenue figures of $9.3 billion (FY 2013) and $7.5 billion
(FY 2012) are testimonial to Apple’s mastery of the business (Apple, 2013c,
2012). Although the original goal may have been to purely drive device sales
and increase stickiness in the Apple ecosystem, it certainly is a viable business
with a healthy growth rate even on its own.
As a summary, Apple’s content, software, and services business is growing at
a rate of 25% year on year (FY 2013 vs. FY 2012). This business has become
the fastest growing product segment as of FY 2013 as a result of the slowing
growth of iPhone and iPad sales. Still in FY 2012, these two product segments
grew at phenomenal rates of 71%, and 59% respectively. Nevertheless, as of
FY 2013, Apple still made more than 90% of its revenue primarily from device
sales. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that Apple lists the principal com-
petitive factors important to its business to include “price, product features,
relative price/performance, product quality and reliability, design innovation,
a strong third-party software and peripherals ecosystem, marketing and dis-
tribution capability, service and support, and corporate reputation”, most of
which relate directly to their device products. (Apple, 2013c, 2012)
Mobile Advertising
Apple originally announced the iAd platform in April 2010, stating that it
wanted to improve the monetization opportunities of developers publishing
free applications. Apple’s then-CEO Steve Jobs was unhappy with the mobile
advertisements of the time, arguing that they detracted from the experience by
taking users out of the app. He emphasized the need for mobile advertisements
to deliver interactivity and emotion (TechCrunch, 2010).
During its first years of existence, iAd was not a great success. The service has
been widely criticized as being too expensive for advertisers, initially requiring
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a one million dollar ad spend. Over time, Apple has lowered this minimum fee
to $400,000 and then $100,000, but it is still considered too expensive for many
advertisers. This is also due to the Cost per Mille (CPM, cost per a thousand
ad impressions) and the performance-based pricing scheme where advertisers
reportedly end up paying $0.50 to $1 CPM or $0.05 to $0.15 CPC (Forbes,
2012a). According to a report by Opera Software cited by Forbes (2012b),
ads running on Apple’s iOS command significantly higher prices than those
on Android and much higher prices than all other platforms. For the iPad,
the effective CPM was reportedly $3.96, for the iPhone $2.85, and for Android
$2.10. This would seem to suggest that iOS has a major lead in actual ad
revenues compared relative to its market share in traffic (Forbes, 2012b).
A related point of criticism is that iAd’s upfront costs and pricing scheme are
a gamble for performance-based advertisers whose profit depends on actions
(e.g., purchases), not impressions or clicks. The share of impressions or clicks
that eventually are translated into actions varies between brands, and bigger,
well-recognized brands are at an advantage. Reaching a particular target
demographic may also be challenging and more expensive with iAd than with
rivaling mobile advertising platforms. Moreover, the conversion rates of iAd
do not match that of AdMob on Android, which may at least partially be due
to iOS’s more engaging app experience. Finally, creating own ads for iAd is
subject to Apple’s sometimes lengthy approval process and is perceived to be
cumbersome compared to Android. (Forbes, 2012a)
Recent data from a report by Opera Mediaworks suggests that for the fourth
quarter of 2013, Apple’s iOS held an impressive lead over Android and other
platforms, capturing 43.4% of the traffic and 55.7% of the revenue compared
to Android’s respective figures of 37.7% and 31.7%. (Apple Insider, 2014a)
Model for Value Creation Process
Apple’s core business of selling devices can be described using the classic value
chain model. The company is responsible for the industrial design of its prod-
ucts as well as the design of device hardware, mobile application processors,
device software and UI/UX, and most complementary services (e.g., iCloud),
and therefore captures value primarily in these areas. With few exceptions,
Apple has almost entirely outsourced its manufacturing operations to overseas
contract manufacturers, most notably Foxconn (Hon Hai Precision Industry
Co., Ltd.) that manufactures its products in China. Foxconn has been an
effective and reliable manufacturing partner, but has also earned Apple some
notoriety due to its reportedly poor working conditions.
As the Chinese domestic market continues to grow at a rapid pace and local
labor costs rise, Apple is considering relocating its manufacturing. Manufac-
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turers in general are turning their attention to Southeast Asian countries such
as Vietnam where the cost level is lower than in China. Although Steve Jobs
had commented that “those [manufacturing] jobs aren’t coming back [to the
U.S.]”, the current CEO Tim Cook said in December 2012 that Apple is in-
deed considering bringing some manufacturing jobs back to the U.S., and that
certain product lines would carry the ‘Made in the USA’ label. Of course,
this doesn’t mean that Apple would completely withdraw manufacturing op-
erations from China as the country is expected to be Apple’s most important
consumer market in the future. According to a Boston Consulting Group
study, somewhat surprisingly, the U.S. is becoming one of the lowest-cost
producers in the developed world, well ahead of countries such as the UK,
Germany, France, Japan, and Italy. (CHaINA Magazine, 2013)
In its device business, aside from actual manufacturing, Apple is very much
vertically integrated, even choosing to design its own mobile application pro-
cessors instead of relying on off-the-shelf solutions from the likes of Nvidia,
Qualcomm, or Texas Instruments. As already noted, it has also invested in a
worldwide network of branded retail stores and care centers with dedicated,
trained sales staff. This is something that very few other mobile device man-
ufacturers have been able to do in a sustainable manner.
On the software, services, and content side, Apple’s value creation is based
on networked relationships. In its software ecosystem or value network, it
acts primarily as a broker, bringing together application developers, content
providers, and consumers. Apple provides the platform, infrastructure, and
tools for the former groups, and facilitates their transactions with the latter
group, consumers, earning a slice of the value of each transaction. In the case
of App Store and iBookstore content purchases, Apple takes 30% of the rev-
enue whereas the developer or publisher gets 70%. The same revenue sharing
scheme also applies to in-application purchases and mobile advertising revenue.
Platform Approach and Governance
Product Technology, Architecture, and Openness
Apple relies fully on proprietary, in-house developed operating systems and
platforms for its products. For the iPhone, iPad, and iPod touch product lines,
iOS is the OS of choice. As noted in Section 1.1.1, iOS is based on a mix of
closed source software components developed by Apple as well as open source
components. The differentiating or value-adding components such as the UI
and application framework are closed source to protect Apple’s intellectual
property and to hinder substitute innovation. A similar approach is applied
to the OS X operating system that powers Mac computers. However, certain
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software interfaces and APIs such as the Cocoa (for OS X) and Cocoa Touch
(for iOS) frameworks are deliberately open and well documented for third-
party developers to develop complementary applications on top the platforms.
Using the terminology of Eisenmann (2008), Apple has clearly adopted a pro-
prietary platform approach consistently throughout the life cycles of the iOS
and OS X platforms, both currently in the maturity phase. Due its stringent
control and proprietary approach, Apple has not had problems with free rid-
ers. No other platform provider or device manufacturer has access to the iOS
and OS X platforms.
Although Apple has been able to maintain its niche position as a premium seg-
ment computer manufacturer, price competition has been particularly intense
between competitors selling Windows-based personal computers, leading to
lower margins for these players. The threat of smaller and simpler, Internet-
enabled devices (such as tablets) is also acknowledged as a threat to existing
Apple products, particularly its personal computers, despite the company’s
active role in developing and selling those newer product categories. Also,
Apple notes that its financial performance substantially depends on its “abil-
ity to continually improve the Mac platform to maintain its functional and
design advantages” (Apple, 2012).
It was long speculated that Apple would introduce its own contactless payment
method in its iPhones rather than the standard method based on Near Field
Communications (NFC), given Apple’s reluctance so far to introduce NFC
despite competitors having done so already some time ago. One alternative
could have been the iBeacon, an in-door positioning system based on Bluetooth
Low Energy (BLE) that also support payments and is already implemented
for iOS 7 devices Expert Reviews, 2014). In September 2014, however, Apple
finally introduced its mobile payment service, ‘Apple Pay’, based on NFC
technology and a secure element (SE) chip embedded in its new iPhone 6 and
iPhone 6 Plus products. The company also said the payment service would
work with its newly announced wearable computing device, the Apple Watch,
extending the service also to over 200 million owners of iPhone 5, 5s, and 5c.
From October 2014, the Apple Pay service is available initially only in the
U.S. (Apple, 2014d,e,f).
Under deals reached with banks individually, Apple will collect a fee for each
transaction made with its payment service, which could amount to billions in
a few years’ time, as the mobile payments market is expected to more than
quadruple to about $90 billion by 2017, according to Forrester Research cited
by Bloomberg (2014). Although the terms of the deals aren’t public, merchants
typically pay fees in the range of 2 percent of the purchase price for credit-
card transactions. These swipe fees, also known as interchange, help banks
that issue credit cards cover fraud costs and fund reward programs. Bloomberg
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(2014) notes that Apple’s arrangement builds on the existing fee structures,
allowing the company to tap into the swipe fees, currently amounting to more
than $40 billion annually. The Financial Times reports, as quoted by Apple
Insider (2014c), that Apple would earn a 0.15 percent of every Apple Pay
transaction conducted over NFC.
In July 2014, Apple and IBM entered into a global exclusive partnership to
“transform enterprise mobility” through a new class of business apps for the
iPhone and iPad. IBM’s strong capabilities in cloud computing, big data,
and analytics are a welcome addition to Apple, whose devices are already
very popular among business users, not only due to the BYOD trend but
also the increased popularity and approval of iPhone and iPad as corporate
devices (BGR, 2014). However, the enterprise IT service offering, integration
and support for Apple devices has not matched that of Microsoft products,
or even BlackBerry products in terms of remote device management, security,
and integration.
Apple and IBM aim to address these gaps by deploying “unique” IBM cloud
services optimized for iOS, including device management, security, analyt-
ics, and mobile integration, a new AppleCare R© service and support offering
tailored to enterprise needs, new packaged offerings from IBM for device ac-
tivation, supply, and management, as well as more than 100 industry-specific
enterprise solutions such as tailored apps for the iPhone and iPad (Apple,
2014b). Some of these industry-specific platform solutions, such as the one for
healthcare promoted by IBM, have raised some skepticism due to numerous
existing companies, even startups, having more domain expertise and offering
better solutions and platforms than IBM (Forbes, 2014b). A further concern
is the apparent lack of device agnosticism, and therefore iOS centricity, of the
mobility management solutions. With BYOD users accounting for some two
thirds of business smartphone users according to Strategy Analytics (2014)
and considering the relative market shares of Android and iOS, it would be
rather inconvenient for many companies to adopt a non-device-agnostic mo-
bility management solution.
Quite aptly put, H. Shaughnessy writes on the Forbes blog that “very few com-
panies truly understand what modern business platforms are about or how to
craft the strategy, technology and services mix”, and although Apple is a “king”
of consumer platforms, they too have shunned from building an enterprise plat-
form, likely due to the dominant position of Microsoft (Forbes, 2014b). The
Register (2014b) questions Apple’s motives to partner with “Big Blue” (IBM),
speculating that Apple’s declining position in the consumer smartphone mar-
ket would be reflected on corporate purchases as well. IBM selling iPads and
iPhones preloaded with business apps with Apple providing the support does
appear a smart complement to Apple’s consumer-oriented channel approach,
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however, and helps defend Apple’s position in the enterprise market.
In-House vs. External Focus in Complements
For iOS, the development of third-party applications has been possibly since
March 2008 when the first SDK was made available. For OS X, application
development has been possible since the beginning also using a non-Apple
toolchain, most notably the GNU toolchain. Furthermore, OS X application
distribution is possible via multiple channels, not limited to the Mac App
Store and its stringent policies. For iOS applications, the only legitimate
distribution channel is the App Store. In this sense, the OS X is more open
for developers compared to iOS. In order to publish applications on the App
Store, whether for iOS or OS X, the developer is required to enroll in the
corresponding developer program for an annual fee of $99.
On the hardware side, Apple maintains full control of its product platform,
being the only authorized maker of hardware running either OS X or iOS.
Particularly in the market for personal computers and peripherals, Apple ac-
knowledges its minority role in a market “dominated by computer makers using
competing operating systems, most notably Windows”, and also notes that in
this market, it has “a number of competitors, many of which have broader prod-
uct lines, lower priced products, and a larger installed customer base” (Apple,
2012). These statements are made to acknowledge the risks that lie in being
a proprietary platform owner with a minority market share in a market that
has historically seen consolidation and is dominated by large competitors.
Apple produces a significant number of branded hardware accessories for each
of its major product lines. These usually follow the same design philosophy
and aesthetic as the core products and demand a price premium. Third-
party accessories do exist and are typically more affordable than the Apple
branded ones, but due to Apple’s control over the licensing of its proprietary
interfaces (such as the now obsolete 30-pin dock connector or the new 8-pin
‘Lightning’ connector), the price difference may not be dramatic. In addition
to protecting its own branded accessory business, the company has used its
proprietary interfaces as a means to control the quality and quantity of third-
party accessories available, as producing compatible accessories requires its
approval. For Mac computers with standard USB ports this is less of an issue,
but to date, the entire iPhone, iPad, and iPod touch product lines only support
Apple proprietary connectors, subjecting the peripherals for those devices fully
to Apple’s control.
In summary, it can be said that Apple does support the creation of external
complements, but exercises significant control over it, particularly for its iOS
based products. On the hardware side, branded complements (accessories) are
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a significant business segment for the company, and thus the company can be
seen to protect that business through its licensing and approval policies.
In a somewhat surprising move, Apple announced it would acquire the sub-
scription streaming music service Beats Music as well as Beats Electronics
in May 2014. Beats Electronics (or briefly, Beats) comprises the ‘Beats by
Dr. Dre’ family of popular consumer headphones, earphones, and speakers as
well as patented Beats Audio software technology. Beats Music, on the other
hand, is a subscription streaming music service that focuses on providing a
personalized music experience for each user “through a unique blend of digital
innovation and musical passion”, delivering “the right music for any situation,
any time, and any preference, personalized to your tastes” (Apple, 2014a).
The price of the acquisition amounted to a total of $3 billion, consisting of a
purchase price of around $2.6 billion plus some $400 million in Apple stock
that will vest over time, making it the most expensive acquisition Apple has
ever made by a wide margin (for comparison, NeXT Software was acquired
by Apple for $400 million in 1997). The high price has lead to some criticism
whether Apple is spending its money wisely, but it clearly is a move to stay
competitive in the music streaming market, with offerings from Pandora, Spo-
tify, Google, Amazon, and recently also Samsung threatening Apple’s position.
Apple itself sells songs through its iTunes store and has also launched iTunes
Radio in September 2013, offering free ad-supported music to its users (Ap-
ple, 2013b). Beats brings some 250,000 monthly-paying subscribers to Apple’s
fold, complementing its existing services nicely (Yahoo Finance, 2014).
Managing and Incentivizing Complementors
Apple has generally been quite successful in managing its complementors par-
ticularly on the software applications side. As noted in Section 1.1.1, much
of the success and rapid growth of the App Store can be attributed to a well-
defined business model as well as a holistic offering of developer programs,
SDKs, documentation, and training. As noted, other mobile companies had
had similar efforts earlier, but they had not been effective in attracting devel-
opers or consumers in large numbers. Apple’s revenue sharing scheme where
the developer gets a 70% cut of the application revenue is simple and effective.
Apple has been consistent in providing updates to its iOS operating system,
allowing developers to gain early access to new APIs and related documenta-
tion well in advance of consumer deployment. It has also managed OS version
fragmentation better than most competitors, which is a clear benefit for de-
velopers who typically need to spend a great deal of effort on validating the
compatibility of their applications (TechCrunch, 2012a).
The App Store has created ample opportunities for complementors producing
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applications for truly diverse customer segments and purposes. In the case
of iOS, Apple has generally not “stepped on the toes” of any notable comple-
mentors by blocking their applications in favor of in-house applications except
in the case of core functionality such as the web browser. On iOS devices,
the preinstalled Safari browser remains the only choice available whereas on
computers running OS X, any compatible browser such as Mozilla Firefox or
Google Chrome can be installed and used. One notable exception is Google,
the services of which Apple has recently been ousting from its iOS devices,
sometimes even at the cost of end-user experience, as evidenced by the poorly
received Apple Maps client that abruptly replaced Google Maps in iOS6 and
later versions of the OS. This points to Apple’s intentions of being increas-
ingly vertically integrated on the software side, acquiring and integrating key
functionality directly into its OS platform, serving the goal of reducing depen-
dency from rivals like Google or any other third parties that might eventually
become supply bottlenecks or competitors.
As noted earlier, Apple does exercise rather stringent control over the publi-
cation of applications on the App Store. The vetting process that applications
are subjected to is also a benefit for consumers as it helps maintain the quality
level and safety of the application catalog. Malware is not really an issue on
iOS, but the same cannot be said for Android on which a more liberal policy in
distributing applications has lead to a significant malware and spyware threat.
Developers of software applications and producers of hardware accessories are
not the only groups of complementors that Apple is courting to enhance its
ecosystem. The content offering of the iTunes Store, one of the company’s
fastest growing business segments, is built on licensing deals with content
producers and publishers of music, movies, TV series, books, newspapers, etc.
Also advertisers, although not necessarily seen as complementors by end-users,
have an increasing role in the economic viability of many complements offered,
enabling ad-supported and ad-funded business models. Indeed, as also noted
by Cusumano (2010), in newer multi-sided platform markets like the one where
Apple operates, it is no longer enough to attract only end-users and developers.
Internal Organization and Propensity to Advance the Overall Good
of the Ecosystem
Apple’s organizational structure, as of 2011, is built around functional units
reporting to the CEO such as ‘Hardware Engineering’, ‘Software Engineering’,
‘iOS Software’, ‘Worldwide Product Marketing’, ‘Industrial Design’, ‘Opera-
tions’, and ‘Retail’, complemented by supporting functions. The previous
CEO Steve Jobs had established a clear system of responsibilities and expec-
tations that didn’t exist at rivaling companies. As CEO, Jobs was surprisingly
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involved in product-related decision-making, attending presentations and re-
views to either give his approval or send the project back to the drawing
board. He was known to dictate seemingly minor product details based on
personal taste. Dissatisfactory projects such as the ‘MobileMe’ cloud service
were discontinued, with the employees responsible reportedly terminated. To
enforce clear accountability, Apple also insists on having a “directly respon-
sible individual” as the go-to person for each product or task. (Electronista,
2011)
Because Apple shares only minimal information on its internal organization
and ways of working, it is not clear which organizational bodies of Apple
are responsible for fostering external innovation and complements. However,
based on observations, it is clear that Apple takes this activity very seriously
and has a clear, consistent strategy for it.
Ecosystem Approach and Governance
For Apple, its ecosystem very much equates to its industry partners acting
as suppliers or manufacturing partners, distributors (mobile operators, whole-
salers, retailers, value-added retailers), or complementors (including service
partners, content producers, publishers, and advertisers). To a limited extent,
Apple is also involved in industry standards bodies, but only when it stands
to gain from such activities. As an example, Apple has been pushing the in-
dustry for smaller subscriber identity module (SIM) form factors, not being
happy with the micro-SIM (3FF) form factor. In June 2012, the company
won a standard battle over the nano-SIM (4FF) standard against a rivaling
proposal from Nokia, RIM, and the Google-owned Motorola Mobility, with the
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) approving Apple’s
proposal. This raised concerns over the licensing policies of the new standard,
but Apple has agreed to “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND)
licensing terms as is common with essential patents required to implement an
industry standard. (Computerworld, 2012)
Ecosystem Role and Health
Per the categorization of Iansiti & Levien (2004a), Apple acts as the undis-
puted leader and keystone of its ecosystem — it provides the platforms and
business models that enable sustainable value creation for a large number of
players of varying sizes, occupying different roles in the ecosystem. On the
software side, according to extensive comparative studies of the App Store
such as the one by Hyrynsalmi et al. (2012), Apple’s iOS platform had over
117,000 developers, compared to 91,000 for Android, and 18,000 for Windows
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Phone. In terms of the number of applications in the catalog, Apple App Store
was long a clear leader but as of July 2013 has been surpassed by Google Play
with its over 1 million Android applications compared to Apple’s 900,000 titles
at that time (PhoneArena, 2013). These figures provide proof that there is
ample diversity (a proxy for the ecosystem health measure of niche creation)
in the iOS software ecosystem, second to perhaps only the Android ecosys-
tem. Also, according to Apple, by end of 2013, the company had paid out a
cumulative total of $15 billion to application developers per its revenue shar-
ing scheme since the launch of the App Store in 2008, a big jump from the
$8 billion announced in February 2013 and a good proxy for the productivity
of its software ecosystem complementors (Apple, 2014g; TechCrunch, 2014b;
The Next Web, 2013).
No statistics exist, however, on the survival rates of companies producing
complements for Apple, a measure of ecosystem robustness identified by Iansiti
& Levien (2004a). The competition for end-users’ attention on the App Store
is fierce, and a large and ever growing application catalog means that discovery
is increasingly a problem, requiring application developers to invest more in,
e.g., social media and viral marketing to ensure the continued discovery of
their applications. This would suggest that the iOS app ecosystem is suffering
from significant crowding-out effects that, according to Boudreau (2008), lead
to diminishing returns for developers as well as a reduced level of innovation on
the platform. Interestingly, as of late 2014, some developers have voiced their
opinion about the stagnant state of the Apple App Store (Upstart Business
Journal, 2014).
Hyrynsalmi et al. (2012) note that of the more than 170,000 iOS developers
they identified as part of their data set of over 850,000 applications, 55% had
published only one app. This highlights the extent of long tail innovation in
the iOS ecosystem. It is fair to assume that many such one-app developers
are individuals or small companies, and the level of churn is likely higher than
with large, professional developers. Nevertheless, Apple’s consistency and con-
tinuity in evolving its platforms has created a relatively stable environment for
complementors where obsolescence is limited and continuity of user experience
and use cases prevails.
By looking strictly at the hardware side of Apple’s ecosystem, it can be argued
that Apple leaves little room for complementary innovation as it remains the
sole maker of hardware being compatible with its proprietary operating sys-
tems and thus the body of software that has been created for them. Although
Apple does allow third-party manufacturers to sell compatible hardware acces-
sories, it captures value from these products through the licensing policies of
its proprietary interfaces and competes head on in many accessory categories
with in-house products. By designing its own mobile application processors
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDIES 134
such as the 64-bit Apple A7 in the iPhone 5s and its successor, the A8 in the
iPhone 6 and 6 Plus, the company is also exhibiting more vertical integra-
tion than many of its rivals (Samsung being a notable exception), capturing
added value also from the chipset domain. Hence, it could be argued that
Apple exhibits characteristics of a value dominator on the hardware side of its
ecosystem, capturing the great majority of value created in that domain.
Software Ecosystem and Application Marketplace
As part of its business strategy statement in its Form 10-K annual report,
Apple declares support for “a community for the development of third-party
software and hardware products and digital content that complement the Com-
pany’s offerings”. As argued by Kenney & Pon (2011), hardware firms and
software firms rely on each other to push technology forward. Even Apple
with its relatively closed iOS operating system depends upon the hundreds of
thousands of application developers to continue to create desirable apps for
end-users. Conversely, the developers that create iPhone apps have made a
bet, a financial investment, on the continued success of the iOS platform and
therefore rely on Apple to maintain and update their access to its operating
system to be able to create complements.
VisionMobile (2011) estimates that an iOS app costs an average of $30,000 to
develop, and hence the more than a million iOS apps available today would
roughly represent an investment of $30 billion in the iOS ecosystem. The value
of the ecosystem contributes to Apple’s bottom line through increased device
sales (as a result of the attractiveness and perceived value of the ecosystem)
and revenue share from app sales. Of course, the iOS App Store in particular
constitutes an ecosystem control point for Apple, as it is the only authorized
marketplace for iOS apps. Apple indeed has complete control over the con-
tent selection and curation, distribution of apps, billing and monetization of
apps, retailing and discovery of apps, and consumer insights, as argued by
VisionMobile (2011).
Apple’s iOS software ecosystem is an OS-centric one per the classification of
Bosch (2009), as the development and distribution of complementary software
is specific to the OS in question. Although cross-platform development of
applications for iOS is possible to a certain extent, Apple has traditionally
discouraged and even banned the use of cross-platform compilers, although
the ban was later lifted (Computerworld, 2010; iMore, 2010). Moreover, the
iOS ecosystem appears to exhibit all of the three success factors highlighted by
Bosch (2009), i.e., 1) minimal effort required by developers due to the availabil-
ity of a comprehensive SDK and developer toolchain as well as well-defined,
rich APIs, 2) generic, evolving functionality and set of features provided by
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the OS due to the regular update cycle and development done by Apple to
introduce new features and functions and refine existing ones, and 3) (a suf-
ficiently large) number of customers that use the OS and that are accessible
to developers which is evident in the hundreds of millions of iOS devices in
use globally, including 150 million iPhones and 71 million iPads sold in its FY
2013 alone (Apple, 2013c).
Using the dimensions of openness identified by Eisenmann et al. (2008), the
iOS ecosystem is open to demand-side users (i.e., end users), as anyone can
join through purchasing or otherwise obtaining an Apple device running iOS.
The ecosystem is also relatively open to supply-side users (i.e., developers)
by allowing practically any individual or company to join the iOS developer
program, although at a cost. As already noted, application development is
possible only with Apple’s own SDK and toolchain, and distribution and mon-
etization takes place exclusively on the Apple App Store. With respect to the
roles of the platform provider and sponsor, however, the ecosystem is closed,
as Apple acts exclusively in both capacities.
By applying the extended role categorization of Müller et al. (2011), Apple
exclusively occupies also the payment broker (iTunes), marketplace (iTunes &
App Store), OS developer, testing & verification party, signing partner, and
device manufacturer roles. In a non-exclusive but dominant capacity it also
occupies the advertisement broker (iAd) and software developer role, and has
significant influence over other software developers (through the terms and
conditions of its developer program) and content providers as well as MNOs.
Apple used to make exclusive deals with MNOs for the first launch rights of
its latest iPhone products, giving the carrier exclusivity for a limited period
of time, but has since given up the practice.
Multi-homing in the iOS software ecosystem appears to be a relatively rare
phenomenon, with 6% or around 12,000 of 178,000 identified developers pub-
lishing also for Google Play (formerly Android Market). Even smaller frac-
tions of iOS developers (0.4% and 0.3%, respectively) developed applications
for Windows Phone or all three marketplaces. Interestingly, there appears to
be no significant difference in the popularity and type of multi-homing appli-
cations compared to the total set of applications available (Hyrynsalmi et al.,
2012). This would suggest that considerable diversity exists within and be-
tween the different application marketplaces, and this could be used as an
argument to promote one software ecosystem over another.
Arguably, Apple is the leading player when measured by number of developers,
revenue earned by developers, and by being the platform that gets most appli-
cation titles first to its catalog. Multi-homing is a relatively rare phenomenon,
with less than 7% or around 12,000 of 178,000 identified developers publishing
also for Google Play (formerly Android Market). Even smaller fractions of
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iOS developers (0.4% and 0.3%, respectively) developed applications for Win-
dows Phone or all three marketplaces. Interestingly, there appears to be no
significant difference in the popularity and type of multi-homing applications
compared to the total set of applications available (Hyrynsalmi et al., 2012).
This would suggest that considerable diversity exists within and between the
different application marketplaces, and this could be used as an argument to
promote one software ecosystem over another. Arguably, Apple is the lead-
ing player when measured by revenue earned by developers, and by being the
platform that gets most application titles first to its catalog. In the num-
ber of applications, it lost its leading position to Android in 2013, although
both platforms currently have well more than one million apps in their store
catalogs (PhoneArena, 2013; TechCrunch, 2014a; AppBrain, 2014).
4.2 Case 2: Google and the Android Ecosystem
Firm Scope and Angle of Entry
Google describes itself as a “global technology leader focused on improving the
ways people connect with information”, aspiring to “build products and provide
services that improve the lives of billions of people globally”. The company’s
famously ambitious mission statement is to “organize the world’s information
and make it universally accessible and useful”. Through innovations in web
search and advertising, Google’s website is a top Internet property and its
brand among the most recognized in the world. (Google, 2013a)
Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility for $12.5 billion was officially com-
pleted on May 22, 2012, resulting in its ownership of Motorola’s business and
assets. At that time, Google itself and many analysts attributed the deal to
mainly acquiring the patent portfolio of Motorola to help protect the Android
ecosystem. In subsequent patent-related legal battles, however, the Motorola
patents have not proven out to be very effective. The company’s reporting
on this business was based on two operating segments: Mobile and Home.
The former segment is focused on mobile devices and related products and
services, whereas the latter is about technologies and devices that “provide
video entertainment services to consumers by enabling subscribers to access a
variety of interactive digital television services”, primarily set-top boxes for
TVs (Google, 2013a).
In December 2012, Google agreed to sell the former Motorola Mobility Home
division to Arris Group Inc. in order to focus and expand on smartphones
amidst accelerating rivalry with Apple (Bloomberg, 2012). The transaction
was closed in April 2013. Also in December 2012, Flextronics (an electron-
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ics manufacturing services company) agreed to purchase Motorola Mobility’s
handset manufacturing assets in China and Brazil (Flextronics, 2012). The
deal also included a manufacturing and services agreement for Android and
other mobile devices, and the transaction was closed in April 2013.
On Jan 29, 2014, Google finally decided to cut its losses with the former
Motorola handset business as well, and Lenovo announced its agreement to
buy the handset business from Google for $2.91 billion. As part of the deal,
Google retains the majority of the patent portfolio of former Motorola Mobility
as well as the Advanced Technologies & Projects unit. This development
clearly highlights Google’s desire to focus on its core business and the Android
ecosystem, leaving handset manufacturing to others. (Reuters, 2014a; Google,
2014a)
Google generates revenue primarily by “delivering relevant, cost-effective on-
line advertising” as the company states in its Form 10-K annual report (Google,
2013a). The AdWords and AdSense programs are at the heart of Google’s ad-
vertising business model. Other businesses use Google’s AdWords program
to promote their products and services with targeted advertising, and addi-
tionally, the third parties that comprise the Google Network use the AdSense
program to “deliver relevant ads that generate revenues and enhance the user
experience”.
Google operates a cloud-based, digital content marketplace called Google Play
with more than one million applications and games in its catalog in addition
to music, movies, and books that users can discover, consume, and share on
the web and on their Android devices. This content offering and marketplace
rivals Apple’s iTunes store and App Store as well as Amazon’s MP3 store and
Appstore for Android. As a further foray into online and mobile commerce,
Google operates a virtual wallet service called Google Wallet that securely
stores credit and debit cards, offers, and rewards cards. It enables users to
tap their phone to pay in-store using Google Wallet at any location where
contactless payments are accepted, at over 200,000 merchants across the U.S.
Moreover, users can also pay online by signing into their Google Wallet ac-
count. For mostly consumer use, Google also offers cloud storage in the vein
of Apple’s iCloud, Microsoft’s OneDrive (formerly SkyDrive), or Dropbox.
(Google, 2014a; Google, 2013a)
Google has a Smart TV platform called Google TV that “gives consumers the
power to experience television and the Internet on a single screen, with the
ability to search and find the content they want to watch” (Google, 2013a).
The platform is based on the Android operating system and runs the Google
Chrome browser. It has been adopted by a number of TV and peripheral man-
ufacturers, including Sony, Logitech, LG, Samsung, Vizio, Hisense, Netgear,
TCL, and Asus. More recently, however, it appears that some TV manufactur-
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDIES 138
ers like Philips have chosen to promote Android (through the slogan “powered
by Android”) rather than the Google TV moniker, perhaps consciously dis-
tancing themselves from the Google brand (TP Vision, 2014).
Google’s efforts in the area of social networking must be mentioned. Google
arrived late to the game, launching its Google+ (Plus) service in 2011, de-
scribed as “a new way to share online just like users do in the real world,
sharing different things with different people”. As of late 2011 and 2012, the
company has tightened the integration between Google+ and our other Google
properties such as Gmail and YouTube, unifying previously separate accounts
under a single sign-on system. The number of monthly active Google+ users
had surpassed 300 million in October 2013, according to Google (USA Today,
2013). In comparison, Facebook had more than 1 billion monthly active users,
while Twitter had just over 230 million at the same point of time.
Interestingly, Google is expanding fast into new business domains, such as
automotive infotainment through the Open Automotive Alliance (OAA), an-
nounced on Jan 6, 2014 together with major automotive OEMs such as Audi,
GM, Honda, and Hyundai as well as the chipmaker Nvidia. The pattern is
similar to the original Open Handset Alliance, except that this time, Google
is pushing for the integration of Android into the in-car environment and
harmonization of the Android-based infotainment platform, presumably in an
attempt to limit the forking of the Android OS as already done by some au-
tomotive manufacturers and Tier-1 suppliers. Also, Google was already a
late mover compared to Apple that had announced its ‘iOS in the Car’ (later
renamed as ‘CarPlay’) solution for in-car iPhone integration in June 2013
(Apple, 2013a; EFYTimes, 2014).
Building off its work with its OAA partners, Google announced and showcased
Android Auto at its annual developer conference, Google I/O, in June 2014.
The platform can be described as essentially a retooled version of Android that
allows drivers to safely use their connected apps and mobile services while
on the road (9to5Google, 2014). Google apparently researched which apps
people were particularly looking for while in their car and placed a major
focus on navigation, communication, and music. Android Auto integrates
many of the apps drivers “know and love”, like Google Maps and Spotify,
to an interface that is designed and built for driving. After connecting an
Android phone to a compatible car, drivers will be able to use Android apps
and services specially designed for use in a car and accessible through in-dash
display and controls (Open Automotive Alliance, 2014). The interface is also
voice-enabled, and reportedly the apps are ran directly from a driver’s phone
as opposed to being natively installed on a car. This brings the advantage of
easier and more frequent application updates, as well as making the Android
Auto experience transferrable between compatible cars (9to5Google, 2014).
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Although an SDK wasn’t yet available at the time of the announcement, the
APIs used in Android Auto are also shared by Android Wear, so developers
are able to migrate their applications between different hardware platforms
without difficulty. Compatible vehicles from some 25 automotive brands are
expected by the end of 2014 (9to5Google, 2014).
Google’s vision for the future of the automobile, however, goes far beyond
merely integrating its popular OS and services into the vehicle. Indeed, the
company has been testing its ‘self-driving car’ since 2010 on public roads
in certain states in the U.S. that allow driverless cars for testing purposes
(albeit with human supervision), with the goal to improve driving safety and
ultimately, to introduce fully autonomous cars (Mashable, 2013).
Google has also launched interesting gadgets of limited commercial success
such as the Google Glass augmented reality enabled spectacles. In March 2014,
it announced Android Wear for smartwatches and other wearable computers,
with the first such products from Samsung and LG launched in June 2014.
Clearly, Google wants to be an active player also in this novel area, talked
about for years and also pursued by its rival Apple.
It has also remained active in acquiring promising companies for their tech-
nology and intellectual property, hinting at its future direction. For example,
Google acquired a number of robotics-related companies, including Boston
Dynamics, in December 2013. One of the latest acquisitions is that of Nest,
a home automation company, announced on Jan 13, 2014 for a price of 3.2
billion U.S. dollars, the second-most expensive acquisition for Google since
Motorola Mobility (Forbes, 2014a). These developments would suggest that
Google is actively and boldly looking to expand into new areas of business,
supporting its vision of organizing the world’s information and making it uni-
versally accessible, not just on computers and mobile devices but in all areas
of life, in the ‘Internet of Things’.
Angle of Entry
Google (NASDAQ: GOOG) is relatively young as a company, having been
incorporated in September 1998 and having made its initial public offering
(IPO) in August 2004. As noted in the mini-case example in Section 2.1.2,
the company started out with search keyword advertising as its sole method
of monetization. In addition to search advertising, Google also provides dis-
play advertising services through its DoubleClick advertising technology that
includes video, text, images, and other interactive ads. These ads appear on
YouTube, Google Finance, and Google Network member websites (BMIMat-
ters, 2012).
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While advertising as a whole remains Google’s primary source of revenue to
date, it has adopted continuous subscription-based monetization models for
some its services such as Google Apps for Business, a fully cloud-based pro-
ductivity software solution primarily intended for small businesses (Google
Enterprise Blog, 2011). Google Apps competes as a more affordable alter-
native to Microsoft’s Office 365 (Google, 2013e; Microsoft, 2013a). It also
enables enterprises to adopt popular services such as Gmail in their own do-
mains, allowing them to forgo the more expensive Microsoft Exchange system.
Google also offers cloud storage using a freemium business model, with the ba-
sic service with 15 GB storage being free and capacity upgrades requiring an
increasing monthly fee. The first increment at 100 GB costs $1.99 per month
as of March 2014.
Already before Google acquired the struggling handset maker Motorola which
already had become dependent on Google’s Android OS platform in its smart-
phones, it was widely speculated whether Google would start making money
by selling its own “Googlephone” or, in general, CE devices enabled with An-
droid and Google software. As already noted, Google has mostly relied on
its hardware partners to produce Android handsets and ‘Chromebooks’ (see
Google, 2012a), laptops running Google’s Linux-based Chrome OS. However,
it has also directly sold their ‘Nexus’ branded Android devices that are in-
tended to showcase the latest “Google experience” on a device, often at a more
affordable price than the highest-end offerings of branded handset vendors.
This showcasing scheme applies also to Android tablets (see Google, 2012b).
Google also introduced a media-streaming entertainment device (set-top box)
called ‘Nexus Q’ in June 2012 but later discontinued it amidst criticism for
having too few features for its price. Having divested the former Motorola
Mobility Home division, it is unlikely that Google will make similar prod-
ucts in the near future. Also with the more recent divestment of the former
Motorola handset business announced in January 2014, Google is unlikely to
pursue further vertical integration in smartphones and tablets, but appears
to be expanding into new business domains such as automotive, robotics, and
home automation, as already noted.
Google being a relatively young company with many of its current technologies
and platforms only a few years old, it is hard to pinpoint any major path
dependence in its platform or technology-related decisions. If any such path
dependence is evident, it is probably on the business model side. Stemming
from its origins as a web search provider earning its revenue from advertisers
and advertising networks, direct monetization through licenses seems to be a
monetization model pursued less frequently by Google, although many of its
cloud-based services aimed at SMBs and other enterprise customers definitely
charge license fees for usage.
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While definitely the hub of the largest smartphone ecosystem currently in
existence, Google is mostly sticking to its roots in terms of monetization,
earning as much as 96% of its revenue from advertising (BMIMatters, 2012).
This goes well with Google’s intention of keeping most of its services “free” to
the general public — free of course meaning ad-funded as there really are no
free lunches. Undoubtedly, Google is increasingly profiting from mining the
“big data” that hundreds of millions of consumers have trusted the company
with, although many other companies and even governments employ similar
techniques (SmartData Collective, 2012).
Value Creation Logic
As a whole, Google’s operations fall within the areas of search and display
advertising, the Android OS platform, consumer content through Google Play
(Google’s digital content marketplace), enterprise, commerce and hardware
products (Google, 2014a). As already noted, search advertising based on the
AdWords and AdSense programs forms the foundation of Google’s advertising
business model. Most of Google’s AdWords customers pay on a cost-per-click
basis, i.e., an advertiser pays only when a user clicks on one of its ads. AdWords
is available also on a cost-per-impression basis that enables advertisers to pay
Google based on the number of times their ads appear on Google websites and
Google Network Members’ websites as specified by the advertiser. In addition
to attracting advertisers to the AdWords program, Google also attracts a larger
body of website owners to the AdSense program, allowing them to make money
by enabling the showing of text or image based ads alongside their web content.
AdSense partners are part of the Google Network. (Google, 2013a)
Google also owns AdMob, the market-leading mobile advertising network, the
acquisition of which was completed in May 2010 for $750 million. In October
2011, AdMob was featured in 89% of Android applications leveraging mobile
advertising, and 50% of the top 1000 downloaded Android applications in-
cluded at least one mobile ad network, which clearly highlights the dominance
of AdMob on Android (Xyologic, 2011). As of June 2012, Google has inte-
grated the AdMob technology directly into its AdWords system and interface,
enabling advertisers to run effective campaigns across the more than 300,000
applications running ads by AdMob (Google, 2013a). These efforts have al-
lowed AdWords advertisers to reach people “across all screens”, on more than
2 million websites and hundreds of thousands of apps.
For its fiscal year ending Dec 31, 2013, Google earned $37.5 billion in advertis-
ing revenue (74% of total advertising revenue) from Google websites and $13.1
billion (26%) from Google Network Members’ websites. In total, the adver-
tising revenue of $50.6 billion represented 91% of Google’s revenue (excluding
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Motorola) in 2013. The remaining 9% or $4.97 billion are accounted for as
‘other revenues’ mostly driven by hardware sales. This revenue stream grew
by 111% from 2012. For comparison, advertising revenue represented 95% of
Google’s total revenue in 2012. Furthermore, counted separately from Google
revenue, Motorola Mobile earned $4.44 billion in revenue in 2013, mostly from
hardware (smartphone and tablet) sales. As noted above, however, Google
has divested the former Motorola handset business. (Google, 2014a)
Platform and Content Business
The area of ‘operating systems and platforms’ is of particular interest as
Google is the owner of the world’s most widely adopted smartphone OS and
software platform, Android. With half a billion Android devices activated
globally through September 2012 (Google, 2013a), the company is in a unique
position to benefit from the rapidly growing smartphone business and the large
user base with devices running Android. Although Google does not monetize
Android directly, it gains extra “eye balls” for its advertisements and also valu-
able information about its user base’s preferences, online activity, and usage
patterns that are used for profile building and targeted advertising. Using
Google services on an Android device requires the user to have a Google ac-
count and being logged in. In principle, this is no different from using Google
services on a desktop computer, but the user cannot really use the services
anonymously on an Android device. Also, opting out of targeted advertising
can be quite challenging on an Android device (Lifehacker, 2011). Effectively,
users of Android are at least partially “paying” for their use of the OS by being
subjected to ads and various kinds of data collection and mining.
Google’s value creation is mostly based on networked relationships, and specif-
ically its advertising programs that bring together advertisers and website
owners. Its advertising programs can be thought of as two-sided (or multi-
sided) platforms that link advertisers (the paying side) to Google’s vast user
base through showing search or display advertisements, but also to Google
Network Members’ websites and their consumers, reaching an even wider au-
dience. Through its AdSense program, Google also facilitates the value cre-
ation of website owners through ads embedded in web content. Google also
operates Google Play, a digital content store that sells Android applications,
music, books, and magazines as well as movies and TV series in select mar-
kets. The store is similar to Apple’s iTunes in its purpose and scope, although
there are differences in the publishing policies and costs. The revenue sharing
scheme for published Android applications is similar to Apple’s App Store in
that the developer gets a 70% cut of the revenue.
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Platform Approach and Governance
Product Technology, Architecture, and Openness
Google is known for its large number of products, most of which are actually
Internet-based services. The company does have physical consumer products
as well, such as the Chromebooks and Nexus series smartphones and tablets
(although they are not manufactured by Google) as well as more peculiar
gadgets such as Google Glass, a pair of augmented reality (AR) glasses (Huff-
ington Post, 2013). The services range from very serious, revenue-earning web
properties such as Google Search and Google Apps to a multitude of niche ser-
vices that may eventually become big, be discontinued, or end up integrated
into a larger service entity such as Google+ (Wikipedia, 2014). Google has a
policy of validating new service concepts by launching the services as public
beta versions. Services that prove successful and meet their targets for user
uptake are “graduated” into commercial grade services whereas less successful
ones, such as Google Wave, are eventually ramped down. Many of the current
services, such as Gmail, Google News, and Google Talk, have originated as
so called ‘20%’ projects which means that individual employees or groups of
employees have began work on them as company-sponsored side projects for
innovating freely (eWeek, 2008).
Despite its breadth of services and a company culture fostering employee inno-
vation, Google is reportedly not so keen to expose its products and platforms
to developers outside the company. This is reflected in the anecdotal com-
mentary of a Google engineering manager who had also worked at Amazon
for many years and had noticed significant differences in the platform and
service architecture approaches of the two companies (Yegge, 2011). In his
view, Google does not “understand” platforms unlike Amazon which had plat-
formized essentially its entire service portfolio and adopted a service-oriented
architecture (SOA) in its computing, resulting in each service, regardless of
whether internal or external, having a neat service interface which can also be
exposed to external developers easily if needed. Arguably, Amazon’s strength
in cloud computing and as a cloud infrastructure (IaaS) and platform (PaaS)
service provider can largely be attributed to this fundamental decision.
Google, on the other hand, has been slow to platformize its services and is
reportedly also lagging behind in providing comprehensive API access for ex-
ternal developers. The golden rule of platforms being that “you eat your
own dog food”, meaning that internal developers should work with similar
APIs and tools that external developer have access to, Google is perceived as
trailing other platform providers such as Microsoft in creating platform value
(Yegge, 2011). Yegge (2011) argues that “you don’t eat People Food and give
your developers Dog Food”, and that doing so will constitute robbing long-
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDIES 144
term platform value for short-term success. He also notes that, at Google, any
product teams that have successfully internalized the notion that the products
should be designed as externally programmable platforms from the ground up
are “underdogs”, and mentions Maps and Docs as examples. He further ar-
gues that as platform thinking isn’t part of Google’s culture, it’s hard for
many teams to get funding for platformization efforts. As the original article
or “rant” was written in late 2011, it is quite possible that Google has made
progress in platformizing many of its products. This should be expected at
least, as competitors such as Amazon and Microsoft, or even Apple, play the
platform game very well.
In the context of smartphone business, however, Google does have one partic-
ularly strong platform, namely Android. As noted in Section 1.1.1, Android
was originally an independent company that Google acquired in 2005. The
platform rose to public prominence after Google announced the founding of
OHA to promote and drive its adoption. Android was heralded as the first
truly open and comprehensive mobile software platform, and the claim does
have truth to it in the sense that Android is an open source project under
the Apache Software License (ASL) 2.0 and, to a lesser extent, GNU Public
License (GPL) v2 where the code is related to the Linux kernel and standard
libraries. ASL2.0 is a permissive license and does not have a strong ‘copyleft’
clause, thereby allowing complements and derivative work to be kept private.
In the Android source site frequently asked questions (FAQ) section, Google
states that this is due to its most important goal for Android being widespread
adoption of the software (Android, 2013).
While acknowledging that launching a software platform is complex, Google
recognizes the vital importance of openness to the long-term success of a plat-
form, since openness is required to attract investment from developers and
“ensure a level playing field” (Android, 2013). Nevertheless, the platform itself
must also be a compelling product to end users, and to this end, Google has
committed the engineering resources necessary to ensure that Android indeed
is a fully competitive software platform. In addition to treating the Android
project as a full-scale product development operation, the company also makes
business deals as necessary to ensure that great devices running Android ac-
tually make it to the market. This helps ensure the vitality of Android both
as a platform and as an open source project.
Google maintains a branch in the open source repository tree for each plat-
form version of Android. At any given time, the most recent such branch
is considered the ‘current stable’ version which manufacturers port to their
devices and is kept suitable for release at all times. There is also a ‘current
experimental’ branch for the development of next-generation features or other
speculative contributions which may not be ready for commercial use. Bug
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fixes and other contributions can also be included in the stable code branch
as appropriate. (Android, 2013)
Google has taken up the practice of working on the next version of the An-
droid platform simultaneously with developing a new flagship device with an
OEM partner. This means that some parts of the next version of Android
including the core platform APIs are developed in a private branch. This pri-
vate development branch includes changes from the experimental and stable
branches as appropriate. Such a practice can be viewed as contrary to the
open source ideology, but Google claims that this is in the interest of both
OEMs and developers, as each can focus on a single version without having
to track unfinished future work just to keep up. Device manufacturers typi-
cally want to ship the very latest software they can, with the latest features.
Developers, on the other hand, value relatively stable platform APIs that do
not change frequently during the development of apps.
Google states that other parts of Android that aren’t related to application
compatibility are developed in the open and that its intention is to move more
of the privately developed parts to open development over time. Nevertheless,
Google Mobile Services (GMS) including Google Play Services and the rest of
Google’s applications and services suite remain proprietary and are not part
of the Android Open Source Project (AOSP), the truly open source part of
the Android platform (CommonsWare, 2013; InfoWorld, 2014). They are, of
course, available to the OEM licensees of Android under certain conditions,
but they are definitely not open source (Ars Technica, 2013a). OEMs using
Android need to follow a “GMS approval window”, effectively forcing them
to ship products running an Android release not older than nine months, if
they want to keep the popular Google apps and services (Android Police, 2014;
DailyTech, 2014). Google has also been criticized for “closed source creep”, i.e.,
increasingly moving its development efforts from AOSP to the closed source,
proprietary counterparts of certain Android apps and services (Ars Technica,
2013a).
In this sense, Google exhibits proprietary control over key components of the
Android platform, components that the average consumer would probably
consider critical to the platform, i.e., the Google Play application store, Google
Maps, Gmail, etc. While it is possible to create and ship products on the AOSP
code base (pending the licensing of certain audio/video codecs), most device
manufacturers using Android, like Samsung and HTC, ship their Android
products with the proprietary GMS suite licensed from Google to deliver the
complete Android experience. Although Google doesn’t charge money for
GMS, it comes with numerous requirements or “strings attached” that give
Google a lot of control over Android devices (InfoWorld, 2014). It is no less
proprietary than iOS or Windows Phone.
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However, since the most popular Android devices at least in the Western world
include both the AOSP core components as well as the GMS suite, most people
probably equate Android with AOSP combined with GMS. The Google Play,
Drive, Maps, and Gmail related APIs that many application developers rely on
in their applications are, unfortunately, also part of GMS, and so developers,
too, must decide whether they want to target the GMS-equipped Android
devices exclusively or make their applications compatible with the bare-bone
AOSP platform with limited APIs. This question is increasingly relevant as
AOSP-based hacks of Android emerge from various OEMs, the Nokia ‘X’ series
of smartphones being one of the latest examples. According to InfoWorld
(2014), some analysts believe that roughly half of the Android products in the
world are running AOSP without GMS. These devices lack the GMS suite and
Google Play and typically replace them with competing, proprietary services
and application marketplaces, such as the Amazon Appstore for the Kindle
Fire tablets or the Nokia Store for the Nokia X smartphones. All in all, while
it can be said that Android (or at least AOSP) is a shared platform, Google
does have a fair amount of control over Android device manufacturers through
its licensing terms for GMS and its practice of developing the next version of
the OS platform in a private branch.
In-House vs. External Focus in Complements
Google is well known for its extensive in-house development capabilities and
fostering of innovation. It has also acquired a number of companies over the
years to further enhance its capabilities in key growth areas. For example,
Google announced its acquisition of YouTube for $1.65 billion in October 2006
to strengthen its video hosting capabilities. The deal was finalized a month
later. The acquisition of Motorola Mobility for $12.5 billion, announced in
August 2001 and completed in May 2012, remains the company’s biggest ac-
quisition to date. The latter acquisition provided Google not only with a siz-
able mobile technology patent portfolio but also with software and hardware
engineering resources to work on smartphone and tablet products. Google did,
however, later decide to step out of the loss-making handset manufacturing
business and sold the former Motorola handset division to Lenovo in January
2014.
Google takes fostering external innovation very seriously and supports third-
party developers working on a number of Google products and platforms,
e.g., Android, Chrome, Google Apps, Google Maps, Google TV, Google+,
the Google Cloud Platform, Google Analytics, and of course the advertise-
ment platforms and APIs such as AdWords and DoubleClick. Commerce
APIs (mainly related to Google Wallet and Google Checkout) as well as
game development on the web and mobile are also supported. Google’s devel-
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oper resources can be accessed at the web address http://developer.google.com.
Google hosts an annual developer conference, Google I/O, for all of its products
and technologies usually in early summer. Additionally, Google has previously
organized developer days mostly focused on its web products as well as ‘code
camps’ or developer programs for students (e.g., Google Summer of Code)
where the students get to write code for various open source software projects
(Google, 2013b).
Android software development has been possible to the general public ever
since the platform was announced and a preview SDK was made available in
November 2007. The platform has a separate, comprehensive developer site
at http://developer.android.com. Unlike Apple’s iOS platform, the Android
development tools are completely free of charge and developers can write and
test applications without having to join a developer program. However, in
order to publish Android applications on Google Play, a one-time registration
fee of $25 is charged from the developer (Android, 2014).
Managing and Incentivizing Complementors
Google actively incentivized Android applications development through two
Android Developer Challenges, the first one announced in January 2008 and
the second in May 2009. Google awarded a total of $10 million in prizes to de-
velopers, distributed between ADC 1 and ADC 2. Particularly the first event
helped jump-start the application catalog of the then-nascent platform with a
total of 1,788 entries from participants from over 70 countries. On the event’s
first deadline of April 14, as many as 170+ submissions per hour reportedly oc-
curred (Android Developers Blog, 2008). Since the second developer challenge,
Android has gained enough momentum to attract large numbers of developers
on its own. Similar developer challenge events have been organized for, e.g.,
the Google Apps suite between June and November 2012. Also smaller local
events and ‘hackathons’ have been organized sporadically, such as the one on
the Google Drive SDK in March 2013.
Google wisely adopted a similar revenue sharing scheme as Apple for its ap-
plication marketplace, but with a less stringent publishing process. With no
thorough inspection of submitted applications taking place, however, Android
has suffered from malware considerably more than rivaling iOS and Windows
Phone platforms that do employ a vetting process for submitted applications.
As of early 2012, Google has taken measures against this, such as introduc-
ing an in-house automated anti-virus system (‘Bouncer’) to remove malicious
apps from the marketplace, resulting in a reduction of potentially malicious
app downloads by 40% (SC Magazine, 2012).
Google is known neither to impose limitations on its complementors nor to
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block certain third-party applications, should they have overlap with in-house
offerings. For example, Google allows third-party web browsers, such as Fire-
fox for Android, to be used freely on Android devices. However, when it comes
to developer APIs, Google has gained a bit of infamy in restricting or depre-
cating certain interfaces and APIs with relatively short notice, as is the case
with the CalDAV API used for calendar synchronization (Google, 2013c).
Much like Apple, also Google is courting content producers and publishers
of music, books and magazines, movies, TV series, etc. in order to build a
comprehensive content offering on Google Play. Although millions of songs are
available in the store in addition to a multitude of books and other content,
Google is many years behind Apple in making its content offering global. While
only the United States and the United Kingdom had the complete breadth of
content available in early 2013, diverse content has since been made available
in dozens of countries — as an example, Google Play Music is available in 43
countries and Movies in more than 90 countries as of August 2014 (Google,
2014b).
Internal Organization and Propensity to Advance the Overall Good
of the Ecosystem
Google’s work culture is regarded as legendary, and the company has regularly
topped the charts for the most popular workplaces in the U.S. Not only was
Google an icon of success among Internet companies, but also for many, the
company represented the most successful blend of culture and technology in
Silicon Valley (ICMR India, 2004)
It is commonly perceived that Google’s lack of unnecessary managerial hi-
erarchies and giving its engineers “a free hand to work” or more liberties in
deciding how they use their working time has been a crucial factor behind the
company’s success. The famous “20% rule” already mentioned above is an ex-
ample of how this culture manifests itself. As Google product teams and even
individual engineers typically have a high degree of independence, innovative
ideas are cultivated. Due to the public beta culture of Google, nascent prod-
ucts (services) may be exposed to consumers and developers at a relatively
early stage, helping to stimulate the interest of external complementors.
Google has a developer relations team that is comprised of a diverse group
of developer advocates originating from different parts of the world (Google,
2013d). Typically, each developer advocate specializes in one or more Google
products or developer APIs, and together they cover the whole range of Google
products and platforms.
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Ecosystem Approach and Governance
For Google as a whole, its most important ecosystem partners are adver-
tisers that bring in the most of the revenue. Almost as important are its
Google Network Members that participate in Google’s AdWords, AdSense,
and DoubleClick programs and host Google’s advertisements on their web-
sites, expanding the target audience for advertisers reachable through Google.
In the context of Android, however, Google’s ecosystem equates to its indus-
try partners such as mobile device manufacturers and operators, as well as
complementors (including service partners, content producers, publishers and
website owners, and advertisers). Google itself (excluding Motorola) acts as
a device vendor only to a limited extent and sell its Nexus devices through
direct online retail.
Google’s self-stated goal is to ensure a successful ecosystem around Android,
but without forcing anyone to participate. As Android’s code is open source,
anyone can modify and distribute the software to meet his/her own needs.
The focus of Google and OHA members is on releasing “great devices” into a
competitive marketplace, and then incorporating the innovations and enhance-
ments made into the core platform as the next version. What this means in
practice is that the Android engineering team typically focuses on a small
number of “flagship” devices, and develops the next version of the Android
software to support those product launches. The advantage of this approach
is that these flagship devices carry much of the product risk and “blaze a trail”
for the broad OEM community, who can follow up with a number of devices
that take advantage of the new features. According to Google, this also ensures
that the Android platform evolves according to the actual needs of real-world
devices. (Android, 2013)
Google has not been very consistent in its Android strategy in terms of ex-
clusivity. For the most part, Google has had the practice of working with
a single OEM and a carrier partner for bringing a new major release of An-
droid to the market, but usually rotating those partners for each release (PC
Magazine, 2012a). As an example, the very first release (1.0) was launched
exclusively on T-Mobile in late 2008, and the device (T-Mobile G1) was man-
ufactured by HTC. Other carriers began offering the device later under a
variety of names. Android 2.0 ‘Eclair’ saw its debut in Verizon Wireless’
Droid smartphone in October 2009, manufactured by Motorola (at the time
still an independent company). The minor Android release 2.3 ‘Gingerbread’
debuted in the Samsung-made Nexus S smartphone that included both Google
and Samsung brands prominently on the device as well as an uncustomized
version of the Android UI (as opposed to the Samsung TouchWiz skinned
Galaxy S devices). The device and all subsequent Nexus branded devices
(and the preceding HTC/Google Nexus One which ran Android 2.1) are so-
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called ‘Google Experience Devices’ that feature prominent Google branding
and the Android UI and Google mobile services as-is, without handset manu-
facturer modifications. For Android 3.0 ‘Honeycomb’, Motorola was chosen as
the lead device manufacturer, this time producing a range of tablets under the
Xoom sub-brand. This version of Android was special in that it was designed
for large-screen tablets only, while Android 2.3 remained the latest version
available for smartphones.
For the release of Android 4.0 ‘Ice Cream Sandwich’, Google again worked
with Samsung to produce the Galaxy Nexus lead device launched in November
2011, this time featuring Samsung’s Galaxy brand despite being a co-branded
Google Experience Device. At the same time, Samsung continued selling vari-
ous versions of its vastly successful Galaxy S II still running Android 2.3. These
devices began receiving updates to Android 4.0 only in March 2012, and some
countries received updates as late as August 2012. As manufacturer-skinned
Android devices (such as the Samsung Galaxy S series) typically require exten-
sive work to make the custom UI and applications work on the newer platform
software release, the updates often lag behind several months. This has con-
tributed to the Android platform fragmentation problem, as there are a large
number of devices in use and even on the market still running older-than-
current versions of the OS platform. This, of course, complicates things for
developers as they cannot assume that the great majority of Android device
users are running the latest version of the platform.
By allowing OEMs to customize the Android experience, Google has effectively
aggravated the fragmentation problem. With Android 4.0, Google intended
to reduce the need for OEM skinning and customization, but so far at least
Samsung is sticking to its TouchWiz UI which is featured on its Galaxy S III
launched in May 2012. For the minor Android release 4.2 ‘Jelly Bean’, LG was
chosen as the OEM partner for producing the Nexus 4 smartphone which has
received very positive reviews. Android 4.4 ‘KitKat’ followed in late October
2013, being showcased in the Nexus 5 smartphone, again produced by LG. The
Android ‘L’ release, expected in late 2014, is to bring major design changes as
well as fundamental new features such as interlocking apps (i.e., apps talking
to one another) (TechRadar, 2014c). As of mid 2014, there have been rumors
regarding an upcoming Android program called ‘Android Silver’ that would
allow Google to enforce more stringent requirements on the specifications of
the devices made by participating OEMs and also apparently to sharply limit
the number of non-Google apps that can be pre-installed, or at least to ensure
that phone owners will be able to uninstall them (TechRadar, 2014a).
True or not, Google did announce an initiative called ‘Android One’ in June
2014, aimed at the very low end of the smartphone market especially in emerg-
ing markets like India where the demand is high for affordable, yet high quality
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smartphones with reasonable data plans (Google, 2014c). Google has worked
with suppliers and OEM partners to define reference platforms for devices that
would all meet a minimum set of technical specifications, including a 4.5 inch
display and a quad-core processor supplied by MediaTek, which are powerful
enough to support all of Google’s mobile services while keeping the price down
to a reasonable 100 USD or less (BBC News, 2014). Although Android-based
smartphones have been available in such price points for quite some time, the
UX and performance of such devices has often left much to be desired.
With Android One, Google is clearly seeking to solidify its grasp of the rapidly
growing entry-level smartphone segment, while at the same time unifying the
Android experience with relatively fixed hardware specifications, and limiting
fragmentation by prohibiting OEM skinning of Android One devices. Even
more importantly, by introducing the large masses of emerging market users,
transitioning from feature phones to smartphones, to Android and Google ser-
vices in a controlled manner, Google is able to secure an ever-growing audience
for its mobile advertising business. To capture growth in this important busi-
ness, it is clear that the emerging markets need to be harnessed more exten-
sively than before. With smartphone platform competitors such as Microsoft
and the operator-backed Firefox OS seeking to tap those same opportunities
in emerging markets, Google is taking proactive steps to ensure it remains in
the leading position.
One of the biggest concerns for Android OEMs was whether the (previously)
Google-owned Motorola Mobile division would gain preferential treatment that
would put other Android OEMs at a disadvantage. Traditionally, OS vendors
such as Microsoft have shunned from producing in-house devices in large scale
so as to not alienate OEMs licensing the OS in question. However, as even Mi-
crosoft seemed to have abandoned this principle with the launch of its Surface
device family, there was speculation whether Google was also inclined to put
more weight behind its in-house handset maker despite the ecosystem risks
involved. Had this happened, with Google devices gaining an upper hand in
the Android ecosystem, the other OEMs would surely have actively sought
alternatives to Android. This is actually the case with Samsung that develops
its own ‘Tizen’ OS that has, however, faced a series of delays and setbacks.
The first Tizen products appeared in late 2013 in the form of a smart digital
camera and a developer-oriented tablet, with smartwatches from Samsung fol-
lowing in April 2014. Somewhat surprisingly, however, Samsung announced
their next generation smartwatches being based on Android Wear, not Tizen,
in June 2014. The company did announce a Tizen smartphone to be sold at
least initially in Russia with other markets planned (CBC News, 2014). Al-
though Samsung is currently the dominant smartphone manufacturer turning
over billions of dollars in sales, to create a viable alternative to Android is not
at all easy or quick for them.
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The concern eventually proved unsubstantiated, as Google decided to divest its
loss-making handset division in January 2014. Had Google really gone vertical,
it could have benefitted the Windows Phone ecosystem that has struggled to
gain real commitments from other OEMs besides Nokia. However, already
before its announced acquisition of Nokia’s handset business, Microsoft was
rumored to introduce a Surface smartphone line as well (PC Advisor, 2012;
DNA India, 2013). With Microsoft having acquired Nokia’s handset business
and licensed rights to the Nokia brand for mobile use for 10 years, there are few
truly neutral options available anymore for handset OEMs seeking to license
a smartphone OS.
Ecosystem Role and Health
Per the categorization of Iansiti & Levien (2004a), Google is clearly a key-
stone — it is a platform provider on many levels and enables value creation
for its entire ecosystem through those platforms. Websites earn revenue by
hosting Google’s advertisements, and advertisers benefit from Google’s broad
consumer reach and effective targeted ads that have a high conversion rate.
Android OEMs benefit from having a state-of-the-art mobile OS platform that
is essentially royalty free and currently enjoys higher consumer adoption rates
than any competing platform. Handset accessory makers appreciate the fact
that they can work with standard interfaces and are not bound to the whims
of any single OEM. Developers benefit from having access to a broad installed
base of Android device owners for which to develop commercial or free appli-
cations. They also generally appreciate Android’s openness and nonrestrictive
philosophy in, e.g., application distribution. Mobile operators benefit from
the overall consumer trend favoring smartphones over feature phones, fueled
in many markets by the availability of affordable Android handsets, allowing
them to sell increased numbers of more expensive devices coupled with data
plans. Unlike its rival Apple, Google derives very little direct revenue from
most of these business activities as it does not charge for Android licenses, nor
does it sell devices in major volumes. Because of this, it is easy to see Google
as the “good guy” that is eager to allow its ecosystem members to make profit
and thrive as they best see fit.
There is at least one area where Google has exhibited worrisome behavior,
though. The area in question is web search advertising, the company’s bread
and butter. Google has been accused of anticompetitive behavior and abuse
of its dominant position in search advertising where it captured 74.5% of total
U.S. revenue in 2012. For comparison, Microsoft’s share of U.S. search ad-
vertising revenue was just 8% in 2012 (Time, 2013). A monopoly in a given
market is not illegal in itself, however. Seeking to achieve or maintain such
a position through anticompetitive practices is illegal. In particular, Google
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has reportedly required its publisher partners to show Google ads exclusively,
i.e., if a publisher wants to show any Google ads to its visitors, it is limited
to Google ads. Due to Google’s dominant position in the search advertising
market, few publishers can afford not to agree to Google’s terms and forfeit
Google ad revenue altogether (Digiday, 2012). If there was more competition
in the market, the publishers could keep a larger portion of the ad revenue
generated by their sites. This is obviously not in Google’s best interest, as it
wants to extract and keep as much value from advertisers as possible. Pub-
lishers, however, need to be able to auction their advertising inventory to the
highest bidder and not be limited to a single advertising broker. From this
perspective, Google can be seen as a value dominator.
Nevertheless, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that had been investigat-
ing Google’s conduct since June 2011 finally ruled on Jan 3, 2013 that there
was not sufficient evidence that Google had violated any antitrust laws or
policies. Google did, however, agree to a settlement that required it to change
its business practices, particularly to allow advertisers more flexible use of
rival search engines. Also under the settlement, Google agreed to meet its
prior commitments to allow competitors access on FRAND terms to patents
on critical standardized technologies needed to make popular CE devices such
as smartphones, tablets, laptops, and gaming consoles (Federal Trade Com-
mission, 2013). The resolution was obviously a victory for Google and a bitter
defeat for competitors such as Microsoft, but the debate over the topic is sure
to continue.
As for the productivity of Google’s ecosystem, let us first look at advertising
performance which directly relates to the business model of Google and its
advertiser & publisher partners. Firstly, Google’s display advertising network
serves up 180 billion ad impressions each month and reaches 90% of all In-
ternet users, according to ComScore U.S. statistics from October 2011 (Kim,
2012). Google therefore has the largest audience reach of any online advertis-
ing network. At least as important to advertisers and publishers hosting ads is
the click-through rate (CTR) that measures how effectively the ad impressions
generate ‘clicks’, i.e., user-initiated actions leading the user to another web-
site where he/she may purchase goods or services or learn about them. For
Google’s display ad network, the average CTR was 0.4% in 2011 which com-
pares very favorably to Facebook’s estimated average CTR of 0.051% (based
on an independent analysis by Webtrends in 2010). Looking at the cost side,
the average CPC for Google is around $0.75 whereas Facebook’s CPC is around
$0.80. So, with almost ten times better CTR and similar CPC, Google offers
superior return on investment (ROI) for its advertisers. Google also offers
better ad targeting and format options than, e.g., Facebook (Kim, 2012).
Looking at the Android ecosystem, the Google Play marketplace had over 1
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million Android applications in its catalog as of July 2013, putting it ahead of
Apple’s App Store with some 900,000 applications at that time (PhoneArena,
2013). As of August 2014, Android’s app count has surged to more than 1.3
million (AppBrain, 2014), although iOS is not far behind with a reported 1.2
million apps as of June 2014 (TechCrunch, 2014a). This is a sign of healthy
diversity (a proxy for niche creation) as well as productivity, as already during
2012, Android had been able to effectively close the gap in the numbers of
applications available compared to iOS which still had a clear lead earlier as
confirmed by, e.g., Hyrynsalmi et al. (2012). In that same study, Android had
more than 90,000 individually identifiable developers compared to more than
170,000 iOS developers. Unlike Apple, Google does not disclose its payouts
to developers from Google Play, commenting only that the payouts have been
growing at a breathtaking pace (TabTimes, 2013).
For evaluating robustness, no statistics exist on the survival rates of these
developers, but a similar high proportion of individuals and small companies
can be assumed as with iOS developers, as 58% of the Android developers
on Google Play had published only one application. Again, this translates to
higher churn than with big, professional developers. Also, Android’s fragmen-
tation (i.e., breadth of different OS platform versions and OEM-customized
variants in use) means that the platform scores less favorably in terms of
limited obsolescence and continuity of user experience and use cases, metrics
associated with the ecosystem health measure of robustness according to Ian-
siti & Levien (2004a). The share of low quality applications in Google Play is
also surprisingly high, 18% in June 2014 as reported by AppBrain (2014).
Software Ecosystem and Application Marketplace
Google’s mobile software ecosystem is built around the Android OS platform,
the runtime environment for over a million available Android applications.
The Android platform is complemented by Google Play, an entirely cloud-
based, digital entertainment store for phones, tablets, and computers that
offers millions of songs and books and thousands of movies in addition to the
vast catalog of Android apps and games. In addition, Google offers a new music
subscription service, All Access, letting people listen to more than 20 million
songs for $9.99 a month on any device (Google, 2014a). Per the definition
of Bosch (2009), the Android ecosystem is an OS-centric ecosystem, although
most Google services and content available on Android are also accessible from
the web.
As with iOS, the Android ecosystem appears to possess all of the three success
factors identified by Bosch (2009), i.e., 1) minimal effort required by develop-
ers due to the availability of a comprehensive SDK and developer toolchain
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as well as well-defined, rich APIs, 2) generic, evolving functionality and set of
features provided by the OS due to the regular update cycle and development
done mostly by Google and its OHA partners to introduce new features and
functions and refine existing ones, and 3) (a sufficiently large) number of cus-
tomers that use the OS and that are accessible to developers which is obvious
due to Android being the most popular smartphone OS platform by a wide
margin, accounting for 80% of all smartphones shipped in 2013 according to
Canalys (2014).
Android applications, however, are not automatically available on other plat-
forms unless the developer/publisher has chosen to publish on multiple plat-
forms, which usually implies separate development effort and cost. Multi-
homing, as this phenomenon is called, appears to be quite rare, especially
for smaller developers/publishers. Hyrynsalmi et al. (2012) note that only
around 12,000 or 13% of the nearly 92,000 Android developers included in
their study were also publishing for iOS. Only 0.9% of the Android developers
also published their apps for Windows Phone and 0.6% for all three plat-
forms, suggesting that multi-homing is very rare for any other combination of
platforms except Android and iOS.
What makes Google Play different from Apple’s App Store or iTunes is that
it is nonexclusive — several other application stores exist for Android, inde-
pendent from Google. Some companies such as Amazon, Barnes & Noble,
and Nokia (the former device business of which now belongs to Microsoft)
have intentionally forked the Android OS for their own purposes and have
replaced Google Play with a proprietary application marketplace on their de-
vices, e.g., Amazon Appstore, as discussed in Section 4.2. Forked versions
of Android are also popular in China, particularly with the country’s largest
operator China Mobile that created its own fork called ‘OPhone’, complete
with its own services and app store tailored for the local Chinese market. Also
so-called application ‘sideloading’, i.e., downloading applications from various
web sites not run by Google, is possible on Android, though this poses security
concerns as the apps are usually not verified in any way and could be poten-
tially harmful. While such a liberal approach to application distribution can
be seen as a disadvantage to Google itself and Android developers who have to
cope with the complexity of multiple distribution channels as well as the plat-
form fragmentation and (partial) incompatibility created by the various forked
versions of Android, it is actually one of the key reasons why Android is so
popular today, across geographies and price points. Apple’s stringent control
over iOS application distribution does ensure good security and promotes bet-
ter quality of apps, but it also ultimately limits the utility and mass-market
appeal of the platform especially outside the Western world.
Along the four dimensions of openness identified by Eisenmann et al. (2008),
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the Android ecosystem is open to demand-side users (end users), supply-side
users (developers), platform providers (as multiple application marketplaces
are allowed, and OEMs are allowed to customize the Android experience),
and partially also platform sponsors (as the OHA members and other parties
contribute in varying degrees to the continued development of the Android
platform, either through AOSP or through other means). Why Android is
only partially open to platform sponsors is because Google still maintains
control over which contributions are accepted into the AOSP, it develops and
licenses the proprietary, non-open source GMS separately with stringent terms
and conditions, and in general has the final say in the evolution of Android.
By applying the extended role categorization of Müller et al. (2011), Google
exclusively occupies the payment broker role, the OS developer role together
with its supporting consortium (OHA), and non-exclusively the advertisement
broker, marketplace (Google Play), testing & verification party, signing part-
ner, and software developer roles. After the divestiture of the Motorola hand-
set business Google no longer occupies the device manufacturer role, but it
certainly has a lot of influence on device manufacturers through the various
controls points in Android, GMS most notably. Google is not known for mak-
ing exclusive deals with MNOs, although especially in the past, it has worked
with a lead device manufacturer and lead carrier for each new Android release
(e.g., HTC and T-Mobile for the first Android smartphone, then Motorola
and Verizon Wireless for Android 2.0). However, there was no real exclusivity
period and other manufacturers and carriers could follow quite quickly.
4.3 Case 3: Microsoft and the Windows Phone
Ecosystem
Firm Scope and Angle of Entry
Of the three case companies included in this study, Microsoft (NASDAQ:
MSFT) is the oldest, having been founded in 1975, highlighting how young
the personal computing industry is, despite being significantly older than the
mobile communications industry. According to its Form 10-K annual report
filed with the SEC, the company’s mission is “to enable people and businesses
throughout the world to realize their full potential by creating technology that
transforms the way people work, play, and communicate”. Microsoft develops
and market software (its traditional domain), services, and hardware devices to
its customers worldwide, having offices in more than 100 countries. (Microsoft,
2013b)
Microsoft is most well known for its PC operating systems, starting with Mi-
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crosoft Disk Operating System (MS-DOS) in the early 1980s and continuing
with Windows, and its suite of office software, Microsoft Office. However, Mi-
crosoft has OS products available for a variety of computing devices, servers,
phones, and other intelligent devices. Being a true software powerhouse, the
company provides server applications for distributed computing environments,
productivity applications, business solution applications, desktop and server
management tools, software development tools, video games (through Mi-
crosoft Studios, its in-house developer and publisher of video games), and
online advertising. (Microsoft, 2013b)
Microsoft is also increasingly active in designing and selling its branded hard-
ware devices, most recently the Surface Pro and Surface RT tablet computers,
running Windows 8 Pro and Windows RT respectively. In the gaming and
entertainment console market, Microsoft has a strong position with the Xbox
360 and Kinect for Xbox 360, also making accessories for the Xbox 360 as
well as the PC. Xbox One, the successor to Xbox 360, was announced in June
2013 and began sales in 13 countries in November 2013, with other markets
to follow later. (Microsoft, 2013b; ExtremeTech, 2013b)
Cloud-based solutions are an important part of Microsoft’s offering, provid-
ing customers with software, services, and content accessible over the Internet
by means of shared computing resources located in centralized data centers.
These services and solutions include Microsoft Office 365, Microsoft Dynamics
CRM Online, Windows Azure, Bing, Skype, Xbox LIVE, and Yammer. Fur-
thermore, in addition to selling individual products and services, Microsoft
offers suites of products and services. (Microsoft, 2013b)
Conducting research and developing advanced technologies for future software,
hardware, and services are key activities at Microsoft, helping the company
fulfill its objectives of growth and meeting its customers’ needs by “delivering
a family of devices and services for individuals and businesses that empower
people around the globe at home, at work, and on the go, for the activities they
value most”, clearly putting emphasis on mobility and accessibility of services
in people’s everyday lives, both in personal and professional context.
Despite its dominant position in the PC OS market and productivity software
as well as its strong position in gaming and entertainment consoles, Microsoft
has struggled to be successful in portable media players as well as smartphones,
also including the software and services related to these devices. After nearly
five years since its first launch, the ‘Zune’ media player devices were discon-
tinued in October 2011 (International Business Times, 2011). In June 2012,
Microsoft announced it would discontinue all Zune services and instead focus
on the Xbox Music and Xbox Video brands.
Microsoft also needs to sort things out with its channel partners, as it would ap-
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pear that Windows Phone handsets are at a disadvantage in the retail channel,
where particularly the major U.S. carrier stores and their sales representatives
seem to recommend the iPhone and various Android models over a Windows
Phone smartphone, discouraging customers from buying them (PhoneArena,
2014b). This is not to say that they are wrong in doing so, as they often rec-
ommend phones based on either positive reviews or personal experiences, but
in any case, the Nokia/Microsoft Windows Phone handsets are often overshad-
owed by the more familiar models from Apple, Samsung, LG, HTC, and other
manufacturers. Moreover, according to statistics from the research company
IDC (2014b), the market share of Windows Phone had contracted by almost
1 percentage point to just 2.5% in Q2 2014 compared to Q2 2013, sending an
alarming message to Microsoft that it needs to change its game if it wants to
stay relevant in the smartphone business.
Angle of Entry
First-degree path dependence as described by Liebowitz & Margolis (1995a) is
visible in Microsoft’s product offering, as the key design decisions of its OS and
application products clearly exhibit dependence on past decisions. Looking at
its PC OS families, first MS-DOS and then Windows, native MS-DOS support
was carried over into Windows for a very long time, remaining a part of the
OS up until Windows 98. Windows Millennium Edition (or ‘Windows Me’),
released in September 2000, was the first mainstream Windows to do away
with loading legacy MS-DOS components. However, it did not run on an NT-
based hybrid kernel like the Windows 2000 released less than a year earlier,
but instead it relied on the legacy monolithic Windows kernel used in the
previous, MS-DOS based versions of Windows. It was not before Windows
XP, released in October 2001, that Microsoft was finally able to move to a
new, more efficient kernel architecture also in its consumer OS and sever the
ties with the MS-DOS legacy (Computer History Museum, 2001).
Looking at Figures 1.2 and 3.1, it is clear that Microsoft represents a distinct
angle of entry into the smartphone business. Like Apple, the company has
its origins in personal computing, although not on the hardware side of the
business but rather on the software side, specifically in PC OS products and
productivity applications. The long experience that Microsoft has from devel-
oping various OS, also for embedded use such as automated teller machines
(ATMs), point-of-sale (POS) terminals, and PDAs, could be perceived as a
technical advantage, although the usage patterns and UI paradigms of those
devices differ significantly from smartphones.
Perhaps due to these differences and the legacy of having predominantly
worked on a desktop PC OS, Microsoft was not very successful in creating
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a UX for its PDA and smartphone OS that would appeal to mass-market con-
sumers. One could even argue that Microsoft exhibited up to third-degree path
dependence per the categorization of Liebowitz & Margolis (1995a), meaning
that it was sticking to a suboptimal UI paradigm and design (stylus-based UI
with small menu items) based on its legacy desktop UI, although at least since
mid 2007, finger touch was seen as the superior paradigm by consumers.
A counterargument in defense of Microsoft could be that the company was
simply following on the path that had been very successful in the PC industry
and doing things in a drastically different way in the smartphone business
would have been greatly time-consuming and costly. After all, in a similar
situation, Nokia also faced great pains in making Symbian S60’s UI finger-
touch friendly1, beginning with the announcement of S60 Touch in October
2007, and while eventually succeeding, spending way too much time and money
on the effort at a time when competition relying on alternative solutions was
moving fast and getting tougher (All About Symbian, 2007). In a way, the
company was first too early, then too late — Nokia had indeed developed a
touch UI earlier, but had abandoned its further development as a result of
shortsighted management, as I noted in Section 1.1.1.
As discussed earlier in the section on the history of smartphones (1.1.1), Mi-
crosoft has offered a licensable OS for smartphones since 2003, first Windows
Mobile, later Windows Phone, while relying on handset manufacturers to make
and sell the devices, a perfect replica of its business model in the PC industry,
except that in the mobile industry, there was significantly more competition.
No OS had an overwhelmingly dominant position, although at its peak in 2006,
more than two thirds of smartphones globally were running the Nokia-backed
Symbian OS. Windows Mobile held 14% of the smartphone OS market at the
same time (Canalys, 2006). Despite Microsoft’s efforts to renew the Windows
Mobile experience in version 6.5 and make it more finger-touch friendly in
order to increase consumer appeal, the experience was never a match for the
iPhone, launched in 2007, or Android devices that started appearing in late
2008 (WP Central, 2009).
Microsoft was to discover that its traditional strengths and near-monopolistic
power did not carry over from the PC business to the smartphone business.
The ‘Wintel’ hegemony, stemming from the early strategic relationship with
the chip manufacturer Intel and IBM, the father of the modern PC, had made
1Even after years of heavy investment into software and UI development, the Symbian
touch UI experience remained clumsy and lackluster compared to the competition. Although
the late versions of Symbian circa 2011 (‘Anna’ and ‘Belle’) were actually quite OK to use,
the burden of legacy in Symbian was just too much for Nokia, and Symbian had become
obsolete also in other ways by the time the largest gaps in the UI and UX were addressed.
The unwise statements of Nokia’s then-CEO helped seal the fate of the OS platform that
had once powered more than two thirds of smartphones worldwide.
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Microsoft arguably the most powerful player in the PC industry, but the mobile
industry played by different rules. With the rise of Google’s royalty-free An-
droid OS platform, the very business model that had earned Microsoft so much
money, OS licensing, was being threatened to become obsolete. Meanwhile,
Apple’s sudden surge with its iPhone and other iOS products was redefining
consumer expectations with regard to smart computing devices and their UX,
causing trouble to incumbents. Microsoft, too, was forced to reconsider its
horizontal business model based mostly on OS and software licensing, as it
could not afford to be marginalized in the mobile business, and support for
its Windows Mobile OS was rapidly declining among handset OEMs. Even
the all-new Windows Phone 7 that featured a completely redesigned, dynamic
tile-based UI dubbed ‘Metro’ could not attract significant support from the
handset OEMs, mainly Samsung, LG, and HTC that already at that time
were putting most of their efforts into designing Android devices that were
not only better received by consumers but also had a stronger and perceivably
more open ecosystem.
As noted in Section 1.1.1, the struggling Nokia provided the perfect oppor-
tunity for Microsoft to secure support for Windows Phone. While Nokia was
still the largest smartphone manufacturer globally when the strategic part-
nership with Microsoft was made, its fortunes quickly declined, with Nokia
‘Lumia’ smartphones and Windows Phone being marginalized into low single-
digit market share (ZDNet, 2013a). The resulting financial troubles eventu-
ally led Nokia to sell its loss-making handset business to Microsoft. After the
transaction was closed in April 2014, Microsoft had become a branded handset
manufacturer, with the right to use the Nokia brand name for up to 10 years
(The Telegraph, 2013).
Already before the acquisition, however, Microsoft had introduced its Surface
line of tablet computers to address the massive market gap it had left for Apple
to conquer with iPad. Furthermore, Microsoft had attempted to enter the
mobile phone market with its ‘Kin’ branded devices in the spring of 2010, but
with abysmal results (Wired, 2010). The Kin devices were developed by the
team from the company Danger, Inc.2 that Microsoft had acquired in February
2008, for reportedly as much as $500 million (GigaOM, 2008). The devices
were not real smartphones as they could not run apps or games, but were
advertised for their easy-to-use social networking features, but the problem
was that many Android smartphones available at the time could do the same
and more, in addition to being true smartphones capable of running apps.
Microsoft canceled the Kin products after only six weeks of very poor sales,
despite having the large U.S. carrier Verizon Wireless acting as a distributor
2As an interesting detail, Andy Rubin, one of the co-founders of Danger, left the company
in 2003 to found the company Android, acquired by Google less than two years later.
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDIES 161
(CBS News, 2010).
Value Creation Logic
Microsoft generates revenue by developing, licensing, and supporting a wide
range of software products and services (including cloud-based services), but
also by designing and selling hardware devices, and by delivering online ad-
vertising to a global customer audience. From its cloud services, the company
earns revenue primarily from usage fees, advertising, and subscriptions. It
also provides consulting and product and solution support services, in addi-
tion to training and certifying computer system integrators and developers.
(Microsoft, 2013b)
Microsoft’s business model is perhaps best described using the value network
concept, described in Section 2.2.3, where it occupies the role of an OS and
applications provider in multiple value networks representing various indus-
tries, most notably the traditional PC industry but also the smartphone and
tablet computer industry as well as embedded automotive computing systems.
In both PC and smartphone/tablet industries, the OS is a critical element and
control point in the value network, largely determining which hardware and
software components and complements are available for use on the complete
product, be it a desktop PC, a tablet, or a smartphone. The OS has been
and continues to be a major source of revenue for Microsoft especially in the
PC industry where viable alternatives, particularly Linux and OS X (though
available only on Apple’s Mac computers), still enjoy relatively small market
shares.
According to statistics from July 2014, various versions of Microsoft Windows
had a joint 92% market share among desktops (NetMarketShare, 2014). This
uniquely dominant market position explains why Microsoft is able to capture
a disproportionately large share of value from desktop computers through its
OS. In the server market, however, Linux is steadily gaining ground, growing
its market share at the expense of Windows and Unix based servers, having
accounted for 28.5% of all server revenue in the fourth quarter of 2013 (IDC,
2014a). When it comes to tablets, however, Microsoft is a very small OS player,
as only 2% of the tablets sold during 2013 ran Windows, compared to 62% for
Android and 36% for iOS (Gartner, 2014b). In smartphones, Microsoft enjoys
a similarly low OS market share, with Windows Phone having accounted for
only 3.2% of units sold in 2013 (Gartner, 2014d). This apparent failure at
cracking the mobile OS market has led Microsoft to pursue also other means
of monetization, although the decision to acquire Nokia’s handset business
hints at Microsoft’s continued commitment to its mobile OS and products
based on it.
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Device Sales and Content Business
The question remains, however, whether Microsoft can successfully be a hor-
izontal services company, licensing its software and cloud services to various
customers, while at the same time being a vertically integrated hardware com-
pany, selling its own devices running on its own OS and utilizing its own ser-
vices. Owing to its legacy as a software and services company, Microsoft has
generally refrained from exclusive arrangements and has pursued vertical inte-
gration only for its gaming and entertainment console Xbox, where it controls
the whole value chain, from published software titles and content (through
Xbox Music and Xbox Video) and the OS to the hardware specifications and
contract manufacturing (Businessweek, 2005). Even many business applica-
tions like the Microsoft Office suite are also available for competing platforms
like the Mac, although typically lagging behind the Windows versions in their
release cycles and features (The Register, 2014a).
Pursuing horizontal and vertical business models at the same time can be
difficult and even more so when a company tries to excel both in services
and hardware in the same market, at the same time. A combined services
and devices company can’t really use its services for differentiation on its
hardware products, as those same services are (or should be) accessible to
horizontal service customers, yet it must maintain the competitiveness of both
businesses. Nokia and Google faced this dilemma, too, and eventually had to
choose between services and devices.
For the fiscal year ended Jun 30, 2014, Microsoft changed its financial report-
ing structure, now reporting most of its B2B revenue3 under the ‘Commercial’
reporting segment, further divided into ‘Commercial Licensing’ and ‘Commer-
cial Other’. It is clear, however, that B2B licensing remains Microsoft’s most
profitable business, generating $38.6 billion or 92% in gross margin from $42.0
billion in revenue for the Commercial Licensing business. For comparison, the
‘Devices and Consumer Hardware’ business generated only $947 million or
8.2% in gross margin from a total of $11.6 billion in revenue, almost entirely
from computing and gaming hardware (i.e., Xbox). The phone hardware busi-
ness, acquired from Nokia, generated only $54 million in gross margin from
a post-acquisition revenue of $2.0 billion, and after subtracting the operating
expenses amounting to $746 million, contributed an operating loss of $692
million. (Microsoft, 2014a)
3Microsoft’s ‘Commercial’ reporting segment excludes revenue from Windows and Win-
dows Phone OEM licensing as well as academic and other non-volume licensing of Windows
and Office.
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Patent Business
Microsoft also has a substantial patent portfolio, numbering more than 40,000
patents in 2013 as reported by GeekWire (2013), and indeed IP licensing is
also an important source of revenue for the company. With its many OS-
related patents, Microsoft has been able to assert a credible threat of patent
infringement lawsuits on device manufacturers using the Android OS platform.
The first IP licensing agreement between Microsoft and a handset OEM using
Android, namely HTC, was reached in April 2010 (Microsoft, 2010). HTC,
who had also been a long-time licensee of the Windows Mobile (and later
Windows Phone) platform, had agreed to pay royalties to Microsoft for every
Android handset it produces. Although the figures were not disclosed, a Citi
analyst source cited by ZDNet (2011) estimated the royalties to be in the range
of $5 per handset.
Thus, Microsoft was earning substantial revenue from Android, a competing
platform it had nothing to do with. However, as reported by Reuters (2011),
Microsoft did not stop there, but went next for the big players like Samsung,
reportedly demanding as much as $15 royalty per device running Android.
Samsung was already at that time expected by analysts to surpass Nokia as
the world’s largest handset manufacturer. Samsung obviously sought to reduce
the royalty payments, agreeing to manufacture also some Windows Phone de-
vices along its Galaxy-branded Android devices. In September 2011, a patent
licensing agreement was reached between Microsoft and Samsung, giving Sam-
sung “legal coverage” for its use of the Android OS in its smartphones in return
for undisclosed royalty payments, although estimates of around $10 per device
were mentioned, based on the cross-licensing nature of the deal (GeekWire,
2011; Betanews, 2011). At any event, this signified another major IP-related
victory for Microsoft, who had secured substantial per-unit royalties from a
company that was soon to become the largest smartphone manufacturer in
the world.
Soon enough, this practice of Microsoft coercing Android OEMs into patent
licensing agreements was dubbed as Microsoft’s “Android tax”. Making things
even worse, also Oracle became active against Google and the Android OEMs
in its claims of Android infringing on Java patents4 (CBS News, 2011).
As of April 2013 and over a period of three years, Microsoft has made licens-
ing agreements with some twenty Android device manufacturers, including
Samsung, HTC, LG, Amazon, ZTE, Nikon, and Hon Hai (a.k.a. Foxconn).
According to Microsoft itself, these deals mean over 80 percent of Android
4In May 2014, Oracle won a second round of court battles with Google over the use of its
Java APIs in Android, overturning a previous decision that Google wasn’t violating Oracle’s
IP (Tech Times, 2014).
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devices sold in the United States and more than half of Android devices sold
worldwide are covered by licensing agreements (Digital Trends, 2013b).
So, whereas Google is not directly profiting from Android, it is turning out
to be a really lucrative business for Microsoft, especially with Android de-
vice shipment volumes expected to reach nearly 1.4 billion by 2015 (Gartner,
2014c). By doing the math, even with conservative royalty estimates, it’s
easy to reach the conclusion that Android is effectively a multi-billion dollar
business for Microsoft, already today. Somewhat ironically, ZDNet (2013b)
called Android Microsoft’s most profitable mobile OS, estimating that the
company’s revenue from the Android related IP licensing deals could amount
to as much as $3.4 billion in 2013, whereas in comparison, Microsoft’s own
Windows Phone fails to make much difference in the market (ZDNet, 2013a).
Also a Nomura analyst quoted by Business Insider (2013) has estimated that
Microsoft’s revenue from Android royalty payments amounts to $2 billion in
2013. These are not modest figures.
Aside from some Asian manufacturers mainly active in their domestic mar-
kets, only Google has stood up against Microsoft’s patent assertions, hav-
ing acquired Motorola Mobility’s substantial patent portfolio with the spe-
cific intention of warding off patent-related attacks on Android. According to
FOSS Patents (2014), however, in the pending Microsoft-Motorola and Apple-
Motorola lawsuits, it is not clear how much Google’s Motorola patents would
protect Motorola as an Android OEM. So far, the patents have offered only
at best partial protection against Microsoft’s claims (FOSS Patents, 2013).
With Google having sold the former Motorola handset business to Lenovo,
depending on how the deal is structured, it could be that Google wouldn’t
be affected in any way by any further patent enforcement against Motorola
Mobility (FOSS Patents, 2014). However, if Google really wants to protect
the Android ecosystem like it claims, it would have to reach a global patent
licensing agreement with both Microsoft and Apple covering its device OEM
partners. So far, no such agreement is in place, and the litigations and counter
litigations will likely continue for some time.
Platform Approach and Governance
Product Technology, Architecture, and Openness
The history of Microsoft’s mobile OS platforms begins with Windows for
Pocket PC 2002, powered by the Windows CE 3.0 kernel and foundations,
available in late 2001. Besides the standard PDA version, Pocket PC 2002
offered a touchscreen-based ‘Phone Edition’ that was used for smartphones.
Microsoft also kept a separate OS product line for non-touch smartphones,
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beginning with the Smartphone 2002. For Windows Mobile 2003, the first
proper Windows Mobile release, the touch and non-touch variants of the OS
were called ‘Windows Mobile 2003 for Pocket PC Phone Edition’ and ‘Win-
dows Mobile 2003 for Smartphone’. Beginning with Windows Mobile 6.0,
released in February 2007, these two variants were renamed as ‘Windows Mo-
bile [version] Professional’ for touch and ‘Windows Mobile [version] Standard’
for non-touch devices. (Spirit Data Capture, 2010)
The complicated naming convention was finally dropped for Windows Phone
7 that was released in October 2010, still based on a Windows CE kernel but
featuring a completely new UI and application framework. While the ‘Metro’5
UI received acclaim from many critics for its clean look and integrated “hubs”,
consumers were generally less impressed, many being used to the traditional
application-centric UI and home screen grid layout of the iPhone and Android
smartphones (ZDNet, 2010). The initial lack of many popular applications
for the Windows Phone platform also put off many users. While the sales
of Windows Phone 7 handsets remained low, there was little financial incen-
tive for most app developers to develop or port their apps for the platform.
Although the situation improved slightly over time through Microsoft’s and
Nokia’s continued evangelism as well as substantial direct financial support
(e.g., Microsoft paying subsidies of up to $600,000 per Windows Phone app to
developers), Windows Phone continued to lag behind both iOS and Android
in number of apps, number of developers, and total revenue earned from app
purchases (Seeing through Windows, 2012). On top of these costly subsidies,
Microsoft together with Nokia spent $24 million to create an app develop-
ment program called ‘AppCampus’ at Aalto University to foster mobile app
development for the Windows Phone and Windows platforms. The three-year
program has been running since spring 2012 (AppCampus, 2014).
In October 2012, Microsoft unveiled Windows Phone 8, yet another major
overhaul of its mobile OS, featuring improvements to the UI such as variable-
sized live tiles and support for new, more powerful hardware and displays as
well as new features such as NFC (Microsoft, 2012c). Major changes, however,
took place also under the skin of the OS — Microsoft had replaced the aging
Windows CE kernel of the core OS with the NT kernel, the same as used in the
regular Windows 8 (WP Central, 2012). This unfortunately meant breaking
the upgrade path for Windows Phone 7.x handsets and their applications.
Customers who had recently bought Windows Phone 7.x devices were upset, as
their devices were effectively rendered obsolete, although Microsoft promised
one last update, version 7.8, which was supposed to bring many of the new
5As of late 2012, the ‘Metro’ moniker was reportedly replaced with the name ‘Microsoft
Design Language’ as the newest way to refer to the design language and tiled style that first
emerged with Windows Phone 7 (ZDNet, 2012c; MSDN, 2014f).
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDIES 166
features of Windows Phone 8 to the older handsets. For app developers,
the break in compatibility meant that any new app development for Windows
Phone 8 would be incompatible with Windows Phone 7.x, although older apps
would continue to run on Windows Phone 8 (Engadget, 2012). As the news
came out, it was most unfortunate for Nokia, who had just launched a new
range of Lumia handsets running Windows Phone 7.5, making these devices
already obsolete in the eyes of many consumers.
As per the terminology of Eisenmann (2008), Microsoft has adopted a propri-
etary platform approach consistently throughout the life cycles of its regular
Windows and Windows Phone platforms. Both platforms are owned, devel-
oped, and provided solely by Microsoft, and although OEMs may license the
platforms by paying a fee, Microsoft retains 100% control over the roadmap,
development, and interfaces of the platforms. While regular Windows is clearly
in the maturity phase, it too has gone through a major overhaul in its UI for
Windows 8, which has lead to some pushback. Windows Phone, on the other
hand, is four years old, but is still struggling to build up its scale through user
acquisition. Although a global number three in market share, the platform
appears stuck far behind the leaders Android and iOS, having currently only
low single-digit market share, a non-sustainable position. The former Nokia
handset business, the largest manufacturer of Windows Phone devices, made
a loss of nearly $700 million in the quarter following its transfer to Microsoft
(Reuters, 2014b). This reflects the struggling state of the Windows Phone
platform.
Microsoft is known for its strict closed-source policy across its OS products
and applications, and the mobile OS platforms Windows Mobile and Windows
Phone have not been exceptions in this regard. Even Nokia, having entered
into a strategic partnership agreement to use Windows Phone exclusively for
its smartphones, had to rely on public APIs for developing its differentiating
Nokia Lumia apps on top of the Windows Phone platform. Unlike with open-
source OS platforms like Android, no changes to the UI, application frame-
work, or middleware were allowed on Windows Phone. Although Windows
Mobile, to a certain extent, had been customizable by handset OEM licensees
in its graphical looks, this was and is not possible on Windows Phone. Thus,
any and all customization by the OEMs has to be done through applications.
This is again a remarkable difference to Android, where the TouchWiz (Sam-
sung), Sense (HTC), Motoblur (Motorola), Xperia (Sony) skins have brought
considerable and often positive UI differentiation to the vast selection of An-
droid devices on the market.
Using Windows Phone has generally required the payment of a per-unit li-
cense fee, estimated to be around $10 to $15 for most device manufacturers,
but information from the Chinese smartphone manufacturer ZTE suggests li-
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cense costs as high as $23-$31 per handset (Neowin, 2012). In March 2014,
however, it was reported by The Times of India (2014) that Microsoft had
waived the license fee altogether for two Indian handset manufacturers known
mostly in their domestic market, Lava and Karbonn. Previously, such deals
were unheard of, as some sources suggest even Nokia had to pay Microsoft
between $20 and $30 per each Lumia smartphone sold (The Times of India,
2014). Already in October 2013, however, Bloomberg (2013) reported that
Microsoft had asked HTC to load Windows Phone on some of its handsets as
a second option to Android while reducing or even eliminating the license fee.
These developments, along with comments from an Indian handset company
executive, would seem to suggest that Microsoft is exploring new models for
the struggling Windows Phone, realizing that the older paid-license model did
not work well, even with Nokia (The Times of India, 2014).
In-House vs. External Focus in Complements
One of the key strengths of Windows on the PC is the extremely large number
of applications available, so many that no other platform comes even close. The
same was true already for MS-DOS before Windows established itself as the
preferred application environment. Indeed, Microsoft has always actively en-
couraged the development of software applications and other complements on
its platforms, and its programming and developer tools, such as QuickBASIC
for MS-DOS (first released in 1985), Visual Basic (1991), Visual C++ (1993),
and Visual Studio have been generally highly regarded by professional develop-
ers and software publishers, although also alternative commercial development
tools and integrated development environments (IDEs) were available for MS-
DOS and Windows (InfoWorld, 2013; Hanselman, 2013).
The Microsoft Windows SDK, available for download for free, includes the
tools, compilers, headers, libraries, code samples, and a help system for devel-
opers working on applications for Windows (MSDN, 2014a). It also includes
the .NET Framework, a software framework developed by Microsoft that com-
prises the Framework Class Library (FCL) as well the Common Language
Runtime (CLR). The .NET Framework is designed to run Windows appli-
cations and XML Web services and offers language interoperability, meaning
that each supported language that conforms to the Common Language Infras-
tructure (CLI) specifications may use code written in other languages. Code
written and compiled for the .NET Framework is managed code6, as it runs
on an application virtual machine, the CLR. This makes the .NET framework
similar to Java. (MSDN, 2014b)
On the mobile front, Microsoft also has an SDK for Windows Phone that in-
cludes the necessary compiler, emulator, Visual Studio Express IDE, and other
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tools for application and game development on the Windows Phone platform.
More advanced versions of the Visual Studio IDE (purchased separately) may
also be used with the SDK. Unlike earlier versions of Windows Phone or Win-
dows Mobile that included the .NET Compact Framework, Windows Phone 8
includes a Windows based CLR called CoreCLR that is shared with Windows
8 and supports the .NET Framework. (MSDN, 2012; MSDN, 2014c)
Microsoft operates the Microsoft Developer Network (MSDN), an online devel-
oper network on which it hosts a wide range of developer resources, including
libraries, tools, and information. Although the network operates on a paid
subscription basis with a multitude of developer programs available for join-
ing, many resources such as the MSDN Library of technical documentation
can be accessed for free on the web (The Guardian, 2011). Additionally, Mi-
crosoft hosts an online community site called Channel 9 under MSDN that
provides a wiki and an online discussion forum for developers and users, also
featuring corporate video logs and promotional videos for showcasing some of
the latest things going on at Microsoft that would not otherwise be reachable
by such a broad audience (WebProNews, 2005).
Despite supporting third-party development of software, Microsoft is well
known for maintaining secrecy over the technical specifications and inner work-
ings of its platforms, choosing to reveal only certain APIs for allowing applica-
tion or device driver development. As a result of the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice’s successful antitrust lawsuit against Microsoft, the company was forced
to share portions of the Windows API with the industry (and sell licenses for
reasonable prices), also putting the Windows division and other related teams
under the oversight of the U.S. federal government for a period of 10 years
since May 12, 2001. Since that period expired in 2011, T. Huckaby of Dev
Pro Connections (2011) argues that Microsoft has again taken steps toward
secrecy, an unfortunate development for the partners, developers, and cus-
tomers who used to enjoy Microsoft’s practice of sharing its product roadmap
and news of upcoming cutting-edge technologies.
As an example, Microsoft’s decision to restrict early access to the Windows
Phone 8 SDK prior to the new OS version’s launch to only the developers
of the most downloaded apps was met with strong criticism, some developers
calling it a “cruel joke” (ZDNet, 2012a,b). At a time when Microsoft should
have gotten developers excited about the new OS and as many “cool” new apps
as possible on the market catalog from day one, it had chosen, in some bizarre
6Managed code is never interpreted, and a feature called just-in-time (JIT) compiling
enables all managed code to run in the native machine language of the system on which
it is executing, which leads to good performance. Additionally, the memory manager pre-
vents memory fragmentation and increases memory locality-of-reference to further increase
performance. (MSDN, 2014b)
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logic, to make it hard for developers to write those apps, presumably in an
effort to keep the new features secret for launch. ZDNet (2012a) further notes
that while you can go for secret features and be picky with developers when
you are on top of the game, you cannot when you are at the bottom, and that
getting people excited about the new features should have been Microsoft’s
top priority.
Any firm producing complements for Microsoft products would do wisely to
be aware of Microsoft’s practice of occasionally enveloping key complement
areas or adjacent platforms, particularly those that the firm sees as critical
control points for value capture in the future. Cusumano & Gawer (2002)
note that “Microsoft often prefers to crush complementors that start looking
like competitors”, and at least since the MS-DOS days in the early 1990s, the
company has been known to trample complementors, one example being the
introduction of a hard drive compression utility called ‘DoubleSpace’ in MS-
DOS version 6.0 released in 1993 that directly competed with Stac Electronics’
popular ‘Stacker’ utility (InfoWorld, 1993). While Stacker was a separately
sold product, DoubleSpace was bundled with MS-DOS for free. Microsoft had
earlier negotiated with Stac Electronics for a license to its technology, without
conclusion. Stac Electronics sued Microsoft for patent infringement and won,
requiring it to remove the infringing code fromMS-DOS (The New York Times,
1994a,b). Eventually, Microsoft reintroduced a new hard drive compression
utility called ‘DriveSpace’, with a new compression algorithm that no longer
infringed on any patents.
Platform envelopment and the different types of envelopment attacks defined
by Eisenmann et al. (2007) were discussed in Section 2.5.4, where I also men-
tioned the example of Microsoft introducing the Windows Media Player as part
of the Windows OS distribution, constituting a foreclosure attack on RealNet-
works and its RealPlayer. Such an attack means incorporating or bundling
the equivalent functionality of a complement directly into a platform, thereby
rendering the complement largely obsolete. Similarly, when Microsoft bundled
its Internet Explorer web browser as part of Windows 95 and 98 and claimed
it was part of the OS, it was clearly a foreclosure attack on rivaling browser
provider Netscape (U.S. Department of Justice, 1999).
Furthermore, according to the U.S. Department of Justice (1999), Microsoft
was concerned about the popularity of certain middleware and applications
based on middleware APIs that had the potential to weaken the applications
barrier to entry associated with Windows, stating that “the more popular mid-
dleware became and the more APIs it exposed, the more the positive feedback
loop that sustains the applications barrier to entry would dissipate”. Two spe-
cific forms of middleware, Sun’s Java technologies and Netscape’s Navigator
browser were particularly shunned by Microsoft. (U.S. Department of Justice,
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDIES 170
1999)
All in all, it can be said that Microsoft is a powerful, yet somewhat unpre-
dictable partner to its complementors. While the vast majority of complements
for its desktop and mobile operating systems are produced by third parties,
the company does not shun stepping on the toes of complementors when it
sees a strategic advantage or major business opportunities in making in-house
complements.
Managing and Incentivizing Complementors
As already noted, Microsoft operates several developer and partner programs
as well as network subscriptions for various audiences. Among them are
‘DreamSpark’ for students and accredited schools and educational institu-
tions, ‘BizSpark’ to encourage startup businesses to build their solutions on
the Microsoft stack, ‘Microsoft Partner Program’ for companies seeking to for-
malize their commercial relationship with Microsoft and obtain accreditation
for their Microsoft products related competencies, ‘Microsoft Action Pack’
subscription for registered and qualifying members of the Microsoft Partner
Network, providing internal-use, full-version software and sales resources, and
of course MSDN currently with six different subscription options: ‘MSDN Op-
erating Systems’, ‘MSDN Platforms’, ‘Visual Studio Professional with MSDN’,
‘Visual Studio Test Professional with MSDN’, ‘Visual Studio Premium with
MSDN’, and ‘Visual Studio Ultimate with MSDN’ (MSDN, 2014d; Microsoft
Partner Network, 2014a; The Guardian, 2011). Additionally, there used to
be a ‘WebsiteSpark’ program launched in 2009 for small professional services
firms specializing in providing web development and design, but that program
ended in March 2013 (ZDNet, 2013c).
Microsoft has had a hard time encouraging developers to write applications for
the Windows Phone OS platform, largely because the platform’s market share
is so low that it would be hard to get any return on the required investment,
let alone cover the costs of additional R&D. This is not a secret, and Mi-
crosoft itself has acknowledged already in the past that it contributed money
to developers to help them create apps for Windows Phone. In the spring of
2012, half a year ahead of Windows Phone 8’s launch, it was reported that
Microsoft paid anywhere from $60,000 to $600,000 to application developers
to incentivize them in building or porting their apps for Windows Phone, the
kind of cash that many developers would have trouble raising on their own
(CNET, 2012).
As cited by The Times, the makers of the popular location-based social net-
working service Foursquare admitted that they could never have built a ver-
sion of their app for Windows Phone without monetary contributions from
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Microsoft (CNET, 2012). This highlights the attitude that many developers,
even major ones, have had toward Windows Phone. Looking at the smart-
phone OS market shares for 2013 as reported by Gartner (2014d), if you can
reach 94% of the world’s smartphone users just by focusing on two platforms,
i.e., Android and iOS, why spend money on development only to be able to
target an additional 3% of smartphone users? The ROI would be negative in
most cases.
The above highlights a significant difference between Microsoft and its arch
rivals Google and Apple, as the latter two companies do not need to pay
developers to create apps for their mobile OS platforms, at least not today,
nor in 2012. Google did organize two Android Developer Challenges in 2008
and 2009, and has given away Android devices to developers attending its
conferences. Ever since the market share of Android skyrocketed, however, no
incentives have been necessary to attract developers to the platform. With
Windows Phone, the stagnant market share is clearly a problem, discouraging
developers from investing into development on the platform. If, on the other
hand, Windows Phone could show some significant growth and increase its
market share, developers would likely give it a higher priority (CNET, 2012).
Like with Apple and Google, applications developers are not the only group
of complementors that Microsoft is attracting to its ecosystem and platforms.
Microsoft has a comprehensive content offering in the form Xbox Music and
Xbox Video that are, despite their name, accessible also on the Windows 8
and Windows Phone 8 platforms and on the web besides the Xbox 360 and
Xbox One consoles, and Xbox Music has client apps available also for Android
and iOS (GameSpot, 2013). Xbox Video allows users to rent or purchase their
favorite movies or TV shows for viewing, while Xbox Music offers ad-supported
streaming, paid subscription streaming, and purchase of music titles, with the
catalog amounting to over 38 million tracks as of 2014 (MSDN, 2014e). Thus,
Microsoft also needs to court entertainment and media publishers as well as
advertisers to maintain and enhance its content business, bringing together
and serving multiple sides of a multi-sided platform market.
Internal Organization and Propensity to Advance the Overall Good
of the Ecosystem
Until mid 2013, Microsoft was organized into five product divisions, also called
business segments, each with a distinct mission and purpose within the com-
pany (Microsoft, 2013b):
• Windows Division is responsible for the Windows OS, Surface, and PC
accessories.
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• Server and Tools provide product and service offerings that include Win-
dows Server, Windows Azure, Microsoft SQL Server, Windows Intune,
Windows Embedded, Visual Studio, System Center products, and En-
terprise Services. Enterprise Services is composed of Premier product
support services and Microsoft Consulting Services.
• Online Services Division’s offerings include Bing, Bing Ads, and MSN.
• Microsoft Business Division is responsible for Microsoft Office, Exchange,
SharePoint, Lync, Yammer, Microsoft Dynamics business solutions, and
Office 365.
• Entertainment and Devices Division provides the Xbox 360 gaming and
entertainment console, Kinect for Xbox 360, Xbox 360 video games,
Xbox 360 accessories, Xbox LIVE, Skype, and Windows Phone.
However, in July 2013, Microsoft announced a reorganization that saw the
company reassign its products and operations into four engineering groups
(‘Operating Systems’, ‘Devices and Studios’, ‘Applications and Services’, and
‘Cloud and Enterprise’) plus the ‘Dynamics’ unit and six corporate affairs
groups (‘Advanced Strategy and Research Group’, ‘Marketing Group’, ‘Busi-
ness Development and Evangelism Group’, ‘Finance Group’, ‘Legal and Cor-
porate Affairs Group’, and ‘HR Group’) (Microsoft, 2013c). The Devices
and Studios Engineering Group includes all of Microsoft’s hardware business:
Xbox, Microsoft Mobile (the former Nokia handset business), Microsoft Hard-
ware, and Surface.
Microsoft’s organizational culture has been described as very achievement ori-
ented and internally competitive, with the notorious ‘stack ranking’ perfor-
mance review system being used until 2013, originating from General Electric
and its then-CEO Jack Welch in the 1980s. This system essentially forced
managers to rank their employees on a Gaussian bell curve, meaning that
even in a very high performing team, there always had to be some low per-
formers who were often fired. In November 2013, it reached the news widely
that Microsoft was to give up this controversial practice.
As already mentioned, Microsoft is active in engaging and supporting its de-
velopers through its online networks and communities (MSDN and Channel
9), its diverse developer programs, and its developer conferences and events,
most notably the annual ‘Build’ conference aimed at developers using Win-
dows, Windows Phone, the Windows Azure cloud computing platform, and
other Microsoft technologies. Microsoft also employs significant numbers of
‘developer evangelists’, senior employees dedicated to associating with devel-
opers on all levels, at large events as well as more informal gatherings, both
online and oﬄine, advocating the company’s technologies and offering toward
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the developer community. The goal of a developer evangelist is to “secure
platform adoption and revenue growth through evangelism, community engage-
ment, relationship marketing and a vibrant solutions ecosystem” as stated in
a job posting by Microsoft. While trying to win the “hearts and minds” of
developers, they help Microsoft stay abreast of any emerging issues with their
platforms and products and provide a direct feedback channel for developers.
Microsoft is also known to have a philosophy known internally as “eating our
own dog food”, meaning the common practice of using pre-release and beta
versions of products internally among Microsoft employees in an effort to test
them in real-world practical situations before commercial launch. Although
the “dogfooding” is reportedly limited to quite small environments, typically
only the product groups that write code, it can be quite powerful, as the people
responsible for the implementation are forced to use their own product, in all
its good and bad. As the pre-release product quality improves, Microsoft
scales up the internal testing efforts and increases the test population size,
up to tens of thousands of people. Exemplary dogfooding occurs also when
a firm’s internal developers are forced to use the same tools that external
developers would use. Presumably this practice is used for the Visual Studio
IDE and other Microsoft build tools that are known for their high quality.
(ZDNet, 2003)
As noted earlier, through the Microsoft Partner Network and other programs
geared at enterprises, SMBs, and even individuals, Microsoft supports the
adoption and use of its technologies, and the creation of complementary in-
novation on top of these technologies. It also offers learning solutions and
certifications to professionals seeking accredited qualifications for Microsoft
products and technologies.
Ecosystem Approach and Governance
For Microsoft, perhaps the most important part of its ecosystem consists of
the Microsoft Partner Network, comprising more than 400,000 firms of all
sizes as members. The common denominator among these companies is that
they all use Microsoft technology-based solutions as part of their customer
solutions and business infrastructure. Microsoft states that “all partners in
the Microsoft Partner Network are recognized for their business and technology
expertise”, and that those with “proven expertise” are awarded a gold or silver
competency depending on their level of proficiency in one or more Microsoft
technology competencies, adherence to Microsoft best practices, and customer
reviews. (Microsoft Partner Network, 2014b)
Microsoft’s focus on its enterprise customers is understandable, as Microsoft
Business Division was the company’s largest business segment in terms of
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revenue and especially in terms of operating income that amounted to $24.7
billion and $16.2 billion respectively in the fiscal year ended June 30, 2013
(Microsoft, 2013b). Although this reporting segment also included consumer
revenue from retail-packaged product sales of the Office product family, for
the most part it represented B2B revenue, generated from the sales of licenses
and subscriptions for the core Office product set, Office 365, SharePoint, Ex-
change, and Lync, representing 90% of the division’s revenue, as well as the
Microsoft Dynamics business solutions (Microsoft, 2013b). Also in Microsoft’s
new financial reporting structure, Commercial Licensing is by far the most
profitable reporting segment (Microsoft, 2014a).
In the PC industry, Microsoft has collaborated with Intel, the processor and
chip manufacturer, for more than 20 years across engineering, sales, and ser-
vices functions to jointly create and deliver “leading business and IT solutions
for a more dynamic and efficient infrastructure” (Microsoft, 2014b). This pow-
erful alliance of the leading PC chip manufacturer and leading OS provider,
often called Wintel, led to disproportionately large value capture and high
margins for the two companies in the PC ecosystem, leaving only crumbs for
other players such as PC hardware and component manufacturers, although
companies like HP and Dell also became very successful in building and selling
PCs. Although Intel has been challenged by Advanced Micro Devices (AMD)
particularly in the server processor market but also in mainstream PC chips, it
remains the leading chip manufacturer in the PC ecosystem, just like Microsoft
remains the leading OS provider (Businessweek, 2012). In the mobile business,
however, both companies have struggled to capture significant market share.
Ecosystem Role and Health
Per the categorization of Iansiti & Levien (2004a), Microsoft is the clear leader
and keystone of its ecosystem — it is not only a platform provider but a tech-
nology provider and enabler in multiple adjacent industries on many levels,
literally for hundreds of thousands of firms. In the Microsoft Partner Net-
work alone, there are more than 400,000 member companies that depend on
Microsoft technologies for critical business functions and value creation. The
number of firms that use Microsoft products in their daily operations is of
course much larger. Microsoft itself reports that more than 1.1 billion people
use Office, and that 1.5 billion people use Windows daily (Microsoft, 2014c).
Although the figures include private users of the products, they are abso-
lutely staggering numbers — no other software company comes close to such a
tremendous global penetration rate. In the PC industry, Microsoft’s position
as the dominant OS provider and the power that comes with it has lead the
company to misuse that power occasionally, as discussed in the sections above.
Due to this behavior, Microsoft can also be considered a value dominator.
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Windows Phone, however, is another story. Although the platform has man-
aged to increase the size of its application catalog to a respectable 300,000 apps
as of August 2014, adding 100,000 apps in less then a year and 50,000 apps
in just four months, it is still behind the behemoths Android and iOS, both
of which have well over one million apps in their official store catalogs (Phon-
eArena, 2014a; TechCrunch, 2014a; AppBrain, 2014). As discussed earlier,
however, Microsoft’s substantial incentives to developers played no small part
in this. While there is adequate diversity in the ecosystem, the sustainability of
that diversity remains questionable, as most developers still clearly prioritize
Android and iOS over Windows Phone, and this behavior is changed currently
only through incentives. As in the previous case studies, I use diversity as a
proxy for the ecosystem health measure niche creation.
Microsoft’s current policy is obviously to “seed” application development on
Windows Phone so that it would attract more users and gain more market
share, mitigating the “app barrier” that has dragged down the platform for so
long and has prevented many smartphone users from switching to it. While
some industry experts and even scholars (see Bresnahan et al. (2014), also
discussed later) have already called such efforts doomed, Microsoft appears to
have a firm belief in its capabilities to bring the Windows Phone ecosystem
to prominence. Otherwise it would have not bought Nokia’s handset business
and would not keep spending more than $700 million in quarterly operating
expenses of said business, in addition to all the money that it spends on
the platform development, marketing, and incentivizing developers (Microsoft,
2014a).
Although I do not perform quantitative analysis of Windows Phone develop-
ers’ ROI in this study nor do I have access to such information, based on the
discussion above, it would seem that the ROI is either very low or negative
without Microsoft’s incentives. As for the other productivity-related metrics
identified by Iansiti & Levien (2004a), a positive change in productivity over
time has been observed in the sense that the growth in the number of apps
in the Windows Phone Store has accelerated within the past year, and the
delivery of innovations seems to have improved in the sense that the time lag
between appearance of new technologies and their adoption in the Windows
Phone ecosystem seems to have reduced, both in OS level features as well as in
applications (Microsoft, 2014c,d; StreetInsider, 2014). So, while the ecosystem
health measure productivity as a whole has probably improved for Windows
Phone, individual ecosystem participants, particularly app developers, com-
monly suffer from low ROI for Windows Phone app development projects
and are thus dependent on Microsoft’s incentives, meaning that the Windows
Phone ecosystem’s productivity is very much dependent on Microsoft’s con-
tinued investment capability and direct incentives to developers.
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As for the ecosystem health measure robustness, the primary metric suggested
by Iansiti & Levien (2004a) is the survival rate of ecosystem participants,
which is rather difficult to measure, as statistics on the entries and exists of
app developers for Windows Phone are rather difficult to get. As for the ad-
ditional metrics of robustness suggested by Iansiti & Levien (2004a), limited
obsolescence has been a challenge particularly due to the break in forward
compatibility between Windows Phone versions 7.x and 8, but continuity of
user experience and use cases has been quite good, with the Metro UI princi-
ples and UX remaining largely consistent across all releases of Windows Phone
beginning from 2010. The persistence of ecosystem structure and predictabil-
ity of the Windows Phone ecosystem have not been very good, as Microsoft
has caused turmoil by acquiring the Nokia handset business, thus becoming a
branded Windows Phone device manufacturer itself, and by waiving the Win-
dows Phone license fee for many manufacturers altogether in an attempt to
win back OEM support and gain market share from Android. Such dramatic
changes in the ecosystem’s structure and basic business principles do not imply
a high level of robustness.
Software Ecosystem and Application Marketplace
Microsoft can be seen to have at least two distinct software ecosystems, one
centered around its Windows OS for Intel-based desktops, laptops, tablets,
and servers, i.e., Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012, and the other centered
around Windows Phone. Additionally, the Windows RT is considered part of
the Windows 8 OS family, although it is only available pre-installed on devices
using a 32-bit ARM architecture, mainly tablets like the Microsoft Surface RT
and certain models from Asus, Dell, Lenovo, and Samsung, some of which
have been already discontinued. The generally poor reception of Windows
RT has been attributed to its limited selection of applications, lack of many
features available in the full version of Windows 8, and slow performance on the
ARM-based hardware it has shipped with, when compared to similarly priced
tablets running on Intel Atom processors and the full version of Windows 8
(ExtremeTech, 2013a). The Windows and Windows Phone ecosystems are
obviously not completely separate, as they share many core technologies and
developer tools, and have a common developer network and community, and
of course, a common proprietor, sponsor, and provider — Microsoft. In this
case study, I focus solely on the Windows Phone software ecosystem.
Microsoft’s Windows Phone software ecosystem is an OS-centric one according
to the classification of Bosch (2009) discussed in Section 2.4.2, as the develop-
ment and distribution of complementary software (i.e., apps) is specific to the
OS in question. The interfaces of Windows Phone play a key role in setting
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the technical boundaries for what can and cannot be done by complementors
on the platform. Furthermore, when looking at the three success factors for
OS-centric ecosystems identified by Bosch (2009), Windows Phone clearly ful-
fills the criteria for minimal effort required by developers due to its well-defined
APIs and a comprehensive SDK and developer toolchain with one of the best
IDEs available for any platform, Visual Studio, as evaluated by InfoWorld
(2013).
When it comes to generic, evolving functionality and set of features provided
by the OS, Windows Phone started out with a limited set of features and
functionality compared to its main competitors, but Microsoft has been able
to fill most gaps due to its continued development of the OS, supported by
the efforts of Nokia who provided many value-adding enhancements in the
form of apps while the corresponding features were still missing from the OS.
However, some common smartphone features such as multiple home screens
and widgets are still missing from Windows Phone, although this is so by
design choice rather than due to any natural constraints of the platform. Some
other common features, like a pull-down notification bar, have been added only
recently, in Windows Phone 8.1 (TechRadar, 2014b). Also, the intelligent
personal assistant ‘Cortana’, remarkably similar in function to Apple’s ‘Siri’
that debuted on the iPhone 4S in 2011, was introduced in that same release
along with many other noticeable improvements (Microsoft, 2014d).
The last of the three success factors, the number of customers that use the OS
and that are accessible to developers, is the Achilles’ heel of Windows Phone.
As I have noted earlier on several occasions, Microsoft has been unable to
grow the market share of Windows Phone beyond low single-digit figures, and
recently, the market share has shown signs of decline rather than much needed
growth, falling to just 2.5% in Q2 2014 (IDC, 2014b). It is very hard to keep
developers interested with that kind of market share. At minimum, Windows
Phone should get closer to the 10% mark and preferably above in order to be in
a sustainable position. As installed base is more relevant than market share for
developers, the forward compatibility break between Windows Phone versions
7.x and 8 certainly didn’t help, although more than 80% of the platform’s
worldwide installed base consisted of Windows Phone 8 devices in February
2014 (WMPoweruser, 2014).
Using the dimensions of openness identified by Eisenmann et al. (2008) dis-
cussed in Section 2.5.5, the Windows Phone ecosystem is open to demand-side
users (i.e., end users), as anyone can join through purchasing or otherwise
obtaining a device running Windows Phone. The ecosystem is also relatively
open to supply-side users (i.e., developers) by allowing as good as any individ-
ual or company to join the Windows Phone Dev Center, the official developer
program, at a cost of $19 per year, down from $99 previously (WP Central,
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2013). Application development is possible only with Microsoft’s own SDK
and toolchain, and distribution and monetization takes place exclusively on
the Windows Phone Store. With respect to the roles of the platform provider
and sponsor, however, the ecosystem is closed, as Microsoft acts exclusively in
both capacities.
By applying the extended role categorization of Müller et al. (2011), Microsoft
exclusively occupies also the marketplace (Windows Phone Store), OS devel-
oper, and testing & verification party roles. In a non-exclusive but dominant
capacity it also occupies the payment broker (credit/debit card registered with
Microsoft account, Microsoft gift card, PayPal, and in some cases, operator
billing are the allowed payment methods), advertisement broker (adCenter),
software developer, and device manufacturer roles. For providing code signing
certificates for Windows Phone, Microsoft relies on Symantec as an exclusive
partner (Symantec, 2014). Otherwise, Microsoft is not known for exclusive ar-
rangements with Windows Phone, although Microsoft’s main Windows Phone
partner Nokia did sell certain Lumia smartphone models exclusively to major
U.S. carriers AT&T, Verizon Wireless, and T-Mobile US. Through its Xbox
Music and Xbox Video services, the company has some influence on content
providers as well.
As already discussed, Microsoft’s attempts to lure manufacturers into the Win-
dows Phone ecosystem have not been very successful, as before the Nokia
partnership, it had only managed to gain partial, non-exclusive support from
handset manufacturers such as HTC, Samsung, and LG. Somewhat ironically,
Windows Phone is yet to gain as much market share and as many licensees as
its predecessor Windows Mobile had during its heyday, roughly between 2004
and 2007, when the platform had up to 17% global market share as noted in
Section 1.1.1. The dynamics of the smartphone business were different back
then, however, and mainly Android changed that for good, making the mon-
etization model based on OS licensing obsolete. Apple’s introduction of the
iPhone made smartphones attractive to mainstream consumers and brought
the UX and usability into focus, areas where Microsoft had fallen behind.
The availability of high-profile applications was also a problem for Windows
Phone, although according to statistics from August 2014, the platform had
as many as 300,000 apps available (PhoneArena, 2014a). This figure is still, of
course, a far cry from the 1+ million apps of Google Play and Apple App Store,
but it is not insignificant either. The biggest problem has mostly been the lack
of sufficient developer incentives to develop applications for a platform with
such a low market share, which has caused developers to focus their efforts
on the iOS and Android platforms where their chances of earning return on
their investment are substantially better. In March 2014, however, Nokia’s
head of developer relations said that the Windows Phone app ecosystem was
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“getting there”, acknowledging that there is a tipping point for developers in
the sense that when the installed base is large enough, Windows Phone can
support their business model (Trusted Reviews, 2014).
In its annual report for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2014, Microsoft acknowl-
edges that competing platforms have application marketplaces with scale and
significant installed bases on mobile devices, and that the variety and utility
of applications available on a platform are important factors that influence
device purchasing decisions, further agreeing that users incur costs to move
data and buy new applications when switching platforms. Therefore, in order
to compete, Microsoft also notes that it must “successfully enlist developers to
write applications for [its] marketplace and ensure that these applications have
high quality, customer appeal, and value” and that efforts to compete with
rivaling application marketplaces may increase its cost of revenue and lower
its operating margins. (Microsoft, 2014a)
A positive notion about the Windows Phone app ecosystem is that due to the
significantly lower number of applications and developers on board compared
to its main competitors Android and iOS, harmful crowding-out effects prob-
ably do not manifest themselves as much as is the case with said competitors,
resulting in a better chance of getting one’s apps noticed and downloaded.
As I explained in Section 2.5.3, Boudreau (2008) argues that under specific
circumstances, adding too many complementors can detract from a platform’s
ability to generate new innovation as well as profits for the firms making com-
plements (e.g., applications) on it, mainly due to crowding-out effects and
substitution as opposed to market expansion.
Based on the comprehensive study on multi-homing in mobile software ecosys-
tems by Hyrynsalmi et al. (2012), the majority of developers publishing their
apps for Windows Phone were exclusive to that platform, while only very few
developers, less than one percent, who had published apps for iOS and An-
droid had also published their apps for Windows Phone, suggesting that in
a sense, Windows Phone app developers did not have to compete much with
developers from the other platforms. Thus, this realization would seem to
support the idea that the Windows Phone app ecosystem is not suffering from
crowding-out effects as much as the Android and iOS ecosystems. Although
Hyrynsalmi et al. (2012) analyzed a data set comprising a total of 850,000 apps
across the three major marketplaces, it must be noted that Windows Phone
was still in a nascent stage of development, and the transition to Windows
Phone 8 with its significant architectural changes had not yet taken place.
One of the key findings of Hyrynsalmi et al. (2012) is that a multi-homing
publishing strategy is utilized only by a low percentage of developers (6.8%).
Taking into account that the study was published in 2012, it is still quite
remarkable that the two major app ecosystems of iOS and Android, very much
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comparable in number of apps and developers at that time, had so few multi-
homing developers publishing apps for both ecosystems, less than six percent.
More recent analysis on app developer multi-homing by Bresnahan et al. (2014)
suggests that when two platforms have roughly equal market shares, incentives
arise for the highest demand apps to multi-home. They find that there is a
particularly strong demand similarity for apps that are successful on either
platform, and that such apps are highly likely to be roughly equally successful
on the other platform as well, leading to the notion of demand symmetry which
is largely reflected in supply, as much of the developer incentive to supply
an app is determined by expected realized demand. The simple rationale
is that when the one platform has approximately the same number of users
as the other platform, the other platform represents an equally large profit
opportunity as the one platform due to demand symmetry.
In their sample data for modeling app supply for iOS and Android, Bresnahan
et al. (2014) find that the supply on one platform is highly symmetrical with
the supply on the other, and thus multi-homing is the most common supply
behavior in the sample, consisting of applications that are popular on either
platform. They note, however, that it is unclear whether the results would
extend to much less popular apps. Unfortunately, Windows Phone is not
included in the study, as the authors note that “at this stage, the market
has strongly tipped away from both Blackberry and Windows Phone”, calling
both platforms “completely irrelevant”, despite acknowledging Microsoft’s very
expensive incentives to keep Windows Phone from “completely dying off”.
4.4 Synthesis of the Results
In this section, I review the results obtained from the case studies conducted
in the previous sections in light of the research questions originally formulated
in Section 1.2.3. After all, the purpose of the analysis framework of Chapter 3
is to guide and direct the study of the case companies in such a way that
the relevant observations, based on existing theories and literature, are made
during the course of gathering and analyzing information on the companies,
with the goal being to obtain answers to the research questions and thus
fulfilling the research objectives set for this study in the first place.
The joint results of the multiple case analysis are first synthesized on a per-
question basis in Sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, and 4.4.4, then finally together, as
a whole in Section 4.4.5, allowing for the identification of common success fac-
tors. The impact of the results and their practical and theoretical implications
are discussed in Chapter 5, however.
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4.4.1 Q1: Angle of Entry and its Impact on the Success
Factors of Ecosystems
How do a firm’s legacy and angle of entry into the mobile business affect the
success factors of its ecosystem?
Case 1: Apple and the iOS Ecosystem
As discussed in the case study, Apple’s angle of entry is computer hardware
and consumer electronics, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 in Section 3.1.1. The
company’s products have particularly appealed to those involved in the cre-
ative side. For decades, many industrial and graphic designers and people
working in marketing and advertising have commonly used Mac computers,
but the user base and appeal of the products is much broader. Many people
prefer Macs for their powerful simplicity and ease of use, enabling the user to
get things done without too many steps or technicalities. Macs have been and
continue to be premium-priced products, which means not nearly everyone is
able or willing to afford them, yet the products have a high level of desirabil-
ity. This gives all Apple products, not just Macs, a premium aura driven by
brand equity. According to Forbes (2013), Apple’s brand was valued at $104.3
billion, ranking #1 in the world in November 2013.
Due to the premium pricing of Apple products across categories, Apple en-
joys very high gross margins, contributing to the company’s financial results.
Although providing cloud services (iCloud) and an extensive content offering
(App Store & iTunes) to consumers, as well as operating a mobile advertising
platform (iAd), Apple still earned more than 90% of its revenue in its FY 2013
from the sales of devices and related services, not including content (Apple,
2013c). Based on this, I argue that Apple has the following success factor:
• A1. Vertically integrated business model with clear focus on device hard-
ware sales, supported by services and content (that serve to drive hard-
ware sales)
As I noted in the case study as well as the mini-case example in Section 2.1.2,
an enduring element of Apple’s legacy is its closed platform approach for its
products, using a proprietary OS and proprietary or otherwise incompati-
ble peripheral interfaces. Originating from the first Macintosh computers, it
has been carried on to all later Apple products, iPods, iPhones, and iPads,
with a strong cohesion in design and UX remaining in force. Moreover, the
strict design and UX guidelines extend to third-party vendors of accessories
and software applications as well. Due to this approach, Apple UX has been
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and continues to be a clear differentiator from that of competitors’ products,
typically highly appreciated by users due to its consistency and ease of use.
Apple’s decades-long tendency to “think different” with its innovative UX and
design while targeting a very high level of consumer satisfaction exhibits first-
degree path dependence. However, the use of proprietary peripheral interfaces
on Apple hardware, another long-enduring path-dependent decision, is not a
positive differentiator for Apple and its ecosystem, as it generally tends to
drive up the cost of even simple accessories like cables, although providing a
useful control point for Apple.
So, there is no ambiguity as to what Apple’s primary revenue model is —
sales of premium-priced products differentiated through superior UX and a
first-class complementary service and content offering. The decision to remain
strictly in the premium segment can also be thought to reflect first-degree path
dependence, although in recent years, older-generation iPhones and iPads have
been sold at more affordable prices in an attempt to capture value also in the
mid-price tiers. For the sake of clarity, I formulate the above as the following
success factor for Apple:
• A2. Differentiation through superior UX and a first-class complemen-
tary service and content offering
Moreover, a psychological phenomenon known as the ‘halo effect’ projects
the positive perception of certain Apple products on other Apple products
as well. Apple has capitalized on this effect multiple times to its benefit.
When the iPod media player first became popular, it was reported that Mac
computer sales had picked up, too (Macworld, 2006). Later, this same effect
propelled iPod users to buy iPhones (Macworld, 2012). Driven by the halo
effect, owners of iPhones and iPads are buying even more Macs than in the
iPod era (eWeek, 2012). Thus, I conclude that Apple and the iOS ecosystem
possess the following success factor:
• A3. Strong brand equity enabling premium pricing and halo effects
across the product portfolio
Case 2: Google and the Android Ecosystem
As per earlier discussion, Google’s angle of entry is Internet (cloud) services,
content, and advertising, or more specifically, Internet search and advertising,
as illustrated in Figure 3.1 in Section 3.1.1. The company is relatively young,
having been incorporated as late as September 1998, with an IPO in August
2004. When the business started out, search keyword advertising was its sole
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method of monetization, and it remains the company’s bread and butter to
this day. Google’s effective search algorithm, based on counting and qualifying
backlinks, along with AdWords technology that allowed the smart auctioning
of search keywords to advertisers are what originally made the company so
successful (Wired, 2005; Businessweek, 2006).
Search advertising based on the AdWords and AdSense programs forms the
foundation of Google’s advertising business model, and in addition, the com-
pany also provides display advertising services through its DoubleClick adver-
tising technology that includes video, text, images, and other interactive ads.
Additionally, Google has adopted continuous subscription-based and freemium
monetization models for some of its services such as Google Apps for Business,
and Google Drive. Most of its services continue to be free to consumers as
long as they endure the advertising. Thus, Google’s primary revenue model
can be described as sales of search and display advertisements on the web and
on mobile devices, which is complemented by sales of subscriptions for SaaS
apps and other cloud-based services. Although Google does sell certain hard-
ware products such as Chromebooks, the Nexus devices, and certain gadgets
like the Google Glass, these do not represent significant revenue to Google.
Being such a young company, Google does not exhibit noticeable technological
path dependence, or at least it is hard to pinpoint any major path dependence
in its platform or technology-related decisions. If there is path dependence
at Google, it has to be on the business model side, as so many services are
advertising funded, without the user directly paying anything. Even Google’s
OS platform for smartphones and tablets, Android, is not generating direct
revenue for Google through means other than advertising. Of course, Google
does get its share of the transaction fee on Google Play that amounts to 30%
of an application’s price, shared with the distribution partner.
In the mobile smartphone business, Google’s strength is that it does not suffer
from a “burden of legacy” like so many other players that have been immersed
in the hardware side of the business, often struggling to keep up in the tech-
nology race while trying to anticipate and appease the needs and preferences
of consumers. By focusing mostly on the web and cloud services that are
largely independent of devices and hardware, Google has saved itself from a
lot of complexity. The brilliance of its business model is that its monetization
is not dependent on fickle consumers looking to buy the latest and greatest
smartphone or other gadget. No matter which device people use to access
the Internet, odds are that they will be using Google services or at least ac-
cessing some Google Network Members’ websites, which means Google earns
revenue. As long as Google services are loved by consumers, the company has
few reasons for concern. At least for the time being, Google is one of the most
loved brands by consumers in the world, ranking #3 according to Sustainable
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Brands (2013). In brand value, it is #5 according to Forbes (2013).
Finally, as Google does not seek vertical integration or physical domination
in the smartphone business, having divested the former Motorola handset
business, it leaves more freedom for device manufacturers and complementors
to innovate on top of its platforms. Therefore, I identify the following success
factors for Google and its ecosystem:
• G1. Platform-agnostic business model, independent of devices and hard-
ware
• G2. No burden of legacy, enabling a clear focus on cloud services, soft-
ware, and content
• G3. More freedom for complementors to innovate on top of Google tech-
nologies
• G4. Google and its services are loved by consumers, also high brand
equity
Case 3: Microsoft and the Windows Phone Ecosystem
As illustrated in Figure 3.1 in Section 3.1.1, Microsoft’s angle of entry is com-
puter software, more specifically operating systems and applications. Having
been founded in 1975, the company has a long history of working on various
Windows OS products and business applications for the PC but also for other
platforms, most notably the Office productivity software suite.
Today, Microsoft develops and market software, services, and hardware devices
to its customers worldwide. Having been in the gaming and entertainment
console business for more than a decade, the company also recently became
a branded handset manufacturer, with its acquisition of the Nokia handset
business completed in April 2014. Most of the company’s revenue is derived
from commercial (B2B) licensing of its business and productivity applications,
mainly Office, as well as its Windows OS family, excluding its smartphone OS,
Windows Phone, however. The mobile version of Office used to be exclusively
available only on Windows Phone before a version of it was launched for the
iPad and iPhone, albeit with limited functionality (TabletPCReview, 2014).
Interestingly, Windows Phone licensing has always been rather insignificant
as a revenue source, and indeed, Microsoft has even waived the license fees
for some handset manufacturers using the OS. Hence, I identify the following
success factors for Microsoft and the Windows Phone ecosystem:
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• M1. Business model largely focused on B2B licensing of Office, the
world’s most popular productivity software suite, as well as other business
apps and services
• M2. Windows Phone includes Office while other platforms have limited
functionality
• M3. Microsoft can afford to waive the license fee for Windows Phone
As noted in the case study, Microsoft has exhibited at least first-degree, possi-
bly third-degree path dependence by carrying over legacy OS components and
support for the text-based MS-DOS operating system into the 2000s, with the
first mainstream Windows running on an NT-based hybrid kernel, Windows
XP, being available in late 2001. This testifies that Microsoft has been slow to
renew its core OS architecture and get rid of legacy design decisions that have
led to suboptimal performance and bloated software (van Wensveen, 2007).
One could argue, however, that Microsoft’s path dependence in its OS devel-
opment at least partially stems from its desire to maintain compatibility with
the vast application base that existed for MS-DOS and the early versions of
Windows, also upholding the application barrier that has made it so difficult
for other OS vendors to gain a foothold in the mainstream PC market — IBM
tried it and failed, and Linux is still far from becoming mainstream outside
the server market (Ars Technica, 2013b).
As discussed, Microsoft was not very successful in creating a UX for its PDA
and smartphone OS that would appeal to mass-market consumers. It can
be argued that Microsoft exhibited up to third-degree path dependence in
modeling the Windows Mobile UI after its legacy desktop UI, also sticking to
a suboptimal stylus-based UI paradigm when finger touch was already seen as
the superior paradigm by consumers. Therefore, I do not see any other success
factors stemming from Microsoft’s particular angle of entry that would help
the company prosper in the smartphone business.
4.4.2 Q2: Success Factors of Ecosystems
How does a leading firm successfully orchestrate an ecosystem to foster value-
adding complementary innovation?
Success Factors Stemming from the Ecosystem Leader’s Role and
Governance
All three case companies, Apple, Google, and Microsoft, have clearly adopted
the keystone role, while acting as the undisputed leaders in their respective
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mobile business ecosystems. As discussed in Section 2.3.2, a keystone is a
company in a leadership role that is valued by the rest of the community,
enabling all ecosystem participants to invest toward a shared future in which
they anticipate profiting together. Thus, a keystone has to advance the overall
good of the ecosystem, as opposed to overpowering it and/or draining all
value out of it. The latter behavior is attributed to dominators that can be
detrimental to an ecosystem if left unchecked. A physical dominator pursues
either vertical or horizontal integration with the goal of encompassing a large
portion of its ecosystem in itself, whereas a value dominator tends to create
little if any value itself, instead robbing most of the value created by other
ecosystem participants.
Interestingly enough, while all three case companies generally speaking act like
keystones, each of them can also be seen to exhibit dominator behavior. Apple
is the only device hardware manufacturer in the iOS ecosystem, thus captur-
ing all value generated from iOS device hardware sales. Due to a high degree
of vertical integration, the company captures value also from its in-house de-
signed chipsets. It also maintains strict control over the manufacturers of
hardware accessories and peripherals through its proprietary electrical inter-
faces such as the Lightning connector. Third-party manufacturers seeking to
produce accessories for Apple products using any proprietary interfaces must
pay a costly license fee (in 2005, up to $10 or 10% of product cost, whichever
was higher) to Apple as part of its ‘Made For iPod/iPhone/iPad’ program, al-
though Apple reportedly lowered the fee in early 2014 (Apple Insider, 2014b).
Such a forced revenue-sharing policy with the accessory manufacturers exhibits
characteristics of a value dominator, but at the same time, can be useful in en-
suring that all accessory manufacturers comply with the compatibility, quality,
and design requirements and guidelines set by Apple. I choose not to consider
it a success factor for Apple and the iOS ecosystem.
Microsoft is known for its disproportionate value capture in the PC ecosystem
through its Windows OS and Office license fees, exhibiting value dominator
characteristics, and it has tried to enforce a similar model in the Windows
Phone ecosystem, although without much success due to the OS platform’s
weak position in the market and unpopularity among handset OEMs. As
noted in the case study of Microsoft, however, Microsoft captures billions of
dollars worth of IP-related royalty fees annually through its patent licensing
agreements with mobile device manufacturers using the Android OS, thus
extracting value from the Android ecosystem without contributing anything
in return. Although harmful to the Android ecosystem, this is actually a
success factor for Microsoft (and possibly the Windows Phone ecosystem as
well, if Microsoft is able to get commitments from OEMs to work on Windows
Phone in addition to, or instead of Android):
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• M4. Strong IP portfolio to defend own OS, also enabling value extraction
from rivaling ecosystems
In its mobile business ecosystem, Google appears to be the fairest player out
of the three companies. In the case study of Google, I explained how the
various Android ecosystem participants benefit from Google’s key decisions in
governing the ecosystem. I rephrase them here as the following success factors,
one of which is also shared with the Windows Phone ecosystem:
• G5. OEMs benefit from having a state-of-the-art mobile OS platform,
essentially royalty free and enjoying higher adoption rates than any com-
peting platform
• G6, M5. Accessory makers appreciate that they can work with standard
interfaces (and are not bound to the whims of any single OEM)
• G7. Developers value the openness and nonrestrictive philosophy in ap-
plication distribution
• G8. Mobile operators benefit from the transition to smartphones, fu-
eled in many markets by the availability of affordable Android handsets,
driving up demand for mobile data plans
Furthermore, websites earn revenue by hosting Google’s advertisements, and
advertisers benefit from Google’s broad consumer reach and effective targeted
ads that have a high conversion rate. Due to Google’s dominant position in
search advertising, however, this is the one area where Google has been accused
of anticompetitive behavior, effectively forcing most publishers to agree to
Google’s terms and conditions that allow the search giant to capture a very
large portion of the advertising revenue. If there were more competition, the
publishers could keep more of the revenue to themselves.
Success Factors Stemming from the Ecosystem’s Health
With regard to the health of the mobile business ecosystems of Apple, Google,
and Microsoft, I have discussed the health metrics of productivity, robustness,
and niche creation, using diversity of the application catalog and developer
base as a proxy for niche creation, and growth in the number of applications
and payouts to developers as a proxy for productivity. Robustness has been
more difficult to evaluate due to a lack of statistics on the survival rates of firms
producing complements for a particular platform, especially application devel-
opers, and thus I have used the additional metrics of persistence of ecosystem
structure, predictability, limited obsolescence, and continuity of user experience
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and use cases. In Table 4.1, I summarize the findings from the case studies
regarding ecosystem health metrics for each of the three ecosystems.
Table 4.1: Ecosystem health metrics evaluated
Ecosystem Health Metric Apple
(iOS)
Google
(Android)
Microsoft
(WP)
Productivity (Catalog & Payout Growth) High High Low
Robustness: High Medium Medium/Low
- Persistence of Ecosystem Structure High High Low
- Predictability High Medium Low
- Limited Obsolescence High Medium Medium
- Continuity of UX and Use Cases High Medium High
Niche Creation (Diversity) High High Medium
Based on these results, I conclude that out of the three case companies in-
cluded in this study, Apple has succeeded best in fostering its ecosystem’s
health, at least when the metrics of productivity, robustness, and niche cre-
ation are considered per the definitions of Iansiti & Levien (2004a,b). Google
and its Android ecosystem rank very close to Apple, scoring high in all metrics
except robustness, where the substantial fragmentation of Android lowered its
score for limited obsolescence and continuity of user experience and use cases.
Hence, I formulate the following success factors for the ecosystems of Apple
and Google respectively:
• A4. Healthiest ecosystem based on metrics of productivity, robustness,
and niche creation
• G9. Healthy ecosystem based on metrics of productivity, robustness, and
niche creation
Success Factors Stemming from the Software Ecosystem and Appli-
cation Marketplace
As discussed in the case studies, the iOS ecosystem, the Android ecosystem,
and the Windows Phone ecosystem are OS-centric software ecosystems ac-
cording to the criteria of Bosch (2009), discussed in Section 2.4.2. The iOS
ecosystem and the Android ecosystem also easily fulfill the criteria for the
three success factors identified for such ecosystems, namely 1) minimal effort
required by developers, 2) generic, evolving functionality and set of features
provided by the OS, and 3) the number of customers that use the OS and that
are accessible to developers, although for Android, the first success factor is
somewhat adversely affected by the platform’s fragmentation. While Windows
Phone clearly fulfills the criteria for the first success factor, having a compre-
hensive SDK and toolchain as well as well-defined APIs, it has lagged behind
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the other two ecosystems in providing the functionality and set of features
that developers expect from a platform, although it has recently shown sig-
nificant improvement in catching up with its competitors. The Achilles’ heel
of Windows Phone is, however, the last success factor, as it ranks low in the
number of customers that use the OS and that are accessible to developers.
Based on this evaluation, I recognize the following success factors for the iOS
ecosystem (A), Android ecosystem (G), and Windows Phone ecosystem (M):
• A5, M6. Minimal effort required by developers
• A6, G10. Generic, evolving functionality and set of features provided
by the OS
• A7, G11. The number of customers that use the OS and that are ac-
cessible to developers
In the case studies, I discussed the number of apps each of the three ecosystems
had in their application catalogs on a number of occasions. As of August
2014, Android’s app count has surged to more than 1.3 million, with iOS
not far behind with a reported 1.2 million apps as of June 2014. Microsoft
reported Windows Phone has 300,000 apps as of August 2014. I also noted
that with such figures, the competition for end users’ attention on the iOS App
Store is fierce, meaning that app discovery is increasingly a problem, requiring
developers to invest more in, e.g., social media and viral marketing to ensure
the continued discovery of their applications. The Android ecosystem, with a
similarly high number of applications in the Google Play store (which is not
even the only application marketplace for Android), is presumably suffering
from the same crowding-out effects that eventually lead to diminishing returns
for developers as well as a reduced level of innovation on the platform, as
argued by Boudreau (2008) and discussed in Section 2.5.3. Indeed, some
developers have voiced their opinion about the stagnant state of the Apple
App Store as of late 2014.
As I discussed in the case study of Microsoft, the majority of developers pub-
lishing their apps for Windows Phone were exclusive to that platform, while
only very few developers, less than one percent, who had published apps for
iOS and Android had also published their apps for Windows Phone, accord-
ing to the study of Hyrynsalmi et al. (2012). I argued that in a sense, this
meant that Windows Phone app developers did not have to compete much
with developers from the other platforms, meaning that the Windows Phone
app ecosystem is not suffering from crowding-out effects as much as the An-
droid and iOS ecosystems. Of course, the lower absolute number of apps and
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developers in the Windows Phone ecosystem as compared to the Android and
iOS ecosystems also makes crowding-out effects less likely to occur.
Although multi-homing has been a very rare phenomenon for Windows Phone
developers, Bresnahan et al. (2014) have modeled the app supply for An-
droid and iOS in the case of symmetrical demand7, finding that the supply
on one platform is highly symmetrical with the supply on the other, and thus
multi-homing is the most common supply behavior, at least as far as popular
applications on either platform are concerned. Windows Phone is excluded
from the study, although due to its very low market share in the U.S. market
as well as globally, there wouldn’t be any demand symmetry, not by a long
shot. Also in the study of Hyrynsalmi et al. (2012), based on global applica-
tion catalog data, multi-homing was more common between Android and iOS
although still quite rare, with 13% of Android developers and only 6% of iOS
developers multi-homing as of 2012.
According to the developer mindshare survey of VisionMobile (2014), Android
is the most popular platform among developers, consistently beating iOS in all
regions, although the differences are quite small in North America and Western
Europe. In these two regions as well as Japan, the majority of developers
actually prioritize iOS over Android, leading to the perception of “iOS first,
then Android”. The most plausible explanation for this is that particularly in
developed markets where iOS has a high market share, the platform continues
to provide better monetization opportunities for the majority of developers,
most of whom still view iOS as the most rewarding and engaging development
platform. Moreover, iOS is the preferred platform for 59% of its developer
base, thus commanding the highest developer loyalty among all mobile OS
platforms (Vision Mobile, 2014). Based on the discussion above, I therefore
identify the following ecosystem success factors:
• A8. Most likely ecosystem to benefit from multi-homing developers
• M7. Harmful crowding-out effects less likely to occur in application
marketplace
4.4.3 Q3: Success Factors of Platforms
How does a leading firm successfully manage a product/industry platform to
enable value-adding complementary innovation?
7Demand symmetry arises from roughly equal market shares for the two platforms par-
ticularly in the U.S. market, 52% for Android and 42% for iOS, as of May 2014 according
to comScore (2014).
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In each of the case studies, I evaluated the openness of the software ecosystem
in question using the dimensions of openness identified by Eisenmann et al.
(2008), discussed in Section 2.5.5. Because the question of openness is equally
if not more relevant to platform management and thus research question #3, I
have chosen to discuss it here. The results of the evaluations are summarized
below in Table 4.2:
Table 4.2: Ecosystem dimensions of openness evaluated
Dimension of
Openness
Apple
(iOS)
Google
(Android)
Microsoft
(Windows Phone)
Demand-Side Users
(End Users)
Open Open Open
Supply-Side Users
(Developers)
Open Open Open
Platform Providers
(Marketplaces)
Closed
(Apple only)
Open
(Google, Amazon,
Samsung, others)
Closed
(Microsoft only)
Platform Sponsors
(OS Development)
Closed
(Apple only)
Semi-Open
(Google, OHA, OAA,
others through AOSP)
Closed
(Microsoft only)
From the table, we can see that the there are no significant differences be-
tween the three ecosystems in terms of their openness toward end users and
developers. A minor difference is that the developer program for iOS is more
costly than the programs for Android and Windows Phone, and joining it is a
prerequisite for testing developed iOS apps on real Apple hardware as opposed
to just using a simulator.
When it comes to the roles of platform provider and platform sponsor, however,
we see a similar approach for iOS and Windows Phone, but a clearly differ-
ing approach for Android. As I discussed in the case study of Google, the
Android ecosystem has several alternative application marketplaces, although
Google Play is the largest one and is mandatory on devices that support
Google Mobile Services. Some players like Samsung offer their own applica-
tion marketplace alongside Google Play, while some others like Amazon have
completely removed Google Play along with GMS, using a forked version of
the open-source Android (i.e., AOSP) complemented with a proprietary set of
services.
Although the latter kind of behavior increases fragmentation in the Android
ecosystem, Google had chosen to allow it based on the ideals of freedom and
open innovation that Android was built on. As discussed in the case study of
Google, however, the company may be more inclined to limit fragmentation
and control the software experience in future Android products by introduc-
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ing a certification program for device OEMs rumored to be called Android
Silver. Without any official statements from Google, however, it is difficult to
say exactly how and when such a program would be realized. The Android
One initiative for entry-level smartphones, however, does already control the
specifications and experience. Still for the time being, however, Android is by
far the most open OS platform also in terms of the platform sponsor role —
as AOSP is open source, it can be freely modified and utilized by manufactur-
ers of various products, not just handsets. Modified versions of Android have
been used in various application domains, e.g., in automotive infotainment by
Audi (CNET, 2014). Based on the arguments above, I identify the following
success factors:
• A9, M8. Keeping the platform provider and sponsor roles closed (under
proprietary control) helps keep fragmentation in check, but may limit
market share growth
• G12. Being open with regard to end users, developers, platform providers,
and platform sponsors enables a high degree of open innovation, but may
lead to severe fragmentation
In addition to the four dimensions of openness, I discussed the findings of
Müller et al. (2011) in Section 2.5.5, outlining 12 distinct value network roles
where owners of mobile application marketplaces (or more aptly, leaders of
software ecosystems) can have varying levels of control and influence, either
by being the sole owner of a role or function, or partial owner through a consor-
tium, and exerting influence on other parties through exclusive arrangements
or some other means. Based on the evaluations done in the case studies, I
have come up with the results illustrated in Table 4.3.
From the results, we can see that Google is acting in a non-exclusive capacity in
five out of seven roles where it is an “owner”, occupying the value network role
in question. For comparison, Apple has non-exclusivity only twice out of eight
ownership roles, and in the other instance, the company still has significant
influence on the external parties (i.e., software developers). As for Microsoft,
the company acts in a non-exclusive capacity in four out of seven ownership
roles. Microsoft does have some influence on device manufacturers through its
licensing policy and fees. All three companies act as content retailers through
their branded content stores and have made deals with the leading content
providers in the world. Out of the three companies, Apple’s content offering
available through iTunes, the iBookstore, the App Store, and the Mac App
8In the past, Google has worked with a lead device manufacturer and lead carrier for each
new Android release. However, there was no real exclusivity period and other manufacturers
and carriers could follow quite quickly.
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Table 4.3: Control and influence along the value network
Value Network
Role
Apple
(iOS)
Google
(Android)
Microsoft
(WP)
Marketplace owner,
exclusive
(iTunes, App Store)
owner,
non-exclusive
(Google Play)
owner,
exclusive
(WP Store)
Payment Broker owner,
exclusive
(iTunes)
owner,
exclusive
(Google Wallet)
owner,
non-exclusive
(MS Acct., Wallet)
Advertisement
Broker
owner,
non-exclusive
(iAd)
owner,
non-exclusive
(AdMob)
owner,
non-exclusive
(adCenter)
Operating System
Developer
owner,
exclusive
owner/consortium,
exclusive
(Android/AOSP)
owner,
exclusive
Software Developer owner,
influence
owner,
non-exclusive
owner,
non-exclusive
Testing &
Verification Party
owner,
exclusive
owner,
non-exclusive
owner,
exclusive
Signing Partner owner,
exclusive
owner,
non-exclusive
-
exclusive
(Symantec)
Software Distributor -
-
-
-
-
-
Content Provider retailer,
influence
(iTunes, iBookstore)
retailer,
some influence
(Google Play
Music)
retailer,
some influence
(Xbox Music &
Xbox Video)
Device Manufacturer owner,
exclusive
-
influence
(esp. lead OEM8)
owner,
some influence
(licensing fees)
Mobile Network
Operator
-
influence
-
some influence
(lead operators8)
-
-
End User -
-
-
-
-
-
Store is the largest, most mature, and most profitable one. Thus, it can be
argued that Apple has the most influence on content providers out of the three
companies. Based on the results obtained and the arguments above, I identify
the following success factors:
• A10. High degree of vertical integration through exclusive ownership
of all core elements in the value network, full control of the publishing
process, and a strong influence on external complementors and providers
• G13. Non-exclusive process of application development, verification, and
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDIES 194
publishing
At first sight, the success factors A10 and G13 would seem to be in conflict
— how can a strongly exclusive model and a non-exclusive model both be
successful? To answer the question, one must look at the broader ecosys-
tems of Apple and Google and understand their business models. Apple is
all about selling premium-priced devices with a superior design and UX, thus
controlling and perfecting every little detail in the products and services of the
company is absolutely core to the company’s success. Although Apple needs
external complementors and content providers to complete its offering, it has
to make sure absolutely nothing compromises the Apple experience and brand
perception that allows it to maintain its high profit margins.
As for Google, however, devices and their experiences are not so important
per se, as long as people use Google services and are subjected to the adver-
tisements through which the company earns the vast majority of its revenue
and profit. It is in Google’s best interests to promote the proliferation of An-
droid as much as possible, and being too exclusive or restrictive in its policies
for app publishing and sales would be counterproductive. Also, as Google no
longer manufactures Android devices in-house, it has little reason to pursue
the kind of vertical integration that Apple is known for.
Thus, the success factors A10 and G13 cannot be combined in any single
ecosystem, and indeed, either of them will not suit just any ecosystem without
knowing more about the said ecosystem’s structure and about the business
model of the company acting as the leader or keystone of the ecosystem.
Success Factors Stemming from the Platform Approach and Gover-
nance
As discussed in the case study of Apple, the iOS platform is based on a mix
of closed source software components developed by Apple (and the company
NeXT Software that Apple acquired in 1997) as well as open source com-
ponents originating from BSD Unix and diverse open source projects. It is
particularly noteworthy that the differentiating or value-adding components
such as the UI and application framework are closed source to protect Ap-
ple’s intellectual property and to hinder substitute innovation. Only Apple
employees have access to the iOS source code.
Also Google keeps the portion of Android source code related to GMS and
Google Play closed source, although the core Android platform without the
Google-branded apps or services, AOSP, remains open source. Google has been
criticized for “closed source creep”, i.e., increasingly moving its development
efforts from AOSP to the closed source, proprietary counterparts of certain
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Android apps and services. OEMs using Android may get access to the GMS
source code, but only if they agree to Google’s licensing terms and follow the
GMS approval window, as discussed in the case study of Google.
For Google, and actually for any company, less open source code means more
work for the company’s competitors. Microsoft, on the other hand, has always
believed in a closed source model, in fact so much that it has revealed certain
interfaces of its Windows OS only as a result of court orders to do so, as was
discussed in the respective case study. Windows Phone is also closed source,
but exposes a set of APIs to OEMs and developers. Based on the above, I
formulate the following success factors:
• A11, G14, M9. The software components of the platform that meaning-
fully differentiate it from the competition or otherwise create significant
added value based on proprietary IP are kept closed source
• A12, G15, M10. The platform exposes enough APIs so that OEMs,
accessory makers, and developers are able to create products and apps
with meaningful differentiation
Looking at how the three case companies manage their complementors and
external innovation on their respective platforms, Google would appear to
have the healthiest and most predictable approach. As discussed in the case
study, Google is neither known to impose limitations on its developers nor
to block certain third-party applications, should they have overlap with in-
house offerings. As an example, Google allows third-party web browsers, such
as Firefox for Android, to be used freely on Android devices, and even basic
functionality like the call dialer can be implemented by third parties. This
is definitely not the case with Apple, where any third-party apps seen as
replacements or competitors for in-house Apple apps like the Safari browser
are automatically rejected. Also Microsoft does not allow alternative browsers
to the Internet Explorer in Windows Phone, and through its API restrictions,
it is not possible to replace any built-in functionality. Making things worse
for Microsoft, the company is known for occasionally trampling or crushing
its complementors through actions that are formally known as envelopment
attacks, often being of the foreclosure type, as discussed in the case study.
Such behavior is very discouraging to complementors, as they can never be
too sure whether their platform provider is going to run them out of business.
• G16. The platform has the most nonrestrictive policy for complemen-
tors, not limited by protective clauses against competition or substitution
The iOS, Android, and Windows Phone OS platforms all have comprehensive
developer programs, SDKs, and various online and oﬄine resources and events
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such as developer conferences to attract and support developers in creating ap-
plications for the platforms. Each platform has also adopted a roughly similar
revenue sharing scheme. What sets them apart, particularly Windows Phone
from the rest, is the sustainability of commercial application development on
the platform. As discussed in the case study of Windows Phone, Microsoft has
resorted to heavily subsidizing app developers to write or port their apps for
Windows Phone in order to keep the store catalog even remotely on par with
the Apple App Store and Google Play. Subsidies anywhere between $60,000
and $600,000 have reportedly been needed to get developers on board. This
is clearly a problem for Microsoft, as Apple and Google do not need to incen-
tivize developers on their platforms. The underlying reason, as was discussed
in the studies, ultimately boils down to the low market adoption of products
based on Windows Phone, i.e., the low installed base of the platform, also re-
flected in its persistently low market share. Thus, the identical success factor
A7/G11 for Apple and Google, the number of customers that use the OS and
that are accessible to developers is equally valid here.
4.4.4 Q4: Commonalities between Successful Platform
Management and Ecosystem Orchestration
What is the interplay between successfully orchestrating an ecosystem and man-
aging a product/industry platform? Are the success drivers similar?
As I discussed in the previous section, the question of openness is equally
relevant to platform management as it is to ecosystem orchestration. Also
questions of control, exclusivity, and influence in multi-sided platforms, their
value networks, and the broader ecosystems are largely related to one another.
Therefore, regardless of whether looking strictly at the individual platforms
or the ecosystems surrounding them, I consider the following success factors
as highly relevant:
• A9, M8. Keeping the platform provider and sponsor roles closed (under
proprietary control) helps keep fragmentation in check, but may limit
market share growth
• G12. Being open with regard to end users, developers, platform providers,
and platform sponsors enables a high degree of open innovation, but may
lead to severe fragmentation
The following success factors stemming from each ecosystem leader’s angle of
entry and business model can also be thought to have wide-ranging implica-
tions to both ecosystem orchestration as well as platform management, as they
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often implicitly define the domains where ecosystem participants or platform
complementors are able to thrive:
• A1. Vertically integrated business model with clear focus on device hard-
ware sales, supported by services and content (that serve to drive hard-
ware sales
• G1. Platform-agnostic business model, independent of devices and hard-
ware
• G2. No burden of legacy, enabling a clear focus on cloud services, soft-
ware, and content
• G3. More freedom for complementors to innovate on top of Google tech-
nologies
• M1. Business model largely focused on B2B licensing of Office, the
world’s most popular productivity software suite, as well as other business
apps and services
• M3. Microsoft can afford to waive the license fee for Windows Phone
Apple’s business model rules out third-party value creation from device hard-
ware sales for iOS ecosystem participants, and also the iOS platform is not
open to third-party device hardware manufacturers, being exclusive to Apple.
The scope of the iOS platform and ecosystem for external complementors is
therefore limited to software applications, hardware accessories, and various
types of digital content sold through iTunes, the App Store, or other Apple-
controlled stores.
Google’s platform-agnostic business model, on the other hand, allows Android
ecosystem participants to freely create value in practically any way they see
fit, although Android devices supporting GMS must include Google Search,
Gmail, Google Play, and other popular Google services. Thus, any form of
third-party value creation except search advertising is, at least in principle,
viable in the Android ecosystem. Furthermore, by using AOSP without GMS,
it is possible for device OEMs to replace Google services altogether and capture
value from the value network roles normally occupied by Google.
Microsoft’s Windows Phone platform and ecosystem both benefit from the
fact that the company still earns the vast majority of its revenue outside of
the mobile industry, allowing it to heavily cross-subsidize the development of
the platform and its surrounding ecosystem. This is particularly evident in
the large developer subsidies paid out by Microsoft as well as the company’s
decision to waive the license fee for Windows Phone, at least for certain OEMs.
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4.4.5 Overview of the Results for Q1–Q4
An overview of the study results across all research questions and case com-
panies is presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, divided in two tables due to layout
requirements. A key purpose of the overview is to facilitate identifying the
success factors that were common across two or all three of the case compa-
nies and their ecosystems. After all, as stated in Section 1.3, the high-level
goal of this study is to identify common success factors in leading mobile busi-
ness ecosystems, based on a multiple case study of the said three companies
chosen because of their distinct angles of entry, as explained in Section 1.4.2.
Although the individual success factors of the ecosystems of each of these com-
panies are quite interesting as such, in order to have any generalizability of the
results to the smartphone business beyond the three companies, commonalities
need to be identified.
If a success factor is exhibited by all three ecosystems, I consider it confirmed,
being generalizable to the analysis of other firms and their ecosystems in the
smartphone business not covered in this study. As a rule of thumb, such
success factors should be valid for any mobile business ecosystems, being highly
relevant for their success.
If, on the other hand, a success factor is exhibited by exactly two ecosystems,
I consider it partially confirmed, meaning that it may be generalizable to the
analysis of other firms and their ecosystems in the smartphone business, but
this may be subject to certain preconditions relating to the business model of
the ecosystem leader or the structure of the ecosystem under analysis. Such
success factors may therefore be valid for many but not all mobile business
ecosystems.
If a success factor is exhibited by just one ecosystem, I consider it a firm or
context-specific success factor that is based on either the unique characteristics
or the angle of entry of a firm, or a very specific business context, e.g., serving
a specific market segment or niche. Such success factors are most often not
generalizable, particularly when they arise from the path-dependent evolution
of a firm, or from unique resources, capabilities, or interfirm linkages that are
difficult to imitate.
Common Success Factors of Ecosystems
• Partially Confirmed: CSF1. Accessory makers appreciate that they
can work with standard interfaces (and are not bound to the whims of
any single OEM) (G6, M5)
• Partially Confirmed: CSF2. Healthy ecosystem based on metrics of
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productivity, robustness, and niche creation (A4, G9)
• Partially Confirmed: CSF3. Minimal effort required by developers
(A5, M6)
• Partially Confirmed: CSF4. Generic, evolving functionality and set
of features provided by the OS (A6, G10)
• Partially Confirmed: CSF5. The number of customers that use the
OS and that are accessible to developers (A7, G11)
The first common success factor (CSF1) suggests that standard interfaces
should be the preferred choice to get as many accessory manufacturers on
board as possible, and also to enable sustainable value creation for these com-
panies as opposed to value extraction from them. This makes senses both
intuitively as well as based on the evidence discussed in the case studies.
The second common success factor (CSF2) is essentially saying that healthy
ecosystems are those that measure high in productivity, robustness, and niche
creation, which is the central argument of Iansiti & Levien (2004a,b), thus
confirmed here for the iOS and Android ecosystems, but not conclusively for
Windows Phone. As discussed in Section 4.4.2 and illustrated in Table 4.1,
the iOS and Android ecosystems both scored highly in terms of productivity,
robustness, and niche creation, whereas the Windows Phone ecosystem lagged
behind in all three metrics to a varying degree.
Finally, the last three common success factors above (CSF3, CSF4, CSF5)
confirm at least partially that the three identical success factors of OS-centric
software ecosystems identified by Bosch (2009) also apply to mobile software
ecosystems and the smartphone business. Interestingly, the iOS ecosystem
exhibits all three success factors, whereas the Android and Windows Phone
ecosystems exhibit strictly speaking only two.
Common Success Factors of Platforms
• Partially Confirmed: CSF6. Keeping the platform provider and spon-
sor roles closed (under proprietary control) helps keep fragmentation in
check, but may limit market share growth (A9, M8)
• Confirmed: CSF7. The software components of the platform that
meaningfully differentiate it from the competition or otherwise create
significant added value based on proprietary IP are kept closed source
(A11, G14, M9)
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• Confirmed: CSF8. The platform exposes enough APIs so that OEMs,
accessory makers, and developers are able to create products and apps
with meaningful differentiation (A12, G15, M10)
The sixth common success factor (CSF6) advocating proprietary control of
the platform provider and sponsor roles to stop fragmentation from becoming
a problem is partially confirmed, as both Apple and Microsoft practice it
successfully to this end, whereas Google does not. Also confirming the success
factor, Apple and Microsoft have been unable to grow the global market shares
of their OS platforms over the 20% mark (and actually, Windows Phone is
far from even 10%), and recently their market shares have been stagnant.
However, even Google has taken steps toward strengthening its control of
the Android platform and reducing its fragmentation through the adoption
of the GMS approval window, and may take things even further through the
rumored upcoming Android Silver program, which it can probably afford to do,
given Android’s largely dominant position in the market. The Android One
initiative, announced in June 2014, is already a step in this direction, limiting
participating OEMs to a stock Android experience with little variation in
hardware specifications.
The seventh common success factor (CSF7) is confirmed by all three case stud-
ies, highlighting the fact that all three leading mobile ecosystems use closed
source, at least to a certain extent, to protect their differentiating or other-
wise value-adding software components, often based on their proprietary IP.
As discussed, iOS and Windows Phone are closed source whereas Android,
although commonly referred to as open source, is only partially open source
— the core platform, AOSP, is indeed open source, but a good deal of the
platform’s value add is being developed by Google and its lead OEM part-
ners as closed source. Google’s reportedly increasing use of closed source in
the overall Android project serves as further evidence to confirm this success
factor.
The eight and last common success factor (CSF8) is also confirmed by all
three case studies, stating the rather simple fact that all platforms must ex-
pose enough APIs and other external interfaces that complementors are able
to create complementary products (e.g., apps, accessories) that have meaning-
ful differentiation and thus business potential. If this were not the case, the
breadth of complementary innovation on a platform would be severely lim-
ited, and the complement business would be diminished to a dire cost-based
competition with little room for profit-making.
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Common Success Factors of Both Ecosystems and Platforms
As discussed earlier, the common success factor CSF6 (also known as A9, M8)
is also related to the orchestration of the broader ecosystem, making it the only
common success factor that is equally valid in both platform and ecosystem
management. One could argue, however, that CSF1 and particularly CSF3–
5 also have to do with platforms of some kind, so actually nearly all of the
eight common success factors identified above are applicable to OS-centric
mobile business ecosystems and platforms. Only CSF2 pertains specifically
to ecosystems, as the ecosystem health measures are originally defined for
business ecosystems, not platforms.
Thus, all in all, I have come up with two confirmed common success fac-
tors, CSF7 and CSF8, generalizable to other mobile business ecosystems and
platforms, as well as six common success factors that are at least partially
confirmed, CSF1–CSF6, but would need further validation through other case
studies in order to get conclusive results about the extent of their generaliz-
ability. For easy reference, all eight common success factors are summarized
in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Common success factors for ecosystems and platforms
ID Common Success Factor Status
CSF1 Accessory makers appreciate that they can work with standard
interfaces (and are not bound to the whims of any single OEM)
P. Confirmed
CSF2 Healthy ecosystem based on metrics of productivity, robustness
and niche creation
P. Confirmed
CSF3 Minimal effort required by developers P. Confirmed
CSF4 Generic, evolving functionality and set of features provided by
the OS
P. Confirmed
CSF5 The number of customers that use the OS and that are
accessible to developers
P. Confirmed
CSF6 Keeping the platform provider and sponsor roles closed
(under proprietary control) helps keep fragmentation in check,
but may limit market share growth
P. Confirmed
CSF7 The software components of the platform that meaningfully
differentiate it from the competition or otherwise create
significant added value based on proprietary IP are kept closed
source
Confirmed
CSF8 The platform exposes enough APIs so that OEMs, accessory
makers, and developers are able to create products and apps
with meaningful differentiation
Confirmed
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Table 4.5: Overview of results obtained for research questions – part I
Research Question Apple and the iOS
ecosystem
Google and the
Android ecosystem
Microsoft and the
Windows Phone
ecosystem
Q1: Angle of Entry
and its Impact on the
Success Factors of
Ecosystems
- Vertically integrated
business model with
clear focus on device
hardware sales,
supported by services
and content
- Differentiation
through superior
UX and first-class
complementary
services and content
- Strong brand equity
enabling premium
pricing and halo
effects across the
product portfolio
- Platform-agnostic
business model,
independent of
devices and hardware
- No burden of legacy,
enabling a clear focus
on cloud services,
software, and content
- More freedom for
complementors to
innovate on top of
Google technologies
- Google and its
services are loved
by consumers, also
high brand equity
- Business model
largely focused on
B2B licensing of
Office, the world’s
most popular product-
ivity software suite, as
well as other business
apps and services
- Windows Phone
includes Office while
other platforms have
limited functionality
- Microsoft can afford
to waive the license
fee for Windows
Phone
Q2: Success Factors
of Ecosystems
- Healthiest
ecosystem based on
metrics of product-
ivity, robustness, and
niche creation
- Minimal effort req-
uired by developers
- Generic, evolving
functionality and set
features provided
by the OS
- The number of
customers that use
the OS and that are
accessible to devs
- Most likely ecosyst-
em to benefit from
multi-homing
developers
- OEMs benefit from
having a state-of-the-
art mobile OS
platform, essentially
royalty free
- Accessory makers
appreciate that they
can work with
standard interfaces
- Developers value
the openness and non-
restrictive philosophy
in app distribution
- Mobile operators
benefit from the
transition to smart-
phones, fueled by
Android handsets
- Healthy ecosystem
based on metrics of
productivity, robust-
ness, and niche creat.
- Generic, evolving
functionality and set
of features provided
by the OS
- The number of
customers that use
the OS and that are
accessible to devs
- Strong IP portfolio
to defend own OS,
also enabling value
extraction from
rivaling ecosystems
- Accessory makers
appreciate that they
can work with
standard interfaces
- Minimal effort req-
uired by developers
- Harmful crowding-
out effects less likely
to occur in app
marketplace
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Table 4.6: Overview of results obtained for research questions – part II
Research Question Apple and the iOS
ecosystem
Google and the
Android ecosystem
Microsoft and the
Windows Phone
ecosystem
Q3: Success Factors
of Platforms
- Keeping the plat-
form provider and
sponsor roles closed
helps keep fragment-
ation in check, but
may limit market
share growth
- High degree of
vertical integration
through exclusive
ownership of all core
elements in the
value network, full
control of the
publishing process,
and a strong in-
fluence on external
complementors
and providers
- Differentiating or
proprietary IP based
software components
are kept closed
source
- The platform ex-
poses enough APIs
so that OEMs, acc-
essory makers, and
developers are able
to create products
and apps with mean-
ingful differentiation
- Being open with
regard to end users,
developers, platform
providers, and plat-
form sponsors enables
a high degree of open
innovation, but may
lead to severe
fragmentation
- Non-exclusive
process of application
development, verific-
ation, and publishing
- Differentiating or
proprietary IP based
software components
are kept closed
source
- The platform ex-
poses enough APIs
so that OEMs, acc-
essory makers, and
developers are able
to create products
and apps with mean-
ingful differentiation
- The platform has
the most nonrestrict-
ive policy for comple-
mentors, not limited
by protective clauses
against competition
or substitution
- Keeping the plat-
form provider and
sponsor roles closed
helps keep fragment-
ation in check, but
may limit market
share growth
- Differentiating or
proprietary IP based
software components
are kept closed
source
- The platform ex-
poses enough APIs
so that OEMs, acc-
essory makers, and
developers are able
to create products
and apps with mean-
ingful differentiation
Q4: Commonalities
between Successful
Platform Management
and Ecosystem
Orchestration
- Keeping the plat-
form provider and
sponsor roles closed
helps keep fragment-
ation in check, but
may limit market
share growth
- Success factors
stemming from the
angle of entry and
business model
- Being open with
regard to end users,
developers, platform
providers, and plat-
form sponsors enables
a high degree of open
innovation, but may
lead to severe
fragmentation
- Success factors
stemming from the
angle of entry and
business model
- Keeping the plat-
form provider and
sponsor roles closed
helps keep fragment-
ation in check, but
may limit market
share growth
- Success factors
stemming from the
angle of entry and
business model
Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 Discussion of the Results
The high-level goal of this study was to identify common success factors in
leading mobile business ecosystems, specifically those led by the three compa-
nies that were chosen for a multiple case study: Apple, Google, and Microsoft.
The reason for choosing exactly these companies was that each of them has
historically been active in different businesses outside the traditional telecom-
munications industry before successfully entering, and as of late, dominating
the smartphone business, pushing aside long-standing incumbents with roots
in the telecommunications equipment industry. Here, ‘success’, although it
could be defined in many ways, simply refers to the ability of a firm to estab-
lish itself in a new business domain previously dominated by incumbents such
as Nokia and BlackBerry, and to create a sustainable ecosystem of complemen-
tary products and innovation around itself. As we have seen, this is clearly
true for at least the Google Android and Apple iOS ecosystems. Therefore,
identifying and understanding the various success factors that have led to such
a major, unprecedented change in the industry and market structure, being
able to learn from them and create guidelines for strategic decision-making
based on them was the practical goal of this study.
From a theoretical perspective, as discussed, very few researchers have at-
tempted to bring together the separate but interrelated theories of platforms,
two-sided markets, and business ecosystems, despite the fact that these con-
cepts largely describe similar phenomena and underlying mechanisms, even if
from somewhat different perspectives. Thus, bridging the different theoretical
concepts with notable similarities and making sense of them in a holistic way
was also a key purpose of the study. This is essentially what I have done,
bringing together and, where possible, reconciling the latest research in the
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above-mentioned fields, combining their key elements in a holistic conceptual
framework that I hoped would capture the essential dimensions of analysis
for the comprehensive study of mobile business ecosystems and their success
factors, the research problem at hand.
Also interestingly, very few researchers have attempted to explain the changes
in the smartphone industry structure using the theory of path dependence,
drawing on analysis of past events and decisions and their impact on the
present. Already before doing any actual research, my hypothesis was that
the ‘angle of entry’ of a firm could at least partially be used to explain some of
the ecosystem or platform related success factors. This hypothesis essentially
became the first research question (How do a firm’s legacy and angle of entry
into the mobile business affect the success factors of its ecosystem? ), and I was
able to validate it through the case studies. The success factors influenced by
the angle of entry of each case company were discussed in Section 4.4.1.
5.1.1 Practical Contribution of the Study
Based on the synthesis of the three case studies conducted, the success factors
identified for ecosystems and platforms, or commonly for both, were discussed
in Sections 4.4.2, 4.4.3, and 4.4.4, grouping together identical or similar success
factors across the three case companies and their ecosystems. Based on this
grouping, the common success factors, eight of them in total (CSF1–CSF8),
were evaluated by me as either ‘confirmed’ (CSF7 and CSF8), when all three
ecosystems or platforms clearly exhibited them, or as ‘partially confirmed’
(CSF1–CSF6), when two ecosystems or platforms exhibited them. The com-
mon success factors were summarized in Table 4.4, and the long list of success
factors was presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6.
I argue that partially confirmed success factors are no less relevant and im-
pactful than the confirmed ones, but their generalizability may be subject to
certain preconditions relating to the business model of the ecosystem leader
or the structure of the ecosystem under analysis. Such success factors may
therefore be valid for many but not all mobile business ecosystems. It is also
quite possible that they are just as valid as the confirmed success factors, but
the relatively limited set of three case studies included in my study was insuffi-
cient to confirm this. Getting further confirmation for the partially confirmed
success factors would be a natural continuation of the study.
Looking at the theoretical background and the analysis framework that I de-
vised based on existing theory according to the research process discussed in
Section 1.4.1 and illustrated in Figure 1.3, it is interesting to note that I was
indeed able to get some expected results (CSF2) from the case studies with
regard to the theory of ecosystem health by Iansiti & Levien (2004a,b), and I
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was also able to (partially) confirm the success factors for OS-centric software
ecosystems (CSF3–CSF5) defined by Bosch (2009) as being applicable to the
mobile software ecosystems of the three case companies, iOS qualifying for all
three success factors and Android and Windows Phone for two. From this
simplified perspective, the much weaker market position of Windows Phone
compared to iOS and Android may seem anomalous, but closer analysis of
the situation reveals that Windows Phone has had problems in multiple areas,
also evident in the ecosystem health evaluation illustrated in Table 4.1, but
especially in the area of sustainably attracting consumers to the devices, which
would lead to the build-up of a credible installed base, which in turn would
sustainably attract developers to the platform. Microsoft, however, is going
the opposite route, paying substantial subsidies to get developers on board for
the most important apps in the hopes of attracting consumers and driving the
sales of the devices up, but at least so far, the results have been nothing to
cheer about.
What has received little attention so far, and what I consider to be a significant
finding, is that all three mobile business ecosystems rely on closed source code
and other control-oriented policies in the management of their OS platforms
and the OEM licensees using those platforms (excluding Apple, who does not
license out iOS). Even Google is increasingly using closed source code in the
Android ecosystem to separate key apps and services from the open-source
AOSP, this already being the case for the most well-known Google-branded
services as well as the Google Play store. Thus, the common success factor
CSF7 (the software components of the platform that meaningfully differentiate
it from the competition or otherwise create significant added value based on
proprietary IP are kept closed source) is confirmed and the conclusion to be
drawn is that while an open source approach definitely has advantages in
fostering open innovation, platform leaders in the smartphone business also
need closed source to be successful, despite exemplary efforts by Google to
provide an open-source mobile OS free of charge.
A second finding is that all three mobile business ecosystems, or rather all
three platforms, expose enough APIs so that OEMs, accessory makers, and
developers are able to create products and apps with meaningful differentiation
(CSF8). This may seem obvious now, but originally, Apple under Steve Jobs
did not plan to release a third-party SDK for the iPhone at all, and many
past mobile OS platforms, like Symbian, have been notoriously difficult to
develop for. Also Windows Phone, when it was first released, lacked many key
APIs severely limiting app developers’ access to device functionality, one of
the reasons why it has been such a rocky road for the platform.
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5.1.2 Theoretical Contribution of the Study
The theoretical concept of ‘angle of entry’ in the context of the historical legacy
and path-dependent evolution of a firm’s previous business activities, capabili-
ties, and assets having an impact on more recent choices and decisions the firm
has made in its ecosystem and platform strategies is my original contribution,
although it builds on the basic concepts of path dependency theory as defined
and elaborated on by David (1985, 1994, 2001), Arthur (1989), and Liebowitz
& Margolis (1995a) among other authors. In this study, I have successfully
applied angle of entry to the analysis of the three case companies in the spe-
cific industry context of smartphone business, allowing me to better structure
and visualize the findings that specifically relate to the companies’ decisions
stemming from their historical legacy and path-dependent evolution. The an-
gle of entry, being clearly different for each of the three case companies, also
served as a key criterion for the selection of the companies, proving its utility
for this purpose. Yet, I haven’t applied the concept to other industry contexts
or research settings and cannot argue for its usefulness in such cases. Never-
theless, I see the concept as a promising tool for analysis of path-dependent
strategies and decision-making.
Furthermore, the holistic analysis framework presented in Chapter 3 brings
together and builds upon many existing theoretical concepts and frameworks
such as platforms, two-sided markets, and business ecosystems, hitherto largely
treated separately by the research community, capturing both firm-level and
ecosystem-level factors that enable value-adding complementary innovation in
a thriving, vibrant ecosystem. This analysis framework proved out to be effec-
tive in getting answers to the research questions of this study and could easily
be applied to other studies of similar scope, yielding even more insights.
5.2 Reliability and Validity of the Results
The vast majority of the descriptive data used in the case studies is collected
from publicly available sources on the Internet. This naturally implies at least
some level of uncertainty, as many articles and news stories are authored and
published on the Internet with quite relaxed criteria for scientific rigor and
accuracy. Furthermore, articles in many industry expert communities and
blogs do reflect, at least partially, the opinions and attitudes of their authors,
although for the most part, they are often highly informative and factual. I
have exercised the proper level of criticism when using such sources, typically
having sought secondary confirmation for important pieces of information.
In the case of press releases, public announcements, and annual reports issued
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by corporations listed on stock exchanges in the United States or elsewhere,
however, we can be reasonably sure that the information is both reliable, as
this is typically mandated by legal requirements, and valid, as the firm in
question arguably knows well how to measure and report metrics related to
its business. We can expect a fairly good level of reliability and validity also
for white papers issued by firms on topics that are closely related to their
business, although the role of commercial white papers in B2B marketing is
fully recognized, and therefore, the need to consider potential biases in such
publications is apparent.
Reports issued by companies offering market research and industry advisory
services usually have good validity, as the firms have well-established method-
ologies and practices for tracking, analyzing, and reporting on the phenomena
that they study, as it is at the core of their business. Reliability is typically
also good, as the large number of iterations in recurring reports that have been
published over the years has contributed to the accuracy. However, for some
newer metrics that have not yet been tracked and analyzed for an extensive
period of time, caution and judgment need to be exercised, as there may not
yet be enough historical data to draw far-reaching conclusions based on them.
To avoid this problem, the individual components of the analysis framework
presented in Chapter 3 are thoroughly grounded in scientific publications most
of which are widely recognized and cited in the scientific community. Hence,
the metrics used in the analysis of the case companies are well-established in
research and their reliability and validity, supported by a broad, comprehen-
sive set of descriptive data on the case companies, is justified.
Additionally, I acknowledge my use of tacit knowledge and intuition gained
through working in a strategic advisory and management role in the ICT
industry for nearly a decade, and my continued interest in the dynamics of
networked business. It would be impossible to find proper references for all
this accumulated knowledge, but where possible, Appendix A is used for listing
references that are not scientific per se but provide valuable insight into a topic.
5.3 Managerial Implications
The strategic management of firms operating in a networked economy or busi-
ness ecosystems is considerably more complex than of most firms operating
in traditional industries. The fact that the value creation of a firm may be
highly dependent on the firm’s relationships with other firms, possibly even
more than on tangible assets and resources, has added a significant amount
of complexity to the problems that firm executives and managers face in their
management processes, particularly in strategic and product-related decision-
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making. As argued by Dyer & Singh (1998), the critical resources of a firm
may extend beyond its boundaries and those resources may be embedded in
interfirm routines and processes. Moreover, firms that make relation-specific
investments and combine resources in unique ways may realize an advantage
over competing firms unable or unwilling to do so. Thus, the network of re-
lationships in which a firm is embedded is a key determinant of competitive
advantage for that firm.
Individually maximizing behavior of firms, typically aiming to maximize profit,
revenue growth, or other key financial performance indicators, is not leading to
optimal results for firms operating in business ecosystems, at least not in the
long run. As Moore (1993, 1996) argues, traditional models of management,
based on product and service competition and process improvement are neces-
sary but no longer sufficient for firms to survive in a modern, rapidly evolving
business environment. It is essential for managers to pay close attention to
the economic environments of their firms as well as to other firms influencing
their evolution.
The related paradigm of systems thinking necessitates seeing a firm as part
of a wider economic ecosystem and environment where it influences — and is
influenced by — other firms. Firms within a business ecosystem coevolve capa-
bilities around innovations, working both cooperatively and competitively to
support new products, satisfy customers, and incorporate the following round
of innovations. Special firms in ecosystems, keystones, act in a leadership role
that is valued by the rest of the community, promoting the health and renewal
of the ecosystem through sustained innovation, while keeping harmful domi-
nators in check. Keystones enable all ecosystem participants to invest toward
a shared future in which they anticipate profiting together. Thus, a keystone
has to advance the overall good of the ecosystem, as opposed to overpowering
it and/or draining all value out of it.
In this study, I have focused specifically on mobile business ecosystems and the
smartphone business, and I have come up with a set of common success fac-
tors for such ecosystems, summarized in Table 4.4. Having an understanding
of these success factors and their underlying preconditions should guide the
strategic decision-making of executives at any company aspiring to become a
significant player in the smartphone business, either as a platform provider or
as the leader of a wider business ecosystem. They may be valuable for compa-
nies aspiring to take on lesser roles in the existing mobile business ecosystems
as well. It is important to note, however, that it is by no means guaranteed
that a firm will sufficiently achieve success for itself or its ecosystem by striv-
ing to possess only these success factors — the list is not meant to be fully
exhaustive based on this study alone. Additional success factors not discussed
in this study may well be required. Not possessing the common success factors
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identified in this study is, however, likely to significantly reduce the chances
of success for any aspiring ecosystem or platform leader, so striving to possess
them should be a priority.
5.4 Suggestions for Further Research
Three extensive case studies were included in this study, allowing me to iden-
tify eight common success factors for the orchestration of ecosystems and man-
agement of platforms. Two of these success factors could be reasonably con-
firmed, whereas the other six were partially confirmed, not yielding conclusive
results about their generalizability. As said, getting further confirmation for
the partially confirmed success factors would be a natural continuation of this
study, likely involving at least additional case studies (e.g., Samsung, Huawei,
Lenovo, or even Xiaomi) and perhaps even more detailed measurement and
analysis of the relevant metrics related to the success factors to be confirmed.
The analysis framework developed as part of this study should be valid also
for the extended research, although it would be prudent to consider including
the findings of any new research on platforms, two-sided markets, or business
ecosystems into the framework as seen fit.
Another possible research path would be to develop the concept of ‘angle of
entry’ further, validating its applicability in other industry contexts. Such
studies would not need to be set in the mobile or CE industry at all, as long
as enough information is publicly available on the historical legacy and key
decisions made by the firms under analysis over the course of their existence.
For purposes of confirming the success factors discovered in this study and
perhaps identifying some additional ones, it would be interesting to study
not only firms whose primary business is smartphones but also firms from
adjacent but partially overlapping industries such as Amazon (online retailer
and e-commerce platform) and Facebook (the most popular social network in
the world).
Furthermore, to achieve better coverage of three generic angles of entry identi-
fied in Figure 1.2, namely traditional telecommunications equipment manufac-
turers, mobile operators, and web browser makers, companies such as Black-
Berry, Vodafone, Verizon Wireless, China Mobile, certain Japanese operators
as well as past joint initiatives such as WAC could be interesting subjects
for further study, even if their current relevance is limited. The prolifera-
tion of HTML5 and other web technologies remains a field to be closely fol-
lowed, as large multinational network operators like Telefónica and Deutsche
Telekom appear to be promoting alternative platforms and ecosystems based
on HTML5, Firefox OS most notably. Most operators would like to see a viable
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third ecosystem emerge beside Android and iOS, giving them more bargaining
power with respect to their handset suppliers and also more choice for their
customers.
At least so far, Windows Phone has been unable to fulfill this role, and Mi-
crosoft’s closed platform policy coupled with the company’s desire to own the
customer relationship and data through the Microsoft account goes against the
similar interests of some operators, not to mention the integration of Skype in
Windows Phone upsetting operators fighting OTT services eating into their
revenue. As Apple cuts off revenue and consumer touchpoints from the opera-
tors in even more ways than Microsoft, the Android ecosystem and its handset
OEMs remain the only even remotely operator-friendly alternative, but oper-
ators nevertheless see Google as a potential threat to their business, turning
excess reliance on Android into a vulnerability.
Thus, an alternative open mobile platform like Firefox OS developed by the
neutral, non-profit Mozilla Foundation would allow operators to reduce their
dependence on Android and perhaps also regain part of the power they once
had in mobile application discovery and distribution. However, Firefox OS
faces the challenge that any other platform faces: getting enough end users
and developers on board to establish and sustain a healthy ecosystem enabling
complementary innovation and viable business for all ecosystem participants.
Both same-side and cross-side network effects, the latter particularly impor-
tant to two or multi-sided platforms, play a decisive role in the adoption pro-
cess. Incentives and subsidies have been the traditional way to drive adoption,
but as the case of Windows Phone shows, sometimes this may not be enough
if the ecosystem lacks critical success factors. Therefore, it would be very
interesting to study the success factors specifically related to HTML5-based
mobile application platforms.
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